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In line with a movement across all areas of health concerned with chronic illness, 
self-management practices have become an important part of what it means to 
provide contemporary mental health care to people with the psychiatric diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder. In mental health settings it is a taken-for-granted practice. The aim 
of this thesis is to use Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to explore how the discursive 
practices of self-management for bipolar disorder produce particular forms of 
subjectivity for those understood to have the condition and the implications of this 
for processes of self-formation.  
In order to consider how discourse is used to both govern others and govern the self, 
two sources of text are used for analysis. The first source is the Psychoeducation 
Manual for Bipolar Disorder (Colom & Vieta, 2006) which details how mental health 
professionals can teach people with bipolar disorder about their condition in order 
that they might better manage themselves. The questions guiding the analysis of this 
text as how discourse constructs bipolar as an object, what subject positions it makes 
available and what relationship people are expected to have with the object named as 
bipolar disorder. 
The second source of text are the transcripts of semi-structured interviews 
completed with 25 people with bipolar disorder as part of their entry to a clinical 
trial of psychotherapy and medication management as a means to reduce rates of 
acute psychiatric assessment and hospitalization. Analysis of these texts is concerned 
with how discourse is used to govern the self and is developed in a two stage process. 
The analysis is guided firstly by questions that ask how bipolar disorder is 
constructed, how is self-management constructed as an object, how is life with 
bipolar disorder constructed and what discourses are drawn on the process. The 
second stage of analysis of these texts focuses on the subject positions being made 
available in self-management discourse. 
This analysis finds that as an object, bipolar disorder is constructed as both an illness 
of the brain and an object the produces an unreliable mind such that it is an object 
that is separate from a person’s sense of self while also being an object that interferes 
with the mind’s capacity to know itself. This results in persistent tensions to be 
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negotiated within self-management practices such that self-management discourse 
produces subject positions characterised by dividing practices and contradiction. 
The discourses of medicine and psychology can be seen to act to tightly regulate how 
bipolar disorder can be understood which results in all aspects of a person’s self 
being shaped by the condition they are understood have. These discourses have 
become the only way a person can legitimately construct a sense of themselves and 
through the workings of pastoral styles of power relationships psychological 
discourse can be seen to be used ultimately in the service of medical discourse. 
With self-management discourse seen as operating on the basis of division and 
contradiction, this thesis proposes that the nature of the problem in the self-
management of bipolar disorder is not the disorder or the person it is understood to 
inhabit but rather the norms of the self on which contemporary Western society 
bases its understanding of what it means to be a normal subject. The thesis concludes 
firstly with two alternate constructions of selfhood; the self as formed through 
connection and the self as formed through the management of the abject and then 
with a proposal for an alternate approach to psychoeducation as a particular strategy 
of self-management discourse for bipolar disorder. 
The significance of this thesis lies in its use of a Foucauldian methodology to question 
the assumptions of beneficence understood to drive the promulgation of self-
management practices in health care. Its resulting re-evaluation of the nature of the 
self in the discursive practices of self-management for bipolar disorder and its 
proposal for an alternate approach to psychoeducation is put forward as a 
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“There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think different 
than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if 
one is to go on looking and reflecting at all.” (Foucault, 1990b, p. 8) 
 
Self-management practices have become an important part of what it means to 
provide contemporary mental health care to people with the condition known as 
bipolar disorder (Bond & Anderson, 2015; Morriss, Faizal, Jones, Williamson, Bolton, 
& McCarthy, 2007; Russell & Browne, 2005; Straughan & Buckenham, 2006; Vieta, 
2005; Yatham, Kennedy, Parikh, Schaffer, Beaulieu, Alda, O’Donovan, MacQueen, 
McIntyre, Sharma, Ravindran, Young, Milev, Bond, Frey, Goldstein, Lafer, Birmaher, 
Ha, Nolen, & Berk, 2013). Most commonly defined as “the individual’s ability to 
manage the symptoms, treatment, physical and psychosocial consequences and life 
style changes inherent in living with a chronic condition” (Barlow, Wright, Sheasby, 
Turner, & Hainsworth, 2002, p. 178), it can be seen as both an expression of the 
growing attention to the psychosocial needs of people who are understood to have a 
chronic relapsing condition and as a reflection of a movement across all health arenas 
toward a construction of chronic illnesses in all their forms as escalating in 
prevalence and burdening health services with ever growing costs (Carrier, 2015; 
Kemp, 2011; Ministry of Health, 2014; National Health Committee, 2007; New 
Zealand Guidelines Group, 2011). 
This concern with a person’s ability to manage a life with what is variously called a 
chronic illness or a long-term health condition has seen the development of 
structured and manualized health education programmes that seek to teach a person 
about their illness, how to manage the symptoms, limit relapse and cope with the 
difficulties that arise from having to accommodate a long-term health condition. The 
work of Lorig and her colleagues in the USA (Lorig & Holman, 2003; Lorig, Ritter, 
Stewart, Sobel, Brown, Bandura, Gonzalez, Laurent, & Holman, 2001) on the Chronic 
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Disease Self-Management Program has had a particular influence upon the 
development of techniques to teach people what they need to know in order to 
become a better ‘self-managers’ of their condition. This work has had an international 
influence upon health systems with it being taken up in UK health policy with its 
‘Expert Patient’ model of care for chronic disease (Department of Health, 2001), in 
Australian health services (Catalano, Kendall, Vandenberg, & Hunter, 2009) and 
further developed by Flinders University in Australia (Lawn, Battersby, Pols, 
Lawrence, Parry, & Urukalo, 2007). 
In New Zealand, it has been the responsibility of each regional District Health Board 
to develop their own response to chronic conditions rather than a government led 
health policy such as in the UK (National Health Committee, 2007).  Despite this, the 
documents that are available to guide the development of health services that are 
responsive to the needs of people with long-term health conditions all emphasise the 
importance of systems that prioritise self-management.  
“A mounting body of evidence supports the notion that if a person with a long-
term condition is a good self-manager then, in the context of a structured CCM 
[Chronic Conditions Management] programme, they are more likely to 
experience an increased sense of wellbeing, improved health outcomes and 
decreased secondary care utilisation.” (Connolly, Barber, Clinton, Devlin, 
Doughty, Dyall, Kenealy, Kerse, Kolbe, Lawrenson, Moffitt, Sheridan, 
Johnstone, Girling, & Boyd, 2011, p. 26) 
Within mental health settings, self-management practices can be seen to be 
implemented through a range of programmes and strategies that are concerned with 
teaching people how to manage their illness. The work of Lorig et al (Lorig & Holman, 
2003; Lorig et al., 2001) on the Chronic Disease Self-Management model has been 
adapted for mental health settings through such programmes as HARP (Druss, Zhao, 
von Esenwein, Bona, Fricks, Jenkins-Tucker, Sterling, Diclemente, & Lorig, 2010) and 
in the approaches detailed by both Lawn (2007) and Urukalo (2003). 
Psychoeducation groups have been developed for people with specific mental 
disorders (Bauml, Frobose, Kraemer, Rentrop, & Pitschel-Walz, 2006; Colom & Lam, 
2005; Terkselsen, 2009) and it is Colom and Vieta (Colom & Vieta, 2006; Colom, Vieta, 
Martinez-Aran, Reinares, Goikolea, Benabarre, Torrent, Comes, Corbella, Parramon, & 
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Corominas, 2003a; Colom, Vieta, Sanchez-Moreno, Goikolea, Popova, Bonnin, & Scott, 
2009) who are particularly known for their work in this area in relation to bipolar 
disorder. In addition there are programmes that teach skills in relapse prevention 
(Stevens & Sin, 2005), Stern and Sin’s (2012)psychosocial group programme, 
Wellness Recovery Action Planning (WRAP) (Cook, Copeland, Jonikas, Hamilton, 
Razzano, Grey, Floyd, Hudson, Macfarlane, Carter, & Boyd, 2012; Copeland & McKay, 
2002), Illness Management and Recovery program (Mueser, Corrigan, Hilton, 
Tanzman, Schaub, Gingerich, Essock, Tarrier, Morey, Vogel-Scibilia, & Herz, 2002; 
Mueser, Meyer, Penn, Clancy, Clancy, & Salyers, 2006), and the Life Goals Program 
(Sajatovic, Davies, Bauer, McBride, Hays, Safavi, & Jenkins, 2005; Simon, Ludman, 
Unutzer, & Bauer, 2002); all programmes that seek to take the expertise of 
psychiatric and psychological experts and teach people how to better manage their 
illness. While most of these programmes are led by health professionals, some like 
WRAP (Cook et al., 2012; Copeland & McKay, 2002), and HARP (Druss et al., 2010) 
are led by peers i.e. people who identify as also living with a mental illness. This 
promotion of the self-managing capacities of a person understood to have a mental 
disorder is now considered ‘state of the art’ practice in mental health care (Kemp, 
2011; Morriss et al., 2007; Russell & Browne, 2005; Straughan & Buckenham, 2006; 
Vieta, 2005). 
Despite its status as a marker of contemporary mental health practice, self-
management practices in a mental health context are a generally uncontested 
construct. It is as if they have taken on a ‘common sense’ status that has resulted in 
questions rarely being asked of self-management policy or practices. This 
introductory chapter seeks to highlight some of the cultural and social forces that 
shape how both self-management and bipolar disorder are constructed and the 
resulting assumptions that are made about the nature of the people expected to 
engage in these practices. After first considering some of the critiques of self-
management practices and policy that do exist in the literature, social theories of 
individualization and trends in contemporary health care named as surveillance 
medicine are both used to explore some of the cultural and social forces shaping how 
self-management can be spoken of. Following this, consideration is given to how 
bipolar disorder is constructed and the place of self-management practices within 
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this. The chapter then makes a case for using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis as a 
means to investigate the discursive practices of self-management for bipolar disorder 
with a focus upon how they then shape how a person with bipolar disorder comes to 
make sense of themselves. 
Critiques of Self-Management 
While self-management is generally an uncontested construct within mental health 
settings and for bipolar disorder specifically, it is critiqued by some authors as part of 
a broader debate about how to manage chronic illness in health systems more 
effectively. The criticisms levelled at self-management primarily arise from the way a 
medical discourse of illness dominates how self-management is thought of and 
practiced and these are now addressed in turn. 
As a construct based upon a medical model, self-management is seen as privileging a 
focus upon the individual with the illness as the ‘problem’. This results in the ‘answer’ 
to the problem becoming how to educate the individual to follow medical advice and 
develop the necessary skills to follow such advice (Thirsk & Clark, 2014; Thorne, 
2008; Wilson, Kendall, & Brooks, 2007). This attention upon the individual’s lack of 
skills and knowledge as the focus of self-management is argued to lead on to a 
tendency to ignore both the moral qualities within it and the social and cultural 
context within which it is practiced. Williams (1993) argues that the construction of 
health as something that comes about as a result of one’s virtuous actions upon 
oneself is a well-developed notion therefore there are routinely, but not necessarily 
explicitly, moral qualities to how people engage with health practices. Lorig et al’s 
(2003; 2001; Marks, Allegrante, & Lorig, 2005) work on Chronic Disease Self-
Management is further argued by Bury (2010) to take the sociological work of Corbin 
and Strauss (1988) and their observations of how people with chronic illness live, 
and transform ideas about what people do into ideas about what people should do. 
When this operates in tandem with a focus upon an individual’s lack of ability to self-
manage, poor health runs the risk of being attributed to a problem within the person, 
most particularly their lack of personal responsibility (Kendall, Ehrlich, Sunderland, 
Muenchberger, & Rushton, 2011). 
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The attention of self-management discourse upon an individual’s deficit that needs to 
be rectified results in a moral quality to the practice but it also results in self-
management policy and practices as themselves lacking in an appreciation of the 
social and cultural context of people’s experiences of living with a long-term health 
condition (Howard & Ceci, 2013; Lindsay, 2008, 2009) such that self-management 
policy and practice is critiqued for underestimating the conditions that make self-
management impossible (Kendall et al., 2011). Thorne (2008) argues that in the 
move in health care from constructs of cure to ideas of stewardship, actions cannot 
be separated social factors yet self-management remains steadfastly focused on 
expert driven definitions. 
Self-management policy and practices are also criticised for a tendency to take a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach where it becomes assumed that it is an approach that always 
works for all people. Any difficulty negotiating self-management practices becomes a 
problem that belongs to the person rather than the practices themselves as individual 
responsibility for health is assumed to be a universal and culturally transferable 
norm (Kennedy & Rogers, 2009). 
While self-management is concerned with the skills, knowledge and confidence of 
people with long-term health conditions, it also becomes concerned with the 
promotion of certain sorts of people; how to teach people to see themselves as 
autonomous, active, and confident decisions makers who can follow medical advice. 
The literature that critiques self-management also draws attention to its effect upon 
identity and sense of self. From their work with older people who live with asthma, 
Koch et al (2004) draw attention to how the ‘self’ in self-management is ignored as a 
result of the domination of a medical discourse of adherence to medical advice. 
Despite the attractiveness of the notions of empowerment that are attached to 
contemporary health care practices and self-management in particular (Paterson, 
2001; Salmon & Hall, 2003; Wilson et al., 2007), Koch’s (2004) work suggests that 
there is limited opportunity for the person with a chronic condition to be positioned 
as an expert in their own right who chooses to use medical knowledge and skills to 
augment their own. In a similar vein, by focussing on how older people with arthritis 
talk about their experiences of living with a chronic condition, Kralik et al (2004) 
draw attention to the way self-management practices involve both ‘doing’ and 
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‘becoming’ such that actions that manage an illness cannot be separated from how 
one comes to see oneself.  
Moore et al (2015) argue that the imperative within self-management practices for 
people with heart disease focused upon the development of success, skills and self-
control brings normative and moral notions to self-management such that it 
promotes subjectivities based upon either success or failure. This construction of 
deficit based identities through the very programme designed to give people greater 
agency is a potential that is also identified by Scott & Wilson (2011) in their critique 
of Wellness Recovery Action Planning; a programme that was developed by people 
who identify as experiencing mental health problems rather than by health 
professionals. Rogers et al (2005) identify how a Chronic Disease Self-Management 
programme assumes that norms of individualism, self –control, responsibility and 
autonomy are transferable across culture and social context. As a result of the norms 
that self-management operates under, Kendall et al (2011) argue that self-
management has the potential to contribute to health inequalities through the way 
that people become disenfranchised as a result of their positioning as people in need 
of instruction by experts regardless of their cultural or social context. 
Overall, these critiques of self-management policy and practices draw attention to the 
view that it can be seen as “…an oxymoronic phrase that neither reflects the 
complexities of how disease is truly managed nor how humans actually behave” 
(Thirsk & Clark, 2014, p. 692). It would seem likely that this concern is as relevant to 
self-management practice focused on mental health conditions as it is to physical 
health conditions. 
This importance now placed upon the promotion of a person’s ability to engage in 
self-management of their chronic condition whether it is of the mind or of the body 
can be seen to have come about from the confluence of a number of social and 
cultural factors to which this discussion now turns as a way to understand some of 
the broader social forces that make it possible to think that self-management is a 




Processes of Individualization 
Constructing members of society as individuals can be seen to have become the 
trademark of modern life where “the choosing, deciding, shaping human being who 
aspires to be the author of his or her own life, the creator of an individual identity, is 
the central character of our time.” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 23).  Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim (2002) argue that contemporary western society can be seen to be 
characterised by the disintegration of ways of life shaped by industrialized societies 
where notions of class shaped family structure, gender roles, education and 
employment. In this mode of life social categories could be relied upon to guide how 
life should and could be lived. The old rules of society were shaped around categories 
of social class, and as such, compelled people into togetherness (Beck, Giddens, & 
Lash, 1994). In the context of the welfare state in western societies there has been 
abrupt change in modes of life. Social class, gender and religion no longer offer the 
certainty of how to live and institutions of welfare and employment act against family 
cohesion and prioritise the individual recipient. Contemporary society is 
characterised by a life “tied to a network of regulations, conditions and provisos” 
(Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 2); from education, employment and welfare 
regulations to every day rules of car warrant of fitness, and refuse disposal. These 
regulations are not imposed through strong prohibitions to action as was the case in 
traditional and industrial societies but rather individuals are incentivised to take 
action for themselves as social advantage and disadvantage are no longer something 
a person is born into, rather they are something that an individual creates for 
themselves with greater or lesser degrees of success in the context of constant 
change and risk.  
The globalization of life creates a need to live with constant movement in time and 
place. People communicate across the globe, spend a life in cars, trains and 
aeroplanes, and are parts of communities that are local, regional and virtual. The 
decisions and options for how to live one’s life are now open to worldwide influences. 
In parallel, society is also constructed as in a period of transition; moving from 
modern industrialisation with its certainty, optimism and belief in the rational action 
of Enlightenment ideals into a period of concern with uncertainty and risk, and 
becoming a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992). Instead of an early modern focus on problems 
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with production and distribution of wealth and human progress through science, 
contemporary debates are focused on issues of risk alongside a recognition that 
scientific knowledge raises more questions than it can easily answer (Lupton, 1999). 
A person is now constructed as an individual who, with the assistance of institutional 
structures, is called upon to see themselves as the one who plans, acts, and designs 
their own life. This making of one’s life through daily choices of how to be is 
understood as a process based upon compulsion such that it is now constructed as a 
necessity of modern life to create one’s own lifestyle and ensure that this lifestyle 
always works with risk and the possibility of failure. Calculation is required as daily 
decisions must be made without the certainty of knowing the ‘right’ decision 
(Giddens, 1991).   
Elliott (2016) argues that in living in a global age of individualism, ones’ individuality 
is not what is important but rather one’s capacity to instantly transform and reinvent 
oneself. This is enacted through practices of consumerism that promote notions of 
instant gratification and a “fantasy of the self’s infinite plasticity” (p43) such that 
people are judged not by what they have achieved but by their capacity for flexibility 
and speed of transformation. If people are to succeed within contemporary society 
they are constructed as needing to be both enterprising and flexible; able to adapt, 
accept defeat, tolerate frustration and be able to start again. The consequences of 
lifestyle become one’s own such that social problems turn into problems of the 
psychological disposition within the individual which therefore require personal 
solutions rather than changes in social structures (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; 
Elliott, 2016). 
With successful living in contemporary society constructed as requiring calculating 
individuals focused on reinvention it also constructs individuals as having the 
capacity to be reflexive; people with the ability to understand and respond to ever 
changing information in an on-going cycle and the continuous revision of how to be a 
person using the practiced art of self-observation (Giddens, 1991). When constructed 
in this way it is not just life that is the focus of an individual’s reflexivity but also their 
subjectivity. In a society where people are bound to each other through their 




Reflexivity has become the way to know oneself through continuous practices of self-
observation, reflection, choice and change. In contemporary society the individual is 
constructed as having the capacity to make choices reflexively such that “…whatever 
lifestyle the individual chooses to adopt, she or he cannot fail to be aware that other 
choices both could have been, and still could be made.” (Sweetman, 2003, p. 546). 
There becomes an “experimental feel” (Elliott, 2016, p. 45) to what people do as they 
learn to factor in all the different possibilities for how to act. In the midst of this, 
expert knowledge can be turned to help relieve the decisions of how to live one’s life. 
While psychotherapy for example, offers a way to cope with the demands of 
individualization it also encourages this notion of reflexivity as a ‘natural’ way of 
being through the opportunity it offers to practice it. Through the process and 
language of psychotherapy a person constructs a narrative of who they are and what 
their ‘naturally’ choosing self wants for itself (Beck, 2002).  
These processes of individualization in society can be seen to be tied to both neo-
liberal forms of governmentality and the expertise of psychology, psychiatry and 
psychotherapy; what Rose (1998a) refers to as the psy-complex.  With the person 
constructed by neo-liberal ideals as a consumer and the location of all agency in 
conjunction with a market forces approach to health care, the individual is positioned 
as active patient, choosing those services and interventions that will best meet their 
needs (Barnett, Clarke, Cloke, & Malpass, 2008). With health as a commodity, the 
consumer has the right to expect certain standards of service as they would with any 
purchase they make. But once again, with the right to choose comes a responsibility 
for the decisions taken (Brown & Baker, 2012).  
Alongside an understanding of contemporary selves as flexible, adaptable and 
reflexive, Rose (2007) argues that identity is also being shaped by an understanding 
of ourselves as somatic individuals. As biological, molecular and genetic selves we 
have come to understand that we have an obligation to make sense of the risks our 
body faces and to optimise our body for the good of our own health and future 
generations (Rose, 2007). In this construction mental illness, like any other illness, is 
located in the body, and the brain in particular. People with mental illness becomes 
human beings with disordered neurochemicals and while they may not be 
responsible for their condition, they are none-the-less at risk of becoming ill and it is 
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this potential risk that they must make their lifestyle project (Scott & Wilson, 2011; 
Teghtsoonian, 2009). “Citizenship, here as elsewhere, is to be active. Thus the actual 
or potential patients must try to understand his or her depression, to work with his 
or her doctor to obtain the best program of medical care, to engage in self-techniques 
to speed the process of recovery – and, of course, to ask his or her doctor to prescribe 
Prozac by name.” (Rose & Novas, 2005, p. 448). In constructing individuality as 
somatic, the source of illness is primarily assumed to be within the individual’s body 
rather than within a social context. As a result both health and illness become a 
central strand of the biography a person creates for themselves, the outcome of 
which they alone are responsible. Within this particular construction of 
contemporary society, it is perhaps unsurprising that ideas of self-management of 
long-term health conditions should be envisioned as essential; that someone with on-
going health problems, can and should actively manage and choose how to live with 
them. In the words of Lorig and Holman who have been influential in the 
development of the Chronic Disease Self-Management Program at Stanford 
University; “One cannot not manage…Unless one is totally ignorant of healthful 
behaviours it is impossible not to manage ones’ health. The only question is how one 
manages.” (Lorig & Holman, 2003, p. 27).  
This is not to suggest that theories of individualization in a context of risk and 
uncertainty are the only way to understand contemporary social life and the 
opportunities and challenges it presents. As Elliot (2002) argues, by placing risk as 
the central force shaping social life, other cultural and political forces that might be at 
work are not acknowledged. He draws attention to social theories that identify the 
increasing standardization of everyday life and how this suggests an understanding 
of human beings as becoming more regulated rather than more individualized. 
Equally, while tradition may no longer be the primary force that determines how to 
live, this loss does not mean that a complete vacuum exits where we are free to be 
whatever or whomever we choose. The language we use to think and express 
ourselves is full of links to past traditions; while a person may speak of the 
importance of concepts of independence and autonomy that does not mean that this 
same person is not also influenced by narratives of how duty and obligation shaped 
the actions of previous generations (Adams, 2003). Equally while the capacity to be 
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reflexive can be considered an essential element of the individualization thesis, 
reflexivity can also be understood as a form of cultural capital; a capacity that is 
reliant upon a particular cognitive and affective style that is shaped by one’s 
socioeconomic position and therefore not open to all (Scott & Wilson, 2011; 
Threadgold & Nilan, 2009). “People who cannot deploy such resources and 
capabilities…are likely to find themselves further disadvantaged and marginalized in 
a new world order of reflexive modernization” (Elliott, 2002, p. 305). 
Surveillance Medicine 
As theories of individualization suggest trends in our relationship with our selves, the 
concept of surveillance medicine can be used to understand trends in contemporary 
approaches to health and illness. Armstrong (1995) argues that over the course of the 
twentieth century a fundamental shift has occurred in the way illness and health are 
constructed. His ideas offer a way of thinking about self-management practices as an 
expression of a broader change in medical ideas about the nature of health and illness 
and our responses to them. 
Armstrong (1995) describes a series of changes in the way understandings of illness 
and the body have changed since the early eighteenth century. Firstly there was 
Library Medicine in which the classical learning of the physician was more important 
than specific knowledge about an illness. Then came Bedside Medicine as physicians 
began to focus upon the illness itself by attending to categorising of symptoms and 
the practical management of illness. At this time illness and symptoms were 
understood to be one and the same; “a headache or abdominal pain was the illness” 
(Armstrong, 1995, p. 394). Armstrong identifies the appearance of Hospital Medicine 
as an important, revolutionary change in the practice of medicine when at the turn of 
the eighteenth century the clinical examination, the post-mortem and the segregation 
of ill bodies in hospitals allowed the body and illness to be conceived of as three-
dimensional. The symptom presented by the patient was now linked to the sign that 
the physician could find by careful examination and both pointed to an underlying 
lesion that was the disease. While this way of understanding illness has remained 
dominant and still relevant, Armstrong argues that from the early twentieth century 
there was a further revolution in medical thought and practice with a developing 
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concern for measuring and overseeing the health of everyone and what he calls “the 
problematisation of the normal” (Armstrong, 1995, p. 395) where few people are 
understood to be fully healthy as everyone is constructed as being at risk of illness 
and potentially in need of medical intervention. 
This attention to the health of the population is more conventionally understood 
using the term ‘public health’. What started as a focus upon reducing illness by 
attending to the environment through such projects as sewage disposal, provision of 
clean water and good housing, became a concern with the individual’s role in helping 
to stop the spread of illness, the role that the environment plays in illness and by the 
later part of the twentieth century, a recognition of the social and economic 
determinants of health (Dew, 2012). Details of people’s personal habits and domestic 
life were documented and became the focus of instruction in hygienic techniques for 
the maximization of health. This surveillance of the population and their habits saw 
the development of techniques of medical inspection, population surveys, education 
in domestic hygiene, registration of births, health visitors, school milk and infant 
welfare clinics. The child (and the mother as the primary caretaker) became one of 
the primary targets of surveillance and training in the health and hygiene of both 
body and mind (Armstrong, 1995; Rose, 1986).  
Population surveys and the statistics required to analyse them provided the means 
by which health and illness could be measured across large groups and in doing so 
provided the evidence of levels of morbidity beyond what could be known in the 
hospital setting. Tools such as these allowed health and illness to no longer be seen in 
a binary, either/or relationship. Instead bodies could be seen on a continuum with 
health something that was relative amongst all bodies. A continuum allows spaces to 
be seen between people and it is in these spaces that Surveillance Medicine has made 
the case that health and illness is firstly calculable and then secondly “that everyone 
was normal, yet no-one was truly healthy…” (Armstrong, 1995, p. 397) and everyone 
therefore needs the “…benevolent eye of medicine” (Armstrong, 1995, p. 399). With 
this blurring of the distinctions between health and illness, health care has moved 
beyond the hospital to take on the wider population. Much of this extension of health 
care into the community is identified by Armstrong as happening post World War II 
with a transition from older techniques of hygiene into newer techniques of health 
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promotion. As people internalised the messages of health promotion, practices of 
diet, exercise and stress management became the means by which communities could 
monitor and surveil themselves. With health and illness on a continuum there is 
space for both to co-exist and for both to be worked upon.  
In Hospital Medicine signs, symptoms and illness come together so that the body 
becomes three dimensional in which the object of the endeavour is to find the hidden 
illness. In Surveillance Medicine signs, symptoms and illness become re-envisioned as 
risk factors; the object is no longer the discovery of illness that the signs and 
symptoms point to but how the illness acts as a risk factor for the future potential of 
other illnesses in a never ending cascade. The conceptualisation of risk factors 
creates space for possibility and uncertainty as likely illnesses that might result are 
just that, likely but not definite. It is the possibility that becomes problematic with risk 
factors acting as “pointers to a potential, yet unformed, eventuality” (Armstrong, 
1995, p. 402). Risk factors no longer live within the body alone and ideas of ‘lifestyle’ 
become a target for intervention. The idea of a psycho-social space within the person 
becomes important to the notion of risk factors as individual attitudes and beliefs 
become tied to the project of health promotion. As evidenced in the launch of a new 
medical journal in 1955 titled The Journal of Chronic Disease, it also became possible 
to conceptualise illness as something that could not necessarily be cured and that 
would remain a constant presence in a person’s life (Armstrong, 1990). Risk factors 
construct health and illness as potentially calculable uncertainties for everyone while 
chronic illness turns risk factors into actual medical problems that require a focus 
upon the individual.  
This discussion of surveillance medicine provides just one way to consider health 
promotion practices and in particular does not draw attention to the social justice 
discourse within contemporary health promotion and its concern with addressing 
the social determinants of health (Dew, 2012). Despite this limitation, the notion of 
Surveillance Medicine allows a way of thinking about health practices as constructing 
particular relationships between subjectivity, illness, health and expert knowledge. 
The practices and ideas of Surveillance Medicine construct everyone as being at risk 
of illness and potentially in need of medical expertise. A culture of surveillance and 
monitoring becomes an unquestioned part of contemporary health care practice and 
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the calculation of potential risks becomes the domain of expert medical knowledge. 
In the process, some population groups become identified as being more problematic 
than others with more risk factors and higher levels of chronic illness and these 
groups or individuals in turn become the subject of intensified intervention. 
Concepts of individualization, reflexivity, and responsibilization act as a way to make 
sense of contemporary notions of the self while surveillance medicine offers a way to 
make sense of concurrent trends in medicine towards a focus upon everyone being at 
risk of illness and in need of expert attention. Without duty and tradition to guide 
how life is to be lived, it is the individual who must choose how to live and accept the 
consequences for choices made. In the context of risk and uncertainty, the capacity 
for reflexivity becomes assumed as processes of self-monitoring, assessment and 
decision making in the light of ever changing information becomes an essential 
expressions of citizenship. Intensified by an embodied construction of individuality, 
maximising health and limiting the impact of illness becomes constructed as both a 
right and a responsibility held by an individual who is expected to recognise risks to 
their health and appreciate how their actions create costs for health care service who 
must in turn prioritise who they provide care to. Self-management thus becomes an 
exemplar of broader social forces of individualization, reflexivity, and the personal 
surveillance of one’s health in the name of risk and responsibility.  
For people understood to have a mental illness these social forces would seem likely 
to be intensified by the regular attendance in their lives of experts in matters 
psychiatric as the language, ideas and practices of psychiatry are powerful; not least 
for their ability to compel a person to accept treatment for their illness because they 
are perceived as being a risk to themselves or others but also powerful in the sense of 
their ability to produce particular forms of subjectivity (Terkselsen, 2009; Weiner, 
2011). Psychiatry relies upon both talk and medication as its technologies of practice 
and while it is known that medication has side effects that need to be monitored and 
managed, it is perhaps harder to see the side-effects of how psychiatry speaks about 
the objects and subjects that it claims as its own. It is to how psychiatry constructs 
the condition known as bipolar disorder and the place of self-management practices 




Bipolar disorder is one of many conditions over which psychiatry claims to hold 
specialist knowledge. To determine if a person is to enter the realm of psychiatric 
knowledge and expertise a diagnosis must first made. Internationally there are two 
texts that act as the authority in determining if a diagnosis of bipolar disorder is 
justified; the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) published by the World 
Health Organisation of which the current edition is ICD-10(World Health 
Organisation, 2015) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder 
(hence forth referred to as DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association 
of which DSM-5 is the current edition (2013). In Aotearoa New Zealand it is the DSM 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) that dominates the process of psychiatric 
diagnosis (Mellsop, Banzato, Shinfuku, Nagamine, Pereira, & Dutu, 2007). 
Bipolar disorder is constructed as a disorder of mood such that people are 
understood to experience recurrent episodes of abnormal mood and activity levels 
that psychiatry understands as ‘mania’, ‘depression’ and ‘hypomania’. The DSM 
constructs mania as episodes of “abnormally, persistently elevated, expansive or 
irritable mood and persistently increased activity or energy” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, p. 124)  that results in either hospitalization or marked 
impairment in a person’s functioning. Hypomania is constructed as a similar state to 
mania but is understood to be milder and of a lesser intensity such that other people 
do not intervene in a person’s life, either in terms of hospitalisation or stepping in to 
take over a person’s day to day responsibilities. Depression is constructed as periods 
of persistently low mood, often associated with a loss of pleasure in usual activities 
that causes impairment in a person’s day to day functioning. The term ‘mixed state’ is 
used to refer to when a person meets the diagnostic criteria for mania or hypomania 
at the same time as meeting diagnostic criteria for depression (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  
While bipolar disorder is understood to be made up of cyclical, episodic and 
abnormal mood states, the nature of the disorder is further conceptualised as having 
two subtypes; bipolar I and II. The primary difference between the two is that people 
with bipolar I are understood to have had at least one period of mania while those 
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with bipolar II experience hypomania i.e. a less intense version of mania. Bipolar 
disorder has not always been divided by these notions of I and II as it was not until 
1994 that DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) introduced the construct 
of bipolar II disorder. Prior to ‘bipolar disorder’ the term used was ‘manic depression’  
and it is to Emil Kraeplin and his work in the late 19th century that credit is usually 
given for being the first to construct different categories of insanity by 
conceptualising  and separating ‘dementia praecox1’ from ‘manic depressive insanity’ 
(Angst & Sellaro, 2000; Jaeger & Vieta, 2007). Also known as manic depressive 
psychosis, these terms were also used to think of people who experienced 
‘depression’ without mania. By 1980 the DSM III (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980) was using the term bipolar disorder as a means to separately categorize those 
people who experienced ‘depression’ from those people who experienced both 
‘depression’ and ‘mania’. (Liebert, 2013c; Pichot, 1997).  
Currently the DSM frames the prevalence of bipolar disorder as 1.8% of the 
population being likely in a 12 month period to meet the diagnostic criteria. Yet there 
is also concern in the scientific literature that rates of diagnosis have grown 
considerably, particularly in the numbers of people being diagnosed with bipolar II 
for which some suggest there could be a prevalence rates of 10.9% (Angst, Gamma, 
Benazzi, Ajdacic, Eich, & Rossler, 2003; Moreno, Laje, Blanco, Jiang, Schmidt, & Olfson, 
2007). Burrows (2010) argues that rather than this being indicative of an actual 
epidemic of bipolar disorder, this is more an effect of how the DSM constructs mental 
disorder by turning to the concepts of ‘subthreshold’ symptoms (meeting modified or 
reduced numbers of diagnostic criteria) and the ‘spectrum’ model (mental illness and 
health are on a continuous scale) such that the definition of what counts as a mental 
illness is becoming more broad. What has changed is not people’s experiences but 
how they are categorised. In DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) this can 
be seen in the way diagnoses of bipolar disorder are to be accompanied by 
designations of severity as an indication of where on the spectrum of bipolar disorder 
an abnormal mood episode is to be placed; mild, moderate or severe. It can also be 
seen how in addition to the categories of bipolar I and II there is also ‘cyclothymic 
disorder’, ‘substance/medication induced bipolar and related disorder’, ‘bipolar and 
                                                          
1 This term would later be transformed into ‘schizophrenia’. 
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related disorder due to another medical condition’,  ‘other specified bipolar and 
related disorder’ and ‘unspecified bipolar and related disorder’ (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Cylothymia, unspecified bipolar and other specified bipolar 
disorder criteria are all concerned with attributing a diagnosis to experiences that 
would usually be considered subthreshold, or below the criteria already set out for 
depression, mania and hypomania. What was once named as ‘manic depressive 
insanity’ has become divided into a number of different categories and as a 
consequence potentially opened up the likelihood of a person’s experiences being 
deemed pathological. 
As with DSM-III and IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, 1994), the DSM-5  
continues to construct illness on the basis of categories despite recognising the 
limitation of such a method as people may “not fit exactly into the diagnostic 
boundaries of disorders” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 19). For Ian 
Hacking (2007) scientific categorical descriptions don’t necessarily describe 
something real or natural but instead they bring into being a new kind of way that a 
person can be conceived of; he proposes that categories ‘make up’ people which in 
turn has a ‘looping effect’ upon how people see themselves and respond to the 
category under which they have been placed. How people present thus categorized 
then changes the category itself. The implications of categorization for ‘making up’ 
people can be seen in the way that bipolar II disorder came into being in 1994. Prior 
to this the less intense versions of mania that lasted only briefly were not constructed 
as an illness and they were not routinely enquired after by clinicians. Instead people 
were more likely to be categorised as having ‘depression’ (Burrows, 2010). The 
person’s experiences haven’t changed in the intervening time but with the creation of 
bipolar II they can now come to see themselves as a different sort of person. Their 
periods of elation, busyness and productivity are now not a natural response to the 
relief of being free of depression, instead they are abnormal experiences which are to 
be viewed with wariness rather than pleasure. With the creation of hypomania as an 
illness category and a greater attention to the nature of these experiences in the 
person, the threshold for what counts as hypomania is in turn being challenged. 
Categories don’t just describe new ‘illnesses’, they also alter how people experience 
themselves and interact with others. 
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The notion of disability and ongoing impairment has also become an important part 
of the construct of bipolar disorder. Kraeplin’s construction of separate entities of 
dementia praecox and manic-depressive insanity was based in part upon a way of 
thinking that saw the experiences now known as schizophrenia as resulting in an 
inevitable deterioration while those with manic-depressive insanity fully recovered 
their functional and cognitive abilities between episodes (Angst & Sellaro, 2000; 
Jaeger & Vieta, 2007). This more hopeful vision of manic depression in comparison to 
schizophrenia, what Jaegar & Vieta call “conventional psychiatric wisdom” (Jaeger & 
Vieta, 2007, p. 1), is now challenged with positivist research arguing that despite 
therapeutic advances, disability and poor outcomes are the norm for bipolar disorder 
(Huxley & Baldessarini, 2007). This notion is reflected in the DSM-5 construction of 
bipolar disorder with statements such as “…at least 15% [of people with bipolar II] 
continue to have some inter-episode dysfunction…” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, p. 138) and “Individual with bipolar I disorder perform more 
poorly than healthy individuals on cognitive tests” (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013, p. 131).  
As well as being located with ideas of ongoing impairment and disability, bipolar 
disorder is also constructed as a condition that inevitably recurs with “more than 
90% of individuals who have a single manic episode go[ing] on to have recurrent 
mood episodes” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 130). It is on the basis of 
bipolar disorder being relapsing and episodic that ideas of monitoring the person for 
the signs of impending relapse in order to take early and appropriate action are 
based. More importantly, if the person can perform this monitoring and surveillance 
upon themselves, then the chances of psychiatric expertise intervening even earlier 
in a relapse are seen to be increased (Morriss et al., 2007; Perry, Tarrier, Morriss, 
McCarthy, & Limb, 1999). Technologies that might aid self-surveillance are a growth 
area in the self-management of bipolar disorder; from digital self-tracking devices 
(Faurholt-Jepsen, Vinberg, Frost, Christensen, Bardram, & Kessing, 2015) to 
education programmes (Colom & Lam, 2005; Proudfoot, Parker, Manicavasagar, 
Hadzi-Pavlovic, Whitton, Nicholas, Smith, & Burckhardt, 2012), all are focussed on the 
early intervention of psychiatric expertise in relapse.  
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Of particular interest to this thesis is the use of the discursive technology of 
psychoeducation as a strategy to develop the self-managing capacities of people with 
bipolar disorder. It is understood as a structured educative process of providing 
people with information about their condition, teaching them the skills needed to 
manage their condition and promote their ability to make more informed decisions 
about their own treatment (Smith, Jones, & Simpson, 2010). Francesc Colom, a 
leading advocate of psychoeducation for bipolar disorder, describes it is a “simple” 
intervention (i.e. not requiring long and complex training) best thought of as “a 
patient’s empowerment training targeted at promoting awareness and proactivity, 
providing tools to manage, cope and live with a chronic condition…changing 
behaviours and attitudes related to the condition”…replacing “guilt [with] 
responsibility, helplessness [with] proactive care and denial [with] awareness” 
(Colom, 2011, p. 339). In a similar vein, Colom and Lam (2005) propose that 
psychoeducation works because of its attention to providing information about 
bipolar disorder that allows people to then improve their adherence to their 
medication regime, change their attitudes toward their illness, seek psychiatric help 
when they notice the early warning signs of relapse and regulate their lifestyle; all in 
accordance with a medical model of the disorder.  
As can be seen from the earlier discussion of self-management practices, 
psychoeducation is explicitly based upon assumptions that position the individual as 
the one with the responsibility for their health and all the attendant obligations and 
duties that come with this position. Given the social forces at work across 
contemporary Western society it would seem unlikely that notions of self-
management are going to quietly disappear. As health services respond to the 
ongoing pressure to address the costs of chronic illness (Bodenheimer, Chen, & 
Bennett, 2009; Meropol & Schulman, 2007; van Baal, Polder, de Wit, Hoogenveen, 
Feenstra, Boshuizen, Engelfriet, & Brouwer, 2008), it would seem likely that the 
pressure to turn people into self-managers will grow and this would seem to have 
implications for how people with chronic illness come to see themselves.  
As a practicing mental health nurse who participates willingly in the promotion of the 
self-managing capacities of people understood to have bipolar disorder, it is these 
pressures and tensions that are of specific interest as both practitioner and 
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researcher. In order to explore the effects of self-management practices in a 
psychiatric context and focus specific attention upon its capacity to shape how a 
person comes to make sense of themselves, this thesis has chosen to focus upon the 
construct of discourse and the work of Michel Foucault. It is an analysis of discourse 
that uses his conceptual tools of technologies of the self, relations of power and 
governmentality which are now discussed in detail. 
Foucault 
Michel Foucault’s work may be difficult to categorize as philosophy, social history or 
political science but his analyses His concern with ‘games of truth’ and technologies 
of power and of the self have helped us to see the relationships between the different 
practices that seek to know and manage human life through the ways that people 
make sense of themselves as ‘naturally’ endowed with certain abilities, duties and 
rights (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). 
“What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature 
when he perceives himself to be mad; when he perceives himself to be ill...” 
(Foucault, 1990b, p. 7). 
Foucault’s interest in the discourse and practices of the human sciences (biology, 
medicine, psychiatry and criminology in particular) demonstrates how they are 
discourses that are regulated by the notion of truth; that they can and indeed do, 
know the truth of what it means to be human. What Foucault demonstrated was that 
through their attention to problems of illness, madness and crime, these knowledges 
have shaped human beings into particular thinkable and manageable forms (Rabinow 
& Rose, 2003). Through his analyses Foucault also showed how power is implicated 
in the means by which these knowledges construct the objects of their attention; how 
they objectivise on the basis of dividing practices (the sick and the healthy, the mad 
and the sane, the criminal and the law abiding citizen) and how power is implicated 
in the means by which a human being turns him or herself into a subject. For 
Foucault, power was and is, not an object that a person holds or not, but rather it is a 
relation – a way of acting upon others to shape the field of their possible action, a 
management of the possible actions of others. Foucault also understood power to 
require freedom or as Petersen (2003) defines freedom; the possession of agency or 
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the capacity to act rather than the freedom to make unconstrained choices. Power 
can only be exercised over people who are faced with a range of possible responses. 
This conceptualisation of power makes it less about confrontation and more about 
how conduct is governed (Foucault, 2003f). Using Rabinow and Rose’s definition of 
technologies as “the intellectual and practical instruments and devices enjoined upon 
human beings to shape and guide their way of ‘being human” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, 
p. xxi), power becomes both a relation and a technology that acts between people to 
shape conduct. 
In the later phase of his life and work, Foucault moved his attention from the games 
of truth and the role of power in objectivising the subject of the human sciences to 
“games of truth in the relationship of the self with the self” (Foucault, 1990b, p. 6) as 
a means to consider how we come to relate to ourselves as particular sorts of selves; 
what are the processes of subjectivization and how are they are enacted by people 
upon themselves through technologies of the self. Foucault understood technologies 
of the self as all “those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set 
themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves” (Foucault, 
1990b, p10) and it is here that the rise of professionals of health and in particular 
how the experts of what Rose (1998b) calls the psy-sciences (psychiatry, psychology 
and psychotherapy) have taken a leading role in claiming to provide the truth about 
human ‘nature’ and “who whisper in our ears and advise us how to act and who to 
be” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. xi). Health care can be seen to place significant faith in 
techniques of self-governance whereby the conduct of individuals are regulated 
through their active engagement in recommended practices to recover from illness 
and achieve health. The problems of people with long-term health conditions and 
their self-managing capacities can be seen as part of this broader reliance upon 
technologies of the self (Petersen, 2003). 
These instruments and devices for working upon the self are many and varied and 
found within a range of institutions beyond health including education, the prison 
and religious institutions. Foucault proposed that what they all have in common is 
that they create particular ethical regimes for living; through the aspect of the person 
that is the target of work, the nature of the relationship between self and authority, 
the techniques used to reshape the self and the type of subjectivity to which a person 
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is led to aspire. Arguably, our contemporary relationships with our selves turn to 
notions of life and health as the central means to making sense of who we are and 
how to act. Rose (2007) makes the case that our self-governance practices have 
moved from an understanding of ourselves as being inhabited by an inner 
psychological space as the source of our difficulties and the target of our self-
governance to practices that are based upon an understanding of ourselves as 
neurobiological creatures whose troubles and potential both lie in the brain. This 
would suggest that psy-bio expertise will increasingly be turned to shape one’s 
relationship with one’s self. Teasing apart a technique of the self such as the self-
management of long-term conditions using Foucault’s concepts allows a way to 
consider in more detail the sort of self being formed as an effect of self-management 
discourse and practices and the ethical regime of which it is part. Perhaps there are 
other ways to be a person than the one prescribed by self-management discourse 
(Foucault, 1990b; Rabinow & Rose, 2003). 
As has already been noted, discussions in the literature of what self-management is 
and how it should be practiced can be seen to rely upon neo-liberal ideas of the 
patient as an active and rational decision maker. For Foucault, attention to techniques 
of self in modern times also has to include a consideration of the ‘arts of government’ 
and the role of liberal and neo-liberal styles of political thought as “the modern 
nation state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s 
emergence” (Lemke, 2001, p. 191). His analysis of the ‘arts of government’ which he 
named governmentality (Foucault, 2003c), brought together ideas about technologies 
of power and of the self in such a way that the nature and practice of government can 
be thought of as on a continuum that moves from an individual’s self-governance and 
techniques of the self through to issues of political practices aimed at governance of 
the nation state. As an ‘art of government’ neo-liberal rationalities are particular in 
their focus upon styles of government that rely upon an apparent ‘natural’ tendency 
of people to be autonomous and seek the freedom to choose their own life. This 
reduces the state’s role to one of providing the environment that enables the self-
steering capacities of individual and allows the state to govern both “at a distance” 
and through a notion of freedom (Rose, 1999a, p. xxii). In this context citizenship 
comes about through enacting one’s free choice in a responsible way which positions 
33 
 
self-management practices as one of a number of potential mechanisms to govern at a 
distance and reward the often marginalized person with ‘chronic mental illness’ with 
another means to achieve citizenship. 
Governmentality understands the conduct of conduct as processes of power and self 
that in contemporary society focuses upon harnessing people’s self-steering 
capacities such that people are governed through their own desires. This means in 
the context of bipolar disorder, people do not necessarily experience or express a 
sense of coercion. This can be seen in the studies that overtly position people with 
bipolar disorder as the expert on how to live and recover from the condition. When 
people are asked about how they live with the condition they often respond with 
ideas that position themselves as active individuals making a choice to get better 
through such actions as developing self-awareness, managing stress, recording sleep 
patterns, taking medications, engaging in physical activity and developing 
relationships with trustworthy others (not necessarily health professionals) (Rusner, 
Carlsson, Brunt, & Nystrom, 2010; Russell & Browne, 2005; Suto, Murray, Hale, 
Amari, & Michalak, 2010; Veseth, Binder, Borg, & Davidson, 2012). Practices that are 
thought of under the rubric of self-management strategies are, in these studies, being 
embraced as a form of self-determination rather than a clinician determined regime 
of living. When viewed through a lens of governmentality, self-management practices 
can be understood as both technologies of power and self that allow government at a 
distance by acting through an individual’s sense of self-determination. This does not 
mean that a person who espouses the benefits of self-management has been ‘duped’ 
into a particular way of seeing themselves and how they should live but it is to 
suggest that the technologies of the human sciences are not necessarily as ‘safe’ and 
as ‘common sense’ as is implied by self-management discourse.  
Aims of this Discourse Analysis 
This introduction has sought to show that our many ways of thinking, speaking and 
acting upon and about ourselves and others are part of a historical, social and cultural 
climate that makes particular assumptions about the kinds of people we can and 
should be; that what we can think and say about ourselves is determined by social 
and cultural convention and practices (St Pierre, 2004) and that these conventions 
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position us, “...hailing us, shouting ‘hey you there’ and making us listen as a certain 
type of person.” (Parker, 1992, p. 9). This overview of self-management has drawn 
attention to how as a discourse it ‘calls’ to a person with a chronic illness as  someone 
who can and will be a responsible health consumer, someone who turns to health 
professionals for guidance on how to live and recognises themselves as the centre of 
any process of change in how they live. But is this necessarily problematic? And what 
might this mean for people understood to have a disorder that is bound to the ideas 
and practices of the psy-sciences? The discussion thus far would suggest that given 
psychiatry’s dominance in shaping what is taken as the truth of the brain and mind 
that it will be strongly implicated in how the self in self-management of bipolar 
disorder can be thought of. Current constructions of bipolar disorder now routinely 
turn to phrases such as “a severe chronic mental illness characterized by fluctuating 
mood and activity patterns”, “suffering”, “frequent, current episodes”, “higher 
functional impairment” and ”severity of symptoms is associated with a lower quality 
of life” (Van den Heuvel, Goossens, Terlouw, Van Achterberg, & Schoonhoven, 2015, 
p. 2). While these quotations are taken from the opening paragraphs of just one 
academic article on bipolar disorder they have none the less come to characterise 
how bipolar disorder is spoken of; as a “...tale of manic numbers and depressing 
outcomes, bipolar disorder is by-and-large depicted as leading to wide-spread and 
long-term disruptions, disability and danger.” (Liebert, 2013b, p. 181). This is not to 
suggest that bipolar disorder is not disruptive, dangerous or disabling, that it is not a 
real illness, or if it does exist, that it is not neurochemical in nature. Neither is it to 
suggest that the experiences that have come to be associated with bipolar disorder do 
not lead to significant distress, loss, unhappiness and chaos. Rather, it is an attempt to 
stand back from the assumptions that are made about what it is and begin to consider 
how discourse shapes how we can and cannot speak of bipolar disorder, the people 
who ‘have’ it and how they are to live with it. In particular it seeks to explore the 
effects of the discursive practices of self-management for bipolar disorder upon 
subjectivity and in the process re-evaluate that nature of the ‘self’ in self-
management. It does this by asking: 
What are the subject positions made available within a discourse of self-management 
of bipolar disorder? 
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What are the implications of these for how a person with bipolar disorder develops a 
regime of living?  
This thesis is an explicit attempt to think differently about the ‘goodness’ or 
otherwise of self-management practices and consider the implications for processes 
of self-formation as a result of the discursive practices of self-management. In doing 
so, the significance of this thesis lies in its use of a Foucauldian methodology to 
identify the iatrogenic effects of psychiatric practice (and self-management practices 
specifically) in a time when psychiatry espouses the importance of constructs of 
empowerment and recovery (Parker, 2014; Roberts & Wolfson, 2004). By 
considering how we can speak about and act upon a chronic health condition such as 
that known as bipolar disorder, it seeks to support both those in practice who 
acknowledge the dilemma faced between providing care and promoting self-
determination (Graham, 2006) and a broader project of a contemporary critical 
psychiatry (Bracken & Thomas, 2010). It takes an alternate approach to constructs of 
power in psychiatry where power is not just about repression but also about 
production and the power of self-management practices to produce a particular sort 
of person that one should and could be when also living with a chronic health 
condition. It moves the focus from assumptions of the beneficence attached to the 
sharing of the specialised knowledge of the psy-disciplines toward a consideration 
that through relations of power, the discourses and medicine and psychology are 
dangerous. 
The intention is treat the subject matter in a dispassionate manner but with aid of the 
work of such people as Nikolas Rose, the work of the thesis has none-the-less 
promoted an unease about the implications of health care services that promote a 
regime of self based upon notions of choice, independence and responsibility; that in 
doing so “...something is lost: the ways of relating to ourselves and others that are 
encompassed in such terms as dependency, mutuality, fraternity, self-sacrifice and 
commitment to others” (Rose, 1999a, p. xiv). In light of this discussion of tone and 
intent, it is also important to note that when the term bipolar disorder is used in this 
thesis it is done so on the basis that it is a concept based upon particular social, 
cultural and political assumptions. It is a term used as if it has quotation marks 
around it so as to “trouble the naturalization” of the concept (Martens, 2008, p. 2). In 
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the same vein, while the phrase “a person with bipolar disorder” is often used, it too 
seeks to assume that the naturalness of the person does not take any particular form. 
It would perhaps be more accurate to write “a person understood to experience the 
object known as ‘bipolar disorder’” but in the name of short-hand the phrase “a 
person with bipolar disorder” is used. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The chapters of the thesis are grouped into three sections; a) theories and concepts, 
b) the application of these theories to the study of self-management discourse and c) 
an exploration of the opportunities for thinking differently about self-management. 
The first section comprises of this chapter and chapters 2, 3 and 4 and is concerned 
with the theories and concepts on which the analysis is based; why use discourse 
analysis and how it has been applied in this project to investigate self-management 
for bipolar disorder. This chapter has provided and overview of the theories being 
put to work and critically explored the notion of self-management and its relevance 
to contemporary health care. It has also explored how the condition named as bipolar 
disorder is constructed and linked it to an expectation that self-management is an 
integral approach in its treatment. Chapters 2 and 3 provide greater detail of the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which this discourse analysis is 
based while Chapter 4 is a discussion of the methods that have been used to both 
obtain and analyse the data.  
The second section comprises of chapters 5, 6 and 7 with each chapter building upon 
the other to apply discourse analysis to self-management discourse. Chapter 5 
applies a discourse analysis specifically to the discourse of self-management as it is 
found in an expert based text on psychoeducation for bipolar disorder, the 
Psychoeducation Manual for Bipolar Disorder (Colom & Vieta, 2006), with a 
particular focus upon process of subjectification i.e. how others are governed and 
objectified by knowledge and power (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2009). The analysis 
within this chapter has formed the basis for a book chapter (Wilson & Crowe, 2016) 
(See appendix 4). 
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Chapters 6 and 7 focus upon processes of subjectivation by using interview data to 
analyse the use of self-management discourse by people understood to have bipolar 
disorder as a means to govern the self. Chapter 6 asks what subject positions are 
being made available through the way discourse is being drawn upon to construct 
bipolar disorder as an object. Analysing the discourse of self-management and the 
subject positions it makes available to people with bipolar disorder is the specific 
focus on Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 forms the final section and discusses the findings of the analysis and 
answers the two questions posed earlier by this thesis; what subject positions does 
the discourse of self-management make available to people understood to have 
bipolar disorder and what are the implications of this for how people with bipolar 
disorder come to understand themselves and a life with bipolar disorder? The 
structure for this discussion is created by applying Foucault’s notion of ethics and the 
ways in which people think and act upon the self to determine preferred ways of 
being. In doing so self-management practices are explored as both a technology of 
power and of self that is shaping how a person with bipolar disorder both determines 
the proper conduct of his or her life and makes sense of the nature of the self and how 
to be concerned with it. This discussion is then used as the inspiration to propose 
that the ‘problems’ of self-management are not the person with bipolar disorder, 
their unpredictable condition and unreliable self but instead our reliance upon a 
notion of subjectivity as singular, contained and independent. To do this a Māori 
ontology is put to work as are Julia Kristeva’s ideas about self-formation in the 
context of managing the abject. Chapter 8 finishes by seeking to apply these ideas to 
the construction of an alternate notion of psychoeducation and self-management for 





Foucauldian Discourse Analysis: Theoretical Context 
 
“The quality of light by which we scrutinize our lives has a direct bearing upon 
the product which we live, and upon the changes which we hope to bring about 
through those lives.”  (Lorde, 1984, p. 36) 
 
As can be seen from the introductory chapter, self-management policy and practices 
require a particular use of language and knowledge about people that has been 
shaped by a dominant medical discourse. As Foucault pointed out, the discursive 
practices of the human sciences are characterised by their use of notions of truth and 
error. To critique the discursive practices of self-management therefore requires the 
use of analytic tools that can treat what is ‘said’ as just one truth among many. It also 
requires a method of enquiry that is concerned with the relationships between 
knowledge, power, discourse and subjectivity and a method that is prepared to 
explore contradiction and complexities rather than assume simplicity of meaning in 
what have become common sense understandings. It is for these reasons that an 
approach to discourse analysis based upon post-structural concepts and the work of 
Foucault has been chosen to investigate the discourse of self-management for bipolar 
disorder  (Parker, 1992, 1999a).  
Willig (1999) proposes that discourse analysis that seeks to address social and/or 
political practice can take three forms; discourse analysis as social critique, discourse 
analysis as empowerment and discourse analysis as a guide to reform. It is from the 
latter that this thesis has sought inspiration; to use discourse analysis to explore how 
language produces both power relations and subjectivity in order to bring about 
positive change in health practices. It is the specific intention of this discourse 
analysis to make it more difficult to think that self-management is a necessary way to 




Discourse analysis is concerned with the close study of text and as a method of 
analysis it has been developed by a range of disciplines who in turn base their work 
upon a range of theoretical assumptions about the nature of language and the people 
who put it to work (Parker, 2014; Traynor, 2006). An essential element therefore of a 
good quality discourse analysis is that the theoretical framework on which the 
discourse analysis is based is clearly articulated (Crowe 2005, Cheek 2004). That is 
the intention of this chapter; to provide a theoretical positioning of this discourse 
analysis as one based upon post-structural and Foucauldian concepts of language and 
discourse and the relationship between discourse and power relations, history and 
subjectivity. This theoretical context and positioning forms the foundation and the 
rationale for the methods used by this discourse analysis. To this end it begins with a 
brief overview of the development post-structural thought before moving on to make 
explicit its stance on the nature of discourse and its relationship with subjectivity and 
power. 
Post-Structuralism 
While post-structuralist theories differ in form and focus, all share fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of language, meaning and subjectivity and as such 
challenge the notion that language can objectively reflect reality. The theories 
associated with post-structuralism came out of a French/Parisian intellectual 
movement that began in the period post World War II and were highly influenced by 
the May 1968 student revolt in Paris and general strike.  Called post-structuralism 
because those involved sought to develop further the ideas of structuralists such as 
Saussure and Levi-Strauss, the most influential early post-structuralist theorists are 
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan with a ‘younger generation’ of 
theorists, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Jean-Francois Lyotard (Sarup, 1993). 
Post-structuralist theories have also been heavily influenced by the work of the 
nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Neitzsche (Mann, 2008; Sarup, 
1993). While the development of post-structuralist theories are primarily attributed 
to male, French theorists, feminism and queer theorists have also been influential in 
the development of post-structural ways of thinking as each have sought approaches 
that can take account of the place of social and cultural practices in the production of 
gender (Butler, 1990; Fraser, 1989; Sawicki, 1991; Weedon, 1997).  
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Language and meaning 
Fundamental to the post-structuralist stance that language does not and cannot 
represent the world is the work of Saussure and his theory of the sign (Saussure, 
1960). In the early years of the twentieth century, influence the development of 
structuralist and then post-structuralist theories in the 1960s and 1970’s. Saussure 
proposed that the hidden, universal structure that explains human society is the 
system of signs and rules that make up the language we use in specific circumstances. 
In language, words are linguistic signs that are understood to be made up of two 
parts; the signifier which is the written mark or sound and the signified which is the 
concept of idea that the mark/sound represents.  In Saussure’s view, language does 
not reflect a real world as there is no intrinsic relationship between an object and the 
word used to name it. Instead the relationship between language and object is seen to 
be shaped by society and therefore completely arbitrary in nature. The meaning 
given to words is determined by society and changes within different social and 
historical contexts. In addition, the connections made by society between signifier 
and signified are seen by Saussure to be established from a position of difference; a 
person can only know what the word ‘female’ means on the basis of its difference 
from the word and meaning attached to ‘male’. This suggests that the process of 
signification, of putting signifier and signified together, is a potentially powerful 
process that relies on “the negating, denying or ‘forgetting’ of other signifiers” (Elliott, 
2009, p. 59). In using difference to divide up and determine meaning within the 
world, people therefore come to ascribe to themselves and others an identity based 
on difference. While Saussure saw the connection between signifier and signified as 
arbitrary and based upon relations of difference, he also proposed that once meaning 
was generated by society, it then become fixed (Sarup, 1993; St Pierre, 2000; 
Weedon, 1997). 
Saussure’s ideas have played a central role in the development of social theories that 
are concerned with how power and domination are at work within language. Post-
structuralism takes his ideas about the lack of correspondence between word and 
object and argues that meaning is never fixed once and for all, rather that meaning in 
language shifts depending on historical and social context which results in meanings 
always being open to interpretation and challenge. (St Pierre, 2000; Weedon, 1997). 
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“Language does not point to pre-existing things and ideas but rather helps to 
construct them, and by extension, the world as we know it. In other words, we word 
the world.” (St Pierre, 2000, p. 483). When we use language to word the world we do 
so on the basis of socially constructed rules that determine what can and cannot be 
said about a particular object or idea. “…[L]anguage gathers itself together according 
to socially constructed rules and regularities that allow certain statements to be 
made and not others” (St Pierre, 2000, p. 485) and it is in this process of gathering 
itself together into a system of statements to construct an object that language 
becomes ‘discourse’ (Parker 1992). 
Discourse 
It is the work of Michel Foucault, exploring how discourses of mental illness, 
punishment and sexuality have been historically produced, that has had a particular 
influence upon post-structural theories (Foucault, 1990a, 1995, 2001; 2002). Salih 
(2002) provides a useful summary of Foucault’s perspective on discourse; 
“ [Discourse] is not just referring to ‘speaking’ or ‘conversation’, but 
specifically to Foucault’s formulations of discourse as ‘large groups of 
statements’ governing the way we speak about and perceive a specific 
historical moment or moments. Foucault understands statements as 
repeatable events that are connected by their historical contexts…” (Salih, 
2002, p. 47) 
Discourse is thus a concept that looks beyond ways of thinking and speaking to the 
way language is tied to wider networks of social institutions, power and knowledge. 
As such, discourse is concerned with things said and written but also the social 
practices which involve discourse to which the term ‘discursive practices’ refers. To 
take an example of a discourse and its discursive practices; the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) is the 
dominant text in the production of a discourse of psychiatry. It constructs and 
categorises particular experiences as ‘mental disorders’ and does so on the basis of 
the authority of medical knowledge to know the nature of a person’s internal ‘mental’ 
world. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM) acts as a text 
that puts together particular statements about the objects understood to be ‘mental 
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disorders’. Through the discursive practice of a comprehensive psychiatric 
assessment, mental health professionals ask particular questions of the ‘patient’ in 
order to determine if their experiences qualify as a ‘mental disorder’ and offer a 
diagnosis based upon the knowledge within the DSM. This speech based investigation 
is then reproduced as a text by using a structured format to write a document that is 
then placed in the person’s medical record. This assessment will then go on to shape 
what can (and cannot) be said about a person’s experiences; by the person 
themselves, family and friends, those whom they approach for help and those other 
social institutions like the legal system that they may also come into contact with. For 
those people compelled through the law2 to use mental health services, the discourse 
of psychiatry has a very material effect upon their lives. The discourse of psychiatry 
also needs to be viewed in a historical context; what counts as ‘mental disorder’ has 
changed over time as each new edition of the DSM makes progressive claims about 
advances in psychiatric knowledge. The inclusion and then the removal of 
homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder and the ongoing debate about the place of 
gender non-conformity in latest edition of the DSM-5 illustrates this point well 
(Drescher, 2010). 
Using the work of Foucault, Parker (1992) proposes a useful list of the characteristics 
of discourse: 
 Discourse is made up of the system of statements (things said and written) 
and the practices (things done) that construct an object. 
 It creates subjectivity by addressing the ‘reader’ in a particular way; to make 
sense of what is being said, the person must take up a particular subject 
position and see themselves in a particular way. In this process, power is seen 
to be at work, as the way a person is positioned in discourse inevitably gives 
certain rights in terms of what they can say and how they say it. People can 
resist the positions on offer but a position of some sort must be taken in 
response to the discourse. 
                                                          
2 In Aotearoa New Zealand the government legislation that permits this is the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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 There is a sense of coherence to a discourse which comes about as a result of 
the culturally available understandings we put to use to make sense of what is 
being said.  
 All “discourses embed, entail and presuppose other discourses” as they draw 
on metaphors, ideas and analogies from other discourses. (Parker, 1992, p. 
13). The term ‘intertextuality’ as used by Fairclough in his Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Fairclough, 1992, p. 84) as a way to describe how texts contain 
‘echoes’ of text that have gone before and how we use other texts to shape our 
interpretation of a text. 
 When taken as a whole, the discourse will in some way reflect upon the way it 
uses words. 
 Discourses are historical in nature as they all refer to objects that have been 
constructed in the past by the same or a related discourse. 
 Discourse is dynamic, changing and inherently contradictory in the way it 
draws on other discourses and gains its coherence. 
 Discourse is intimately connected to power; discursive practices reproduce 
institutions, discourse often reproduces relations of power, and discourse has 
an ideological effect. 
Using a post-structural approach, language as discourse doesn’t just describe the 
social world, it also brings it into being such that it becomes difficult to think 
otherwise. And while this does not mean that there is nothing outside of discourse, 
discourse can be seen to be intimately tied to power and knowledge.  
Discourse and subjectivity 
Post-structural theories have a particular concern with how language as discourse 
constructs subjectivity3. In opposition to both humanist and psychological discourses 
that assume a unique, rational, fixed and coherent ‘self’ at the centre of all human 
action and thought, post structural theories instead construct subjectivity as 
                                                          
3 In line with Mansfield (2000) this thesis uses the term ‘subjectivity’ rather than ‘self’, ‘identity’ or ‘individual’ as a way 
to think about the self as an experience rather than a thing; a discursively orientated experience that is an effect of the 




precarious and plural with discourse as a central player in processes of self-
formation. When meanings in language are understood to be social and historical 
constructions, what it means to be human, to be ‘I’ is also understood to depend upon 
the discursive resources available to make sense of the self. ‘Gender’, ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘personality’ all become ways of thinking the self that are objects of discourse rather 
than statements of an essential human nature. Rose (1998b) directs our attention to 
the dominance of what he calls the psy-complex and the discursive practices of 
psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy as the means by which 
people come to know what it means to be human, to determine the boundaries 
around ‘abnormal’ human experience and use this knowledge to govern oneself. 
The place of discourse in processes of self-formation draws particular attention to 
what Parker (1992) identifies as a key attribute of a discourse; that it creates 
subjectivity by addressing a particular sort of ‘reader’. To make sense of what is being 
said, the person must take up a particular subject position or way of being in the 
world. In this process, power is again seen to be at work as the way a person is 
positioned by and in discourse inevitably gives them certain rights in terms of what 
they can say and how they say it. People can resist the positions on offer but a 
position of some sort must be taken in response to the discourse.  
To return to the earlier example of the discursive practices of psychiatry, the person 
who attends the appointment for an assessment with mental health services can 
occupy a variety of positions; ‘patient’, ‘client’ and ‘consumer’ are all possible options 
in contemporary psychiatric discourse. Each of these positions ‘calls’ a person to 
understand themselves (not necessarily consciously) in particular ways with 
particular attributes within the discursive practices of psychiatry. To take up a 
subject position as ‘patient’ may lead to a way of being in the world that is based 
upon an unquestioning acceptance of the expertise of mental health professionals 
while in responding to a call to be a ‘consumer’, a person may resist how it positions 
them as someone with choices. Discourse can be seen to be acting upon subjectivity 
through what St Pierre (2000) describes as “post-structuralism’s double move…a 
subject that exhibits agency as it constructs itself by taking up available discourses 
and cultural practices and a subject that, at the same time, is subjected, forced into 
subjectivity by those same discourses and practices ” (St Pierre, 2000, p. 502). 
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Power, Discourse and Subjectivity 
This discussion of discourse and processes of self-formation demonstrates how 
discourse is a concept that refers to more than ways of thinking, speaking and 
producing meaning; discourse is always tied to wider networks of social institutions 
and power relations (Weedon, 1997). It is Foucault’s theories of power and the 
capacity of power relations through discourse to shape an individual’s relations with 
themselves and others that are particularly pertinent to this thesis.  
Under the influence of the secular discourses of both humanism and psychology, we 
have developed a ‘common sense’ notion of power and freedom as universal 
resources which as human beings we have a right to possess. In this context they 
become objects that are binary in nature; we either have them or we do not and if we 
do not, someone else holds them instead. Foucault developed radically different ideas 
about the nature and location of power and the relationships between power, 
resistance and freedom. For him, power is not an object that could be “acquired, 
seized or shared” (Foucault, 1990a, p. 94) nor is it located as super-structure type 
object that the ruler uses to oversee the ruled. Instead he uses the metaphor of a 
network of relations where power operates from all angles in such a way that these 
relations are what holds the network together (Foucault, 1995) and as such it is a 
strategic rather than a juridical model of power where “...power is not an institution, 
and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the 
name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” 
(Foucault, 1990a, p. 93). As a network of force relations, power is both strategic and 
anonymous acting indirectly upon actions, “…an action upon an action, on possible or 
actual future or present action” (Foucault, 2003f, p. 137).  
Foucault used Bentham’s Panopticon design for a new type of prison as emblematic 
of a style of power relations that emerged through-out the 18th and 19th century 
whereby people’s self-governing capacities where developed as the means to control 
individuals, instead of resorting to direct coercion or violence. Bentham’s proposal to 
have a watchtower within a prison was designed such that each inmate was in an 
individual cell and always visible to the watchtower. The inmates knew they are 
always visible to a guard whom they in turn could not see and this permanent 
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visibility would induce the prisoner to discipline themselves and create “…a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power…where the inmates [are] caught in a power situation of which they are 
themselves the bearer” (Foucault, 1995, p. 201).  
This metaphor of the Panoptican as a disciplinary style of power was not seen as 
limited to the prison but rather as being used through-out society. Schools, hospitals 
and workplaces could all be seen to be putting to work techniques that separated 
people into categories, allowed observations to be made and norms to be developed 
with which to further categorise. The ultimate aim of disciplinary power is 
normalization and the removal of irregularities so as to produce useful and docile 
minds and bodies (Hook, 2003). It is a style of power that can be said to have enabled 
the emergence of ‘human sciences’; psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy and 
criminology whose knowledges have been used to further refine how people are 
regulated and normalised (Roberts, 2005). This demonstrates the productive rather 
than repressive nature of power; its ability to produce certain sorts of knowledge 
about people and how they function as well as to produce certain types of individuals. 
This inter-relationship of knowledge, power and subjectivity in discourse then works 
to produce particular versions of reality which become assumed as true. This can be 
seen in the example of psychiatric discourse used earlier where the discursive social 
practice of a psychiatric comprehensive assessment is a relation of power whereby a 
discursive based examination of the person is used to determine their degree of 
individual deviance from the norms of how the mind is understood to function in 
‘healthy’ individuals. This produces particular subject positions of the ‘patient’, the 
‘professional’ and the ‘family’ which in turn shapes the range of possible actions of 
people thus categorised. 
With this construct of power as a network of force relations, power is located 
everywhere and is not something from which we can escape. But this does not mean 
that the ‘patient’ in the psychiatric examination cannot resist the power relations at 
work. As power is a network, so too resistance is constructed as being located in a 
network which makes it always possible but inherently local and unpredictable. 
While power may be everywhere we are not powerless in the face of it. Instead 
power, resistance and freedom require each other as power can only be exercised 
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over people who are faced with a range of possible responses (Foucault, 2003f). 
Rather than freedom being constructed as an end goal to be possessed by right, in 
Foucault’s model of power, freedom becomes the ability to engage in a constant 
questioning of who and what we are as what may seem inevitable or ‘natural’ about 
us hardly ever is (St Pierre, 2000). 
These styles of power relations which Foucault identified as emerging in the 18th and 
19th century and of which the Panoptican is emblematic (i.e. the regulation of 
another’s conduct through processes of individualisation and normalisation) remain 
relevant to understanding contemporary styles of power and they continue to show 
themselves in a range of institutions including health care settings4. But in his later 
works, Foucault began to explore how technologies of power in contemporary society 
were being hidden within practices focused upon how individuals judged, mastered 
and controlled themselves and a recognition that contemporary society regulates 
conduct through citizen’s active engagement with recommended practices rather 
than the overt use of coercion (Petersen, 2003; Rose, 1999b). With power as a 
network, it can flow from above through authoritative others but also flow upward 
through how individuals work upon themselves. Indeed within contemporary society 
self-governance has become an imperative, for both the individual citizen and as an 
essential element of the governance of society as a whole (Hook, 2003). This results 
in notions of self and identity as one of the primary vehicles for contemporary 
relations of power and draws attention to contemporary styles of government based 
on neo-liberal ideals which make a specific place for self-regulating citizens while 
offering in return the withdrawal of the state from the daily of life of individuals 
(Rabinow & Rose, 2003). It is at this point in discussions of power relations that the 
notion of governmentality becomes useful to this thesis. 
Governmentality 
The terms ‘government’ and ‘governmentality’ are being used here to think more 
broadly about all of the strategies used by both people and institutions (of which the 
state is just one) to manage or shape the affairs of others in a more or less calculated 
way (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 2003f; Rose, 1998b). Rather than a theory of how to rule 
                                                          
4 See Hook (2003) for an exploration of psychotherapy as disciplinary power. 
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others, these are strategies that act upon actions in the name of shaping conduct and 
a conceptualisation of government as having a primary focus upon regulating the 
choice of individuals as the means to govern society (Foucault, 2003f; Petersen, 
2003). The ultimate goal of governmental power relations is the management and 
welfare of the population as whole. Power becomes a generative force – making 
things and people grow, ordering them and optimizing them (Hook, 2003). It is a 
concept that helps to make sense of the many diverse ways that authorities attempt 
to act upon others in order achieve such goals as social order, prosperity, 
empowerment or health (Foucault, 2003c; Rose, 1998b).  
In the context of governmentality, the political ideals of neo-liberalism can be thought 
of as a ‘family’ of ways for thinking about the nature of government (who can govern, 
what and who can be governed and how) that operates on the assumption that it is 
the ‘natural’ tendency of people to be autonomous, and to have the freedom to choose 
one’s own life. On this basis neo-liberal ideals position the state’s role as creating the 
environment that enables these natural self-steering capacities while the individual 
citizen is positioned as cultivating within themselves their redisposition toward 
entrepreneurialism and autonomy (Binkley, 2011; Rose, 1999a). This style of power 
relation thus allows government to happen both at a distance and through freedom 
because of “…a matrix of institutions, practices and discourses that exert rule through 
the apparent absence of rule…” (Binkley, 2011, p. 382). In such an environment, 
anything that might impose limits on the freedom of an individual to develop their 
potential human capital is problematic; from depending on others for decisions and 
leaving habitual behaviours unexamined through to an apparent unwillingness to 
accept responsibility for the consequences of one’s own actions – all are regarded as 
a problem as they signal a failure of personal freedom (Binkley, 2011). Norms of 
contemporary human conduct that prioritise subjectivities based upon notions of 
choice, independence and responsibility, act as the means by which people can be 
governed (both by others and themselves), particularly in health care settings. For 
example, people who use mental health services who are deemed unwilling to take 
responsibility for the outcome of their own behaviour can find themselves discharged 
from health services, unable to access particular services, subject to legal penalties or 
enforced treatment (Brown & Baker, 2012). In this way a moral perspective is 
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brought to shaping conduct as certain behaviours are valued more than others and 
rewarded as such. 
Contemporary social institutions embody both disciplinary and governmental styles 
of power and both rely on expert knowledge to achieve their aims (Hook, 2003). It is 
the human sciences and the psy-sciences in particular with their claims to know how 
and why humans think and act as they do that have come to the aid of strategies to 
govern both the self and others (Miller & Rose, 2008). We govern ourselves and 
others on the basis of what we take to be true about the nature of being human and 
psy-knowledge and practices have made it possible to govern people in ways that are 
compatible with neo-liberal ways of thinking. In keeping with the theoretical 
foundations of this thesis, psy-related phenomena are not understood as having 
being discovered by psy-sciences as proof of the innate psychological make up of 
individuals but that these phenomena, such as intelligence, personality, self-esteem 
and motivation to name but a few, are objects produced by the discursive practices of 
psy-science itself. They may be constructs that do or do not actually exist but it is in 
the process of searching for and giving shape to the object of ‘personality’ for 
example, that what it is comes into being. From the test in a women’s magazine to the 
categorization of one’s personality style as a means to become a more effective 
worker or manager and on to the contemporary debates between experts about how 
best to recognise a disordered personality – they are all practices that shape what can 
and cannot be said about the object named as personality. Psy-knowledge has made it 
possible, indeed has become essential, to understanding the qualities and capacities 
that people are endowed with and how best to develop these capacities in people 
through their own actions or the actions of others (Rose, 1998b, 1999a). The 
discourses of neo-liberalism and psychology can be seen to be working in tandem to 
produce “humans as selves with autonomy, choice, and self-responsibility, equipped 
with a psychology aspiring to self-fulfillment, actually or potentially running their 
lives as a kind of enterprise of themselves.” (Rose, 1998b, p. 33). These modern forms 
of power relations are not overtly oppressive but instead promote governance of self 
and others through ideas of choice and freedom, “…a type of regulated freedom that 
encouraged or required individuals to compare... what they were with what they 
could or should be.” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 9) and through which they are bound to 
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authoritative others who provide the knowledge and practice that provide the tools 
of self-governance. 
Strategies of governmentality are concerned with power relations and how to 
conduct the conduct of others but they also frequently operate through technologies 
of the self so that people work upon themselves through what they perceive to be 
their own desires and aspirations and making their own judgments of how best to 
conduct themselves (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1988; Rose, 1998b). “Power operates by 
convincing us of the selves we want and need to become, in order to be ‘true’ to 
ourselves.” (Frank, 1998, p. 333). Health care relies heavily upon practices and ideas 
that allow “individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault, 2003g, p. 146). In 
the case of health care, it is the practices and ideas that allow people to enact the 
search for health. Again, these techniques are dominated by an understanding of an 
internal, psychologically shaped space for the self where the individual is the location 
of any processes of change. Any failure to engage in self-governance on the basis of 
these again highlights the moral nature of these endeavours, “…creating a moral 
hierarchy in which the ‘successful striving’ are pitted against those who ‘fail’ to 
reconstruct their experience adequately” (Holt & Stephenson, 2006, p. 215). 
In this way the construct of governmentality acts as a foundational theoretical 
position for this thesis, seeing the practices and theories of self-management as an 
intersection of both power relations and technologies of the self; as both a micro-
politics of self-governance and self-transformation and as a practice through which 
others are governed in the name of the health and productivity of the nation state. 
Summary  
This chapter has sought to lay out the theoretical foundations upon which this 
discourse analysis has been built. Using post-structural theories from the work of 
Michel Foucault, the nature of discourse and its relationship with and to subjectivity 
and power have been discussed. Conspicuous by its absence thus far is a detailed 
consideration of the historical nature and circumstances of discourse. This is rectified 
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in the next chapter by looking specifically at self-management discourse from a 
historical perspective. To do this the practice of psychoeducation has been taken as 
an example of a strategy of self-management discourse and using academic texts on 
the subject, an attempt is made to consider the circumstances, ideas and events that 




Foucauldian Discourse Analysis: Historical Context 
 
“The future accumulates like a weight upon the past” (Frame, 1994, p. 149) 
 
“What counts in the things said by men is not so much what they may have 
thought or the extent to which these things represent their thoughts, as that 
which systematizes them from the outset, thus making them thereafter endlessly 
accessible to new discourses and open to the task of transforming them” 
(Foucault, 1989, p. xxii) 
 
While discourse is tied to power relations and the ways in which people construct 
their sense of themselves, in a post-structuralist context discourse is also understood 
to have a historical nature. A central feature of a Foucaldian Discourse Analysis is to 
locate it as an object in time because discourses draw on and develop layers of 
meaning on the basis of relationships with other discourses. So too a discourse 
develops layers of meaning through how it connects itself to references of the past 
(Parker, 1992, 2015c).  
This chapter further develops the theoretical stance of this discourse analysis by 
applying the notion of ‘conditions of possibility’  as way to think about how other 
discourses and circumstances over time have likely shaped self-management 
discourse and the subject positions within it. It does this by treating psychoeducation 
as a particular tactic or strategy of self-management discourse as was identified in 
the introductory discussion of self-management practices and their place in mental 
health setting. Treating psychoeducation as a historical object thus become a means 
to give thought to the events, circumstance and styles of thought that over time have 
helped to make it possible for both health professionals and those living with the 
condition called bipolar disorder to view self-management practices as essential and 
to the layers of discourse within discourse (Foucault, 1981; Hook, 2001; Parker, 
2004).   
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This is not to suggest a notion of history as a linear construct nor the idea that history 
can provide a single explanation for the development of the discursive practices of 
self-management. Instead it is an attempt to show the multiple forces that sit behind  
the discourse and shape what can and cannot be said and in doing so, “enable one to 
think differently about the present” (Rose, 1996, p. 106). While history and its texts 
don’t determine what can or cannot be thought, it can be understood to shape the 
possible ways people can come to understand themselves. A historical perspective on 
self-management discourse offers a way to start thinking about the different subject 
positions it makes available to those living with bipolar disorder and the 
opportunities and constraints inherent within these.  In terms of the analysis, an 
attention to the historical context of self-management discourse is a way to “make 
strange [the] everyday practices within which we are embedded in order to more 
clearly investigate their rules and structures” (Parker, 2015a, p. 84). As such, this 
historical analysis of selectively sampled literature is central to understanding the 
manner in which the discourse analysis was approached. 
Psychoeducation 
Psychoeducation can be broadly understood as a health professional led intervention 
where, by using group based education methods, people with a particular health 
condition (often seen as both long-term and relapsing in nature) and sometimes their 
families, are provided with relevant information in order that they might become 
more active participants in the treatment process. The person with the mental illness 
and their family is understood to need to go through a process of emotional and 
psychological adjustment to having a chronic condition and the engagement in an 
educative process of learning about the condition is constructed as providing both 
the opportunity to explore these adjustments and to learn new skills to manage and 
live with the condition (Haslam-Hopwood, Allen, Stein, & Bleiberg, 2006; Lukens & 
McFarlane, 2004; Ryglewicz, 1991). 
In order to treat ‘psychoeducation’ as an historical object, a selection of journal 
articles that discuss psychoeducation as a health intervention were located. They 
covered a time period of 1975 through to 2006. While 1975 acted as the point where 
the first reference could be found to the term ‘psychoeducation’, all other articles 
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were selected on the basis that they either described the purpose of the intervention, 
referred to ideas and theories about how psychoeducation might work, described 
what the role of participants and health professionals, or discussed the limitations of 
psychoeducation. Each article was read with the purpose of seeking to understand 
the events, ideas and circumstances that over time have made it possible to speak of 
psychoeducation as the object it is now understood as and the implications of this for 
how self-management discourse constructs subjectivity. 
Psycho-education 
A common theme in the literature is the relationship psychoeducation has with both 
education and therapy; is educating and informing people a therapeutic endeavour or 
is education an essential aspect of psychotherapy? Two examples of differing views 
are now considered. Throughout their entire article Bauml et al (2006) are explicit in 
their intention to persuade the reader that psychoeducation is a therapeutic 
endeavour; “In the following, reasons for viewing psychoeducation as an independent 
psychotherapeutic approach for acute and post-acute schizophrenic patients will be 
presented.” (Bauml et al., 2006, p. 2). Hatfield’s (1988) concern about whether 
psychoeducation is therapy or education appears motivated by the palatability of the 
concept to families of people with mental illness. Therapy is for people who see 
themselves as ill and therefore based on a medical construct in which those providing 
the therapy are expected to treat or cure. Education on the other hand, “does not 
assume that the person to be helped has a pathological condition, but rather that he 
or she has a deficit in understanding or skill that is interfering with competence in 
living.” (Hatfield, 1988, p. 52). Seeing psychoeducation as ‘education’ and not 
‘psychotherapy’ means the family will not be embarrassed about seeking help for 
themselves. This concern is perhaps making a silent reference to the historical idea 
that schizophrenia was caused by pathological family dynamics and the parenting 
style of mothers in particular (Harrington, 2012). Psychoeducation therefore with 
families of people with schizophrenia potentially walks a fine line between wanting 
the family to understand how their interactions with their ill family member can 
generate stress and therefore relapse, and not wanting families to feel they are being 
blamed. It is possible that Hatfield was seeking to distance psychoeducation from 
these ‘out of date’ notions. 
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When constructed as an educative rather than therapy based intervention, 
psychoeducation offers a way of seeing oneself as both ‘just like everyone else’ (as 
everyone engages in education) and as a person in need of instruction. When 
constructed as a therapeutic endeavour those people who participate are positioned 
as needing assistance to process and express the emotional experiences of living with 
a health condition. While the dominance of either therapy or education alters the 
discursive practices of a particular psychoeducation intervention, both are practices 
that fall under the assemblage of governmentality techniques. Both education and 
psychotherapy provide people with the knowledge, tools and techniques for 
continuous self-development in order that they might shape themselves into the 
person they wish to be; providing “…the means of shaping and sustaining subjects not 
in opposition to their personal identity but precisely in order to produce it” (Hook, 
2003, p. 624). In this sense both education and psychotherapy are practices that 
allow the state to govern through a person’s own desire (Bondi, 2005; Brookfield, 
2001; Hook, 2003). 
Self-help 
While both educational and psychotherapeutic processes are purported to be at work 
in psychoeducation, one of the other mechanisms by which change is understood to 
come about is through the notion of mutual support as psychoeducation happens 
most often in a group setting. “In the interviews the partners highlighted the facts 
that they had shared their problems with others and had gained a better 
understanding of the patient.” (van Gent & Zwart, 1991, p. 17). While the content of 
the educational aspect is based primarily on a medical discourse5, group members 
are also understood to gain something through being able to support each other and 
learn from each other’s experiences.  
Self-help groups formed as a co-operative endeavour between people in similar 
circumstances in order to support and learn from one another. From the 1970’s, self-
help groups were being recognised as a contemporary phenomenon of modern life 
(Archibald, 2007; Robinson & Henry, 1977). Three decades on the relevance of self-
help ideas to everyday life remains strong (McGee, 2005). While many groups were 
                                                          
5 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the nature of medical discourse. 
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formed out of a common experience of a health condition such as obesity, cerebral 
palsy, alcoholism, depression or manic depression, other experiences such as being a 
widow, an ex-prisoner, or single parent was also reason enough to draw people 
together. Primarily seen as a ‘grass-roots’ groups, they are constructed as forming 
when existing social institutions are unable to meet their needs (Robinson & Henry, 
1977). This development of supportive groups separate from professional, 
conventional health services brought to the fore the idea that people in such groups 
were “trying to teach helpful attitudes and skills to each other”  and this practice 
should be welcomed by ‘psychological practitioners’ interested in a ‘psychoeducator’ 
model of helping others. (Authier, Gustafson, Guerney, & Kasdorf, 1975, p. 34). 
Archibald (2007) proposes that there are seven critical elements to a self-help group; 
a common problem that members share, mutual aid, provision of a network of social 
and emotional support, the production and sharing of knowledge, nominal costs, non-
judgmental acceptance and equality between members. While these may remain 
relevant for group based self-help, with the proliferation of self-help texts there is 
arguably less focus currently on creating a community of support to improve the 
social conditions of its members and more focus upon self-help as an individualised, 
self-improvement practice (McGee, 2005; Rimke, 2000). In a search of the Scopus 
database to find contemporary academic literature about self-help, it appeared that 
for those people with identified health conditions, individualised guided self-help 
programmes, often using the internet, are now the norm rather than self-help groups.  
Within the self-help literature there is a notable tension between the idea that self-
help initiatives are an “alternative [to the] formal health care system” where reliance 
is placed upon the experiential knowledge of group members rather professionals 
(Borkman, 1990, p. 321) and those who critique self-help discourse by drawing 
attention to the central role of expert others claiming authoritative knowledge about 
how best to help oneself (Hazleden, 2010; Rimke, 2000). “The art of being free 
ironically depends upon submission to a particular class of expertise and upon a 
range of discourses which instruct the subject on how to be free” (Erjavec & Volćić, 
2009, p. 99). This paradox of self-help – learning the art of helping oneself whilst also 
relying upon an expert other – is also identified as a paradox of self-management 
discourse (Wilson et al., 2007) and links to Paul Rabinow’s (1992) notion of 
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biosociality. He identified a trend in contemporary society whereby collectives of 
people come together in the name of particular biological ‘problems’ and on the basis 
of “...medical specialists, laboratories, narratives, traditions and a heavy panoply of 
pastoral keepers...” (Rabinow, 1992, p. 244) come to know who they are and how 
they should live. From this perspective self-help practices become another strategy of 
governmentality and governing the state through individual self-hood (Erjavec & 
Volćić, 2009; Rimke, 2000) 
By turning to ideas of self-help and mutual aid as a mechanism of change, 
psychoeducation links to a history of self-help initiatives that have been about 
collective action to support one another and learn from each other. As such there 
exists the conditions of possibility for the development of subjectivity based upon a 
notion of the self as an active agent in relation to one’s life and as a valued member of 
a community. But the individualised self-improvement version of self-help that now 
appears more prevalent relies more upon a subject position where the self is an 
active agent who acts alone rather than in community with others. In addition, the 
linking of psychoeducation to self-help can be seen to make available a subject 
position that relies upon authoritative others to shape how one should understand 
and respond to a particular biologically based problem and to come to know oneself 
through these forms of knowledge.  
Shaping behaviour through rational scientific knowledge 
Through-out the literature there is a preoccupation with the need to find ways to 
change what people do in relation to the condition they are understood to have. Some 
are explicit about this concern by ensuring they include a discussion of the theory 
being used to understand how to change behaviour e.g. the health belief model in a 
group aimed at preventing the spread of HIV infection (Sorenson, London, & Morales, 
1991) but mostly this preoccupation is seen in how authors describe the purpose of 
psychoeducation such as “…to develop strategies to use the information in a 
proactive fashion” (Lukens & McFarlane, 2004, p. 206), “…imparting information as 
well as helping participants develop coping skills (Daley, Bowler, & Cahalane, 1992, p. 
163), or  as “…compliance enhancement and early identification of prodromal 
signs…” (Colom & Lam, 2005, p. 359). To understand how best to go about 
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influencing behaviour, psychoeducation literature turns predominately to 
psychological concepts of behaviour modification, operant conditioning, cognitive-
behavioural and social learning theories (Authier et al., 1975; Goldman, 1988; 
Hatfield, 1988; Lukens & McFarlane, 2004; Malow, West, Corrigan, Pena, & 
Cunningham, 1994; Sorenson et al., 1991). 
These approaches base their claims to the truthfulness upon the use of techniques of 
rational science to justify the turn away from psychoanalytic ideas (Authier et al., 
1975) and make it possible to conceive of the person’s behaviour as directly 
malleable through the use of appropriate incentives. Psychological theories of human 
behaviour have moved from a focus upon altering behaviour through simple 
stimulus, for example Pavlov’s dogs (Butler-Bowdon, 2010) to models that find a link 
between cognitions, behaviour and emotions. As a result, the way people think is now 
understood as a key determinant of behaviour (Beck & Weishaar, 1989; Ellis, 1989). 
Ellis’s (1989) and Beck’s (1989) development of cognitive behavioural theories for 
the treatment of psychological dysfunction can be seen as a rejection of 
psychoanalysis in favour of more rational approaches developed through the science 
of behavioural psychology.  The latter half of the twentieth century has arguably seen 
psychological science being put to work specifically in support of Surveillance 
Medicine as people have drawn attention to the idea that health information on its 
own is not enough to get people to change what they do (Gibson, Catania, & Peterson, 
1991). In the search to understand how to influence behaviour, psychological science 
has developed constructs such as self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Lorig & Holman, 
2003), the Health Belief Model (Janz & Becker, 1984; Lorig, 2001)and the 
Transtherorectical Model of Change (Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992) in 
order to understand why and how people change what they do. It is these theories 
based upon the individual as the location of change that are often directly referred to 
as providing the justification for a particular approach to self-management including 
psychoeducation. 
The notion of a rational psychological science providing the knowledge and the 
techniques that could help those with psychiatric and psychological problems can 
also be seen as part of a broader adoption of psychological constructs in the 
management of life (Rose, 1999) as exemplified by the scientific management 
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movement of the early twentieth century associated with the work of F.W Taylor 
(Taylor, 1911) and his ideas about how to transform the workplace to improve 
profitability. Credited with the establishment of management as a role distinct from 
ownership with whom full control of the process of productivity should rest, 
scientific management sought to increase the wealth of the nation by using scientific 
knowledge and rational techniques to make the most of resources, including the 
workforce (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 2000). This meant that the labourer became 
the subject about whom knowledge was sought and in turn, to whom techniques 
were applied to improve productivity. This resulted in a range of ways to measure 
and standardise production from practical tools such as elaborate slide rules and 
adjustable scaffolds to intellectual tools; methods to study time, keep records, break 
down tasks into their component parts as well as standard formulae to replace the 
judgement of the individual worker, written instructions for each task, bonus 
payments to workers who complete tasks on time and methods for the scientific 
selection of workers (Miller & Rose, 2008; Thevenot, 1984). Just as cognitive 
behavioural approaches to understanding psychological dysfunction, this approach to 
industry and production applied ideas about science and rationality to the individual 
for the primary purpose of governing the behaviour of others. Psychoeducation’s 
adoption of constructs of psychological science as the means to explain how people 
can be induced to change how they act can thus been seen as another tactic in the 
government of people through the use of the psy-sciences in the name of increased 
productivity, health and wellbeing (Rose, 1998a). 
What might this attention to the shaping of behaviour through rational science mean 
in terms of the subject positions that it brings to psychoeducation? It would seem that 
it positions people as creatures with rational reasons for why they act as they do such 
that it becomes possible to predict behaviour and calculate response. This results in 
people’s thoughts, attitudes and motivations all becoming possible points in which to 
intervene in people’s lives for their apparent good. Through scientific management 
people become both objects of theory and subjects of rational endeavour. As the 
object of scientific theory, if someone does not change their behaviour as a result of 
psychoeducation, the assumption could be made that there are some hidden aspects 
of a person’s internal psychological world yet to be worked upon and understood. As 
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the subject of rational endeavour the problem is not the theory, but the person; their 
inability to change their behaviour becomes an expression of assumed inadequacy or 
faulty way of being. In line with the earlier discussion of the critiques of self-
management, it would seem that through the way psychoeducation draws heavily on 
psychological constructs, there is the potential for it to construct subjectivity on the 
basis of deficit and failure (Moore et al., 2015; Scott & Wilson, 2011). 
Mental hygiene 
Psychological science has worked hard to explain how and why individuals might be 
induced to change their health related behaviour. From the early twentieth century it 
has also worked hard in the guise of mental hygiene to provide knowledge about 
what constitutes ‘good’ mental health and how to best to educate people about these 
constructs for the good of society as a whole. While not named as mental hygiene, 
these samples of psychoeducation texts can be seen to contain traces of these ideas. 
Colom and Lam (2005) for example, stress the importance of education people 
bipolar disorder about the deleterious effect of poor attitudes upon mental health. In 
a similar vein, Landsverk and Kane (1998) talk about psychoeducation as a vehicle 
for education people with schizophrenia about the influence of stress upon mental 
health. For Authier et al (1975), Lukens and McFarlane (2004) and Haslam-Hopwood 
(2006), psychoeducation is an intervention to be used with all people in the name of 
improving mental health because of its capacity to teach “individuals and 
communities how to anticipate and manage periods of transition and crisis.” (Luken 
& McFarlane, 2004, p. 221). 
Beginning in 1909 in the USA with the creation of the National Committee for Mental 
Hygiene by a group of reform-minded physicians, psychiatrists, academics and social 
workers,  over the next twenty years mental hygiene became an international 
movement (Groves & Blanchard, 1930).  In this way of thinking about people, all 
forms of mental disturbance, maladjustment, illness, or disorder were seen as 
damaging to the economic health and social order of a nation. Encouraged by the 
success of public health campaigns against such illnesses as tuberculosis, mental 
hygienists sought the same focus upon mental illness. Initially their focus was upon 
improving the care and treatment of those deemed ‘insane and mentally defective’ 
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but their optimism in the ability of medical science to find the cause of mental illness 
meant they extended their focus to include all people and those things in life with the 
potential to undermine mental health. This meant “education, marriage, parenthood, 
industry – all the relationships of individuals to each other and to their environment” 
(Groves & Blanchard, 1930, p. 7) were the focus of attention.  
Mental hygiene ideals were seen as progressive and reformist for their day (Crossley, 
2006). Taking ideas from psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis and medicine, both 
mind and body were seen to be interconnected and directly affected by the 
environment. While hereditary influences upon mental disturbance were relevant, 
they were down played in favour of a focus upon environmental influences. People 
were understood to be a product of social forces which began in childhood when 
personality traits and behaviour were understood to develop in response to the 
child’s environment. If children were exposed to situations that elicited a repeating 
pattern of behaviour in the child, these patterns were thought to then become 
permanent. Maladjustment was understood as developing over time so intervening 
early to change habits of behaviour and emotion increased resistance to mental 
disturbances. Mental strain and fatigue were understood to be caused when people 
could not adjust to the complexities of modern life which led to emotional conflicts 
and a sense of failure to achieve. These emotions made then people vulnerable to 
mental collapse. Personality traits were understood to be important in predicting 
who might develop mental problems with certain traits and behaviours being linked 
to the development of dementia praecox (which became known as schizophrenia). 
The problems of mood and behaviour in manic depressive psychoses was also related 
to personality traits with these people having a particular temperament  that was the 
cause of their intense variations in mood (Groves & Blanchard, 1930). By identifying 
these problems in personality early, treatment could begin to reduce the 
vulnerability of a person’s mental capacities. Their thinking, their attitudes, and their 
personality were all understood to be malleable.  
World War I played a significant role in the development of mental hygienist ideas 
(Crossley, 2006). The war was seen to have had a significant impact upon both those 
who fought in it and the general population and there was a growing recognition that 
there was a psychological basis to how people responded to the experience of war. 
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“Now, the war, by the fatigues, the emotions, and the privation which have affected 
civilians as well as combatants, has created conditions favourable to the development 
of neuropathic states. A pressing social problem has thus arisen ” (Colin, 1921, p. 
460) The aftermath of the war also brought a fear of impending social collapse as 
criminality, alcoholism and an apparent lessening in people’s willingness to work 
were all understood to be on the rise (Colin, 1921). These were all signs of 
deteriorating mental health, therefore the mental health of the population needed to 
be tended to in order to improve a nation’s economy and military efficiency. 
Deterioration in a person’s mental capacities was not considered inevitable so 
everyone needed to be educated into the workings of the mind in order to prevent 
mental disturbances occurring and encouraging people to seek early assistance with 
problems. This meant that a significant focus of mental hygiene work was upon 
intervening in childhood; either upon children themselves by working to identify 
those with a predisposition and then treating them or by educating teachers and 
parents about the needs of children so they could provide the best environment for 
the developing mind (Cohen, 1983). This focus upon training others in the ideas of 
mental hygiene saw the development of child guidance clinics as a means to identify 
and treat problem children, teach parents how to help their child and train teachers 
in how to identify and intervene in the conduct of problem children (Miller & Rose, 
2008). 
Prevention and treatment of mental disturbances was inherently moral in nature 
within the mental hygiene movement; there was a ‘right’ way to live in order to 
develop one’s mental capacities. “It is interested in environments, that they may be 
wholesome and exert a good influence upon the development of right mental 
attitudes and habits and upon the correction of wrong ones…”(Abbot cited in 
(Forsyth, 1921, p. 508). The type of social order being promoted through mental 
hygiene was that espoused by the white, middle classes so degeneracy within the 
working classes was a central concern. The ‘right’ way to live in the name of mental 
health did not include excessive use of alcohol, refusing to work, poor manners nor 
sexual promiscuity (Crossley, 2006).  
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Mental hygiene’s concern with the mental abilities of people, the social implications 
of mental illness and a need to control social behaviour for the good of the nation can 
be seen as complementary to the Eugenics movement which was also a feature of the 
early part of the twentieth century. People constructed as lacking in intelligence were 
seen to be mentally defective, lacking in mental capacities and a subgroup of the 
mentally ill. This included women who were seen as ‘hypersexual’ and those unable 
to protect themselves from the sexual advances of men (Robertson, 2001). Within 
eugenics, mental defects were seen as primarily hereditary and degenerative in 
nature and the cause of social problems. Along with this, the feeble-minded were 
seen as more fertile than the rest of the population and growing in number. With the 
social upheaval that followed World War I, fears for the future of society produced a 
climate supportive of the idea that the best way to respond to the problem of the 
mentally defective who, by definition, did not therefore have the intelligence to 
exercise self-restraint or moral judgement, was to segregate them and control their 
reproductive capacities. Through the 1920’s and 1930’s New Zealand, along with 
other nations, considered the possibility of government legislation to enforce 
sterilization of those deemed unable to regulate their conduct for the good of society. 
Robertson (2001) suggests that the Depression made it harder for people to equate 
social problems with mental defects alone and that in the process of collecting data 
on the population, it was found that the numbers of people deemed defective was not 
as large as once thought. As a result, eugenics ideas lost favour.    
While mental hygiene ideals are no longer directly influential, a focus upon the 
mental health of the nation remains important in contemporary public health 
campaigns. While ideas about the cause of mental illness no longer centre around 
defects in a person’s mental capacities or personality, other constructs of mental 
hygiene remain highly influential; mental health as influenced by social environment, 
the mental health of individuals as linked to the wellbeing of society as a whole, and 
an understanding that it is possible to take action to promote an individual’s ability to 
care for their own mental health remains an important construct in contemporary 
public mental health campaigns.  Education programmes about the norms of mental 
health and how to achieve ‘good’ mental health are aimed at everyone6 and the expert 
                                                          
6 http://www.mentalhealth.org.nz/home/ways-to-wellbeing/  
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knowledge that shapes these ideas continues to come from the psychological sciences 
along with the more recent addition of the neurological sciences (Cloninger, 2006; 
Foresight Mental Capital and Wellbeing Project, 2008).  
Mental hygiene ideas offered “to all the predisposed a regime of life suitable to their 
mental weakness.” (Colin, 1921, p. 461). While not using the same language of mental 
deficiency or weakness, present day public mental health initiatives continue to offer 
regimes for living with particular mental disorders7. Psychoeducation acts in a 
similar vein, targeted at particular groups of people with identified health conditions 
but also with the potential to assist the general population (Haslam-Hopwood et al., 
2006; Lukens & McFarlane, 2004) . People with identified mental illnesses are 
therefore able to construct themselves as participating in a broader social project 
where ‘good’ mental health is a valuable social asset. Both mental hygiene and its 
transformation into contemporary public mental health initiatives can be seen as 
programmes of governmentality, where the population is governed through 
engineering the conduct of individuals so that people work upon themselves in the 
name of their own health whilst simultaneously producing the health and welfare of 
the nation state. 
Deinstitutionalization: Who will manage these people now? 
While the previous sections have highlighted the connections between 
psychoeducation and self-management to a broader social project of regimes of living 
that promote good mental health for all citizens, for people understood to have a 
mental illness, contemporary ways of living are intimately connected to a long history 
of institutional life. Internationally it is only over the last half of the twentieth century 
that questions have been asked about whether placing someone in a hospital 
institutional setting is the best way to treat a mental illness and if there might not be 
more helpful alternatives within communities (Bachrach, 1978; Durie, 1982; Scull, 
1993).  But in this movement away from institutional care, the problem of how to 
manage people with mental illness and how to influence the potentially problematic 
choices they might make when freed from the regime of the institution remains a 




central concern. In this context psychoeducation can be understood as a response to 
the problems of deinstitutionalisation. 
Whether in spite of or because of the optimism of the period of lunacy reform in 
Britain, by the Victorian period institutions had become the standard response to the 
needs of the poor (the workhouse), the criminal (prisons and penal colonies) and the 
mentally ill (Scull, 1993; Ernst, 1991). The therapeutic optimism of the early 
nineteenth century did not last and asylums became associated with a sense of 
inevitable mental decay. In the New Zealand context, the development of asylums for 
the mentally ill in the new colony was based on British experiences of asylum care. 
With the significant growth in the settler population throughout the 1850s and 
1860s, small scale lunatic asylums were established in centres of population growth 
but the size and quality of these institutions varied greatly (Ernst, 1991). While lay 
superintendents were involved in some of the first established asylums8, medical 
superintendents soon dominated asylum care with many having been trained as 
medical practitioners in Scotland. Despite medical control of asylums “the factual 
evidence about nineteenth-century pākehā asylums points to conditions of decay, 
neglect and lip service to reformist doctrines rather than to enlightenment and real 
reform.” (Ernst, 1991, p. 79). It was not until the 1950s that it became possible to 
consider something other than institutions as the appropriate response to the 
problem of mental illness (Scull, 1993). In New Zealand, psychiatric inpatient 
accommodation levels did not peak until 1970 (Brunton, 2001).  
What made deinstitutionalisation possible after several centuries of asylum based 
care is open to debate. Psychiatry’s ability through ideas such as mental hygiene to 
intervene in the lives of all people, the development of medications to manage 
symptoms of psychosis (and possibly prevent manic-depressive illness), the civil 
rights movements, a growing awareness of the damaging effects of institutions and 
the growing cost of providing care in institutions that needed significant 
improvement; all are implicated to varying degrees (Brunton, 2001; Dew & Kirkman, 
2002). While the suspicion remains that cost-containment had more of an influence 
than is usually acknowledged, it is claims to reform and humanitarian ideals that are 
                                                          
8 For example Edward Seagar at Sunnyside Hospital in Canterbury from 1863-1880, 
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constructed ultimately as motivating the change. “Deinstitutionalisation has assumed 
no less a task than that of humanizing mental health care – a task that would reverse 
the dehumanizing influences that are perceived to be part and parcel of traditional 
mental health care.” (Bachrach, 1978, p. 575). 
In New Zealand, the move away from institutions was not initiated from central 
government and this led to the replication of problems experienced in other 
countries of underfunding and fragmentation in what was becoming known as 
community mental health care (Brunton, 2001; Dew & Kirkman, 2002). 
Internationally, in the move to community care it was those people with long-term, 
psychotic conditions who were most likely to lose access to services. Scull, in 1993 
describes the American experience when he writes of how for the “thousands of 
younger psychotics discharged into the streets, it has meant a nightmare existence in 
blighted city centres, amidst neighbourhoods crowded with prostitutes, ex-felons, 
addicts, alcoholics and the other human rejects now repressively tolerated by their 
society. Here they eke out a precarious existence, supported by the welfare cheques 
that they may not even know how to cash.” (Scull, 1993, p. 391). 
It is within the literature on psychoeducation for families that the connection to 
deinstitutionalisation can be found; with no institutions and inadequate community 
care it is the role of families to care for their ill family member and to do this the 
family are constructed as in need of education. For Hatfield (1988) this new direction 
of psychoeducation had limited usefulness until a clear theoretical framework for 
what it has to offer families was made explicit with the implication that it needs to go 
beyond a primary goal of training the family to act as long-term caregivers and 
psudeo mental health workers in an era of deinstitutionalisation and corresponding 
lack of residential and outpatient services. In this context, psychoeducation brings 
with it a history of inadequate care for people with mental illness, rather than the 
progressive, consumer based right to information approach put forward by others 
(Colom & Lam, 2005). 
When it comes to psychoeducation and bipolar disorder, it is the advent of lithium 
clinics to which some authors refer when providing a rationale for the value of 
educational approaches for bipolar disorder (Colom et al., 2003a; Peet & Harvey, 
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1991) and articles about lithium clinics link themselves to deinstitutionalisation 
(Fieve, 1975; Gitlin & Jamison, 1984). From the 1960’s lithium carbonate offered a 
new form of pharmacological treatment for manic-depressive illness, and one that 
promised the possibility of preventing the illness from recurring. This in turn offered 
those researching its use the opportunity to run speciality treatment services which 
came to be known as ‘lithium clinics’ “on the assumptions that specialty clinics would 
give sophisticated care in a highly efficient manner...” (Gitlin & Jamison, 1984, p. 363). 
In a lithium clinic people were offered a specialist diagnostic service and once manic-
depression was confirmed, the majority of people were placed on lithium. This 
specialist approach was argued as being particularly relevant in a time of 
deinstitutionalisation. “This problem of incorrect diagnosis leads to improper 
treatment of affective disorders...With improved diagnosis and treatment, the 
community would have less cause to fear that inadequately treated patients would be 
returned to society.” (Fieve, 1975, p. 1019). Once a week, usually in the morning, 
patients would attend the clinic, have blood levels taken and in the process have their 
mood evaluated. Patients attended weekly or monthly as their medication regime 
indicated. Non-physicians, most often nurses, were trained to use rating scales to 
evaluate mood so psychiatrists did not need to meet with every patient unless their 
blood test showed this as necessary. This model of service delivery was seen to be 
more efficient and importantly, less costly (Fieve, 1975; Gitlin & Jamison, 1984). 
Lithium was the first psychiatric drug to require blood tests to be taken to ensure a 
therapeutic level and to monitor the risk of toxicity and potential damage to the 
kidneys. As its role was as a preventative treatment, it could appear to the person 
taking it that the drug was doing nothing beyond causing side effects so patients were 
seen to require education about the benefits and instruction in how to monitor for 
the potential of toxicity. Patients who did not take the drug as it was prescribed 
became over time a significant issue for lithium clinics (Peet & Harvey, 1991). 
Referred to as non-compliance, this problem was one to which education was 
understood to have much to offer; if people increased their knowledge and changed 
their attitude toward lithium then compliance with doctor’s orders was assumed to 
be more likely (Peet & Harvey, 1991). 
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Lithium clinics also create a link back to the debate about whether psychoeducation 
is best understood as a process of psychotherapy or education. In Fieve’s style of 
lithium clinic in 1975, no reference is made to educational interventions beyond the 
possibility that it happens within the “other services, including social work, nursing 
and referral” that are provided (Fieve, 1975, p. 1020). He is clear though that “our 
focus in the clinic is on the presence or absence of an affective episode and the staff 
make little attempt to deal with the interpersonal or intrapsychic problems of the 
patients except as they relate to mood.” (Fieve, 1975, p. 1021).  In this style of lithium 
clinic a person might receive education but psychotherapy was explicitly not on offer. 
For Gitlin & Jamison (1984) the expectation that the lithium clinic will provide both 
education and psychotherapy to its patients is overt, as is the opportunities offered 
by group interactions. “What is surprising, in retrospect, is its [psychotherapy] 
absence in the earlier clinics. Manic-depressive illness involves many psychological 
issues that lithium itself cannot treat...Many of these issues can be handled more 
effectively in individual therapy; however, group therapy provides a unique kind of 
support, as in helping facilitate compliance issues through peer rather than 
professional encouragement.” (Gitlin & Jamison, 1984, p. 367).  
Bringing people with bipolar disorder together in groups was also seen as 
problematic, as suggested by Volkmar et al (1981) when laying out the background to 
the successful long-term group therapy they offered to people attending a lithium 
clinic. “These patients were thought to exhibit superficial and conventional 
relationships with strong underlying feelings of dependency, hostility, envy and 
competition. The patients’ inability to tolerate anxiety or intimacy and their use of 
massive denial and manipulation were seen as precluding the formation of a 
treatment alliance even during the euthymic phase of illness.”  (Volkmar et al., 1981, 
p. 226). Instead Volkmar and colleagues aimed to provide a “weekly meeting that 
would present the members with the opportunity for interpersonal learning and 
support as well as providing for close follow-up of medications...Thus the focus of the 
group was on expression of affect, reality issues and immediate problems and 
concerns rather than on past history.” (Volkmar et al., 1981, p. 229). By refuting the 
notion that people with bipolar disorder have character flaws that cannot be worked 
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with, it becomes possible for both therapy and education in a group setting to be 
provided to people understood to have manic-depression. 
Without institutions to apply the science of behaviour management to potentially 
problematic people or to provide the regime of daily life as they once had, families 
now needed to be trained to take on the role of long term caregiver. For those with 
manic depression now living outside of institutions, ways needed to be found to 
monitor their use of medication and respond to problems of non-compliance. 
Psychoeducation offered a way to act on these problems; a way to manage people 
when institutions no longer have the mandate to do so by sharing skills that used to 
be held exclusively by mental health professionals. In the context of 
deinstitutionalisation, psychoeducation draws on a long history of seeing people with 
mental illness from a deficit perspective, as lacking skills and personality attributes 
that would allow them to live like everyone else.  
Psychoeducation also potentially constructs the problem of mental illness as one that 
can be attended to by an individual having more skills in caring for themselves rather 
than addressing the place in society of a group of people who have more usually been 
excluded rather than included. The absence of institutions also meant that new ways 
of surveilling those people with manic depression needed to be found and with the 
assistance of Lithium, it became possible to provide this. But these same services also 
provided a means by which the nature of manic depression and the person who has it 
could be challenged. For those with the condition, no longer did they have to be 
thought of as possessing a flaw in their personality. Instead they could be constructed 
as having the ability like everyone else to learn about themselves through 
relationships with others and that the condition itself could be thought of as creating 
psychological issues which needed attention. 
Moral treatment: re-learning self-control 
Contemporary psychoeducation taps into a long history of mental health as 
malleable; with appropriate knowledge from the sciences of psychology, psychiatry 
and neurology, people can intervene in their own lives to reduce those factors, most 
commonly stress and lifestyle related, that put people at greater risk of emotional and 
psychological distress. If people with mental illnesses are to live successfully outside 
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of institutions they need to learn knowledge and skills that were previously the 
domain of mental health professionals so that they too can intervene in their own 
lives. This requires the ability to see oneself firstly as the object of the science of 
behaviour change and then as a subject with the capacity to change oneself. It is in the 
development of moral treatment that history allows us to see early ways of thinking 
about of the mind of those deemed mentally ill; that it could be managed in such a 
way that the person’s self-governing capacities could be drawn upon to change 
behaviour. 
Moral treatment and particularly how it was practiced at The Retreat at York in 
England in the nineteenth century, has come to represent the humanitarian and 
progressive side to the history of psychiatry (Micale & Porter, 1994; Lilleleht, 2002). 
In 1796 William Tuke, a Quaker and tea merchant, founded The Retreat as a place to 
which fellow Quakers deemed to be insane could come for care and treatment as 
means to try and address concerns with inadequate care for the insane. Tuke was not 
alone in his concern with improving the conditions of asylums; Phillipe Pinel in 
France is also credited with similar but separate developments in asylum care that 
saw “the essential attribute of the mad as irrationality rather than animality” (Digby, 
1985, p. 6). This was a fundamental change in the way insanity was viewed and it 
allowed space for the idea that the mind could be managed rather than brutalised. It 
is an approach that recognised an insane person as being temporarily without reason 
and therefore having the capacity to regain it. It focused upon developing the self-
governing capacities of people using a code of moral or ‘right’ living based on a 
Quaker Christian view of the person. Physical forms of ‘treatment’ were still used at 
The Retreat but attention was more upon using ‘milder’, psychological means of 
control rather than physical control. The ultimate goal was to develop a person’s 
internal capacity for self-control and self-discipline. The human desire for the 
approval of others and an aversion to fear was understood to motivate people to 
behave in socially appropriate ways.  
“...patients are considered capable of rational and honourable inducement; 
and although we allowed fear a considerable place in the production of that 
restraint, which the patient generally exerts on his entrance into a new 
situation; yet the desire of esteem is considered, at the Retreat, as operating, in 
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general, still more powerfully. This principle in the human mind, which 
doubtless influences in great degree, though often secretly, our general 
manners...yet when properly cultivated, it leads many to struggle to conceal 
and overcome their morbid propensities and, at least, materially assists them 
in confining their deviations, within such bounds, as do not make them 
obnoxious to the family. This struggle is highly beneficial to the patient, by 
strengthening his mind, and conducing to a salutary habit of self-restraint; an 
object which experience points out as of the greatest importance, in the cure 
of insanity, by moral means.” (Tuke, 1964, p. 157-158). 
This meant that punishments and rewards for behaviours were all reasonable 
practices but only so long as they were within the bounds of what might happen 
within any family.  
“The principle of fear, which is rarely decreased by insanity, is considered as 
of great importance in the management of the patients. But it is not allowed to 
be excited, beyond that degree which naturally arises from the necessary 
regulations of the family.” (Tuke, 1964, p. 141). 
Kindness and comfort were central to care, not subjugation and brutality.  
“...since whatever tends to promote the happiness of the patient, is found to 
increase his desire to restrain himself, by exciting the wish not to forfeit his 
enjoyments...The comfort of patients is therefore considered of the highest 
importance, in a curative point of view.” (Tuke, 1964, p. 177-178). 
The desire for the good opinion of others and the fear of losing things that the person 
enjoyed were complemented by the creation of a therapeutic environment led by the 
benevolent authority of the superintendent in a familial atmosphere that allowed the 
close, daily observation of patients within a philosophy of kindness (Scull, 1993). 
Moral treatment as practiced at the Retreat was based on Quaker concepts of what it 
meant to be human and the type of relationship that a person needed to have with 
God (Stewart, 1992). For Quakers every person, regardless of class, gender or colour, 
had the Light of Christ or the Inner Light within them. This Light within allowed all 
people to be connected to God in the here and now and for all people to be connected 
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to each other. Cultivating this Inner Light could not be done through violence or force 
and it also required the suppression of self-centredness so that the divine could 
spontaneously guide a person to right action. Following the Inner Light did not come 
naturally; it was something that people learned to do through a process of inner 
discipline. Quakerism was based upon religious practices that stripped away 
religious tradition and valued inward reflection rather than outward ceremony. To 
experience God within each person, the cultivation of an inner discipline was 
essential. A Quaker’s behaviour, speech and outward appearance were an expression 
of his or her beliefs and as such required simplicity and plainness. Quaker life was 
about learning positive habits that reflected religious belief and it is the cultivation of 
habits of inner self-control that moral treatment was based (Stewart, 1992). It was 
the systematic regulation of daily life based on a cohesive moral code that endorsed a 
Quaker view of the world and a person’s place within it.  
The work of Philippe Pinel in France and Vincenzo Chiarugi in Italy saw similar but 
separate developments in ideas about the humanity of the insane and their capacity 
to respond to gentleness and kindness, but without any of the religious doctrine. 
Collectively, these approaches all came to be known as moral treatment and all saw 
the insane person as someone how needed to relearn how to govern their inner 
world of emotions and thoughts (Porter, 1997). In histories of psychiatry, moral 
treatment often takes on a heroic and progressive character as an expression of a 
time when psychiatry found (and then kept) its humanity (Micale & Porter, 1994). 
Foucault’s history of madness controversially revised such a view (Foucault, 2001) 
and argued that instead of liberating the mad, moral treatment created hidden and 
therefore more sinister, psychological chains. “The real operations are different. In 
fact Tuke created an asylum where he substituted for the free terror of madness the 
stifling anguish of responsibility; fear no longer reigned on the other side of the 
prison gates, it now raged under the seals of conscience.” (Foucault, 2001, p. 234). 
Many have critiqued Foucault’s work and its accuracy as a work of history (Gutting, 
1994) but regardless of these criticisms, his ideas about moral treatment have 
opened up the possibility of thinking about it as more than humanitarian; that power 
was and is at work in practices that are concerned with teaching people to develop 
their internal capacity to govern thoughts, emotions and behaviour. 
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While not the only institution concerned with moral treatment as an approach, The 
Retreat had a significant influence upon ideas in both Britain and the USA about the 
role of asylums in the care of the insane (Lilleleht, 2002; Porter, 1997), much of it as a 
result of the publication by Tuke’s grandson Samuel of ‘Description of The Retreat’ in 
1813 (Tuke, 1964/1813). As a result, “…what started as a local, private, sectarian 
experiment in charity wrought a fundamental change in the attitude to the insane in 
England and spread throughout the civilised world.” (Hunter & Macalpine, 1964, p. 
19). While perhaps not as grand as this quote may claim, it has none the less been 
highly influential. Psychiatry quickly adopted these more humane approaches but 
without any of the religious overtones. When New Zealand asylums were being 
developed in the last half of the nineteenth century it was the British asylum practice 
of moral treatment and physician Superintendents that were adopted (Ernst, 1991).  
While claims to be providing moral treatment in New Zealand asylums is considered 
rhetoric rather than reality, in the Victorian period moral treatment was talked about 
as an example of enlightened psychiatric practice (Ernst, 1991). Indeed it continues 
to be referred to in contemporary times as an example of how psychiatry needs to 
return to similar practices based upon “kindness, compassion, respect and hope for 
recovery” as illustrated by the work of the Tukes” (Roberts & Wolfson, 2004, p. 37).  
Moral treatment aided in the creation of the space for further developments in 
psychological interventions for the treatment of the mentally ill. It helped to open the 
door on ways of thinking that see both people’s emotions and behaviours as 
mechanisms through which people can be governed and can learn to govern 
themselves and in doing so it created a significant condition of possibility for self-
management and psychoeducation. Through its reference to the texts of moral 
treatment, psychoeducation practices in psychiatry are linked back to examples of 
social reform and expressions of humanity and in doing so they become 
contemporary examples of enlightened practice. But as Foucault’s work suggests, 
there is power at work within practices that promote self-governance. For the person 
who is the target of psychoeducation there is the potential to see themselves as 
taking part in what could be an example of a progressive psychiatric treatment as 





When texts on psychoeducation are treated as historical documents and a way to 
understand the events, ideas and circumstances that have made the development of 
psychoeducation practices possible, it can been that it is a practice that is tied tightly 
to the historical development of the discourse of psychology and its infiltration over 
the 20th century into how we understand the nature of being human (Rose, 1998b). 
Moral treatment’s behavioural approach of rewards and punishments as the means 
to manage a person’s emotions can be seen as part of the early development of the 
discourse which over time would develop further in the application of scientific 
constructs to how a person can be persuaded to engage in changing their attitude 
toward their health condition as a means to change their behaviour. These ideas 
converge with an assumption that it is a ‘natural’ state of humanness to seek 
autonomy, independence and to make one’s own choices; to think or act otherwise is 
constructed as abnormal. The notion of the therapeutic potential of psychological 
constructs and their ability to help heal or improve a person’s life can be seen in ideas 
about the ‘proper’ regimes for living promoted by both mental hygiene ideals and 
public health campaigns; that there is a psychological shaped space inside everyone 
and with education, all people can learn to optimise this space (Rose, 1998b, 1999a). 
Ideas about self-help and group therapy also turn to the therapeutic potential of 
psychology to heal; that people need the knowledge of psychology if they are to either 
heal themselves or turn to the healing powers of others.  
The subject positions that would seem to be on offer are also infused with 
psychological constructs; a person who needs to learn from psy-experts in order to 
make the ‘right’ decisions about a suitable regime of living, a person with the capacity 
to change themselves but if they don’t or can’t they become positioned as lacking in 
psychological norms of self-confidence and self-efficacy. For the person understood 
to have a mental illness, they are positioned as having been freed from the 
oppression of institutions but in return they become someone who must now take on 
their own governance and regulation on the basis of psy-related expertise. It remains 
to be seen if these subject positions continue to make themselves available to the 
selves who are the focus of self-management for bipolar disorder and it is to this that 
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the thesis turns after first addressing the practicalities of engaging in a Foucaldian 






“…every word, every phrase has the deepest roots, a lifetime of connections and 
associations, of sounds that ripple through words, of memories and dreams. 
Words, all words, are so deeply enmeshed, so implicated, it seems a wonder that 
we can still use them to new effect, can still pull them off ourselves like blood-
fattened leeches and throw them back into the pool.”  (Dugdale, 2013) 
 
When discourse is understood as the way a system of statements come together to 
construct an object and as a result shape what can and cannot be said about the 
object/s, it becomes possible to unpick the patterns being used in discourse to 
produce particular understandings and show how they work to produce and 
reproduce ways of being a person through relations of power. Having created a 
theoretical position for this discourse analysis based upon the work of Foucault and 
having constructed a historical context for the discourse of self-management for 
bipolar disorder, this chapter is used to firstly position this discourse analysis within 
a field of other analyses concerned with critiquing the practices of health and 
medicine before moving on to make explicit how the key theoretical concepts of 
discourse, subjectivity and power are used to approach this Foucauldian discourse 
analysis. 
Post-structural theories and Foucault’s concepts in particular have been used 
extensively by authors seeking to critique dominant assumptions in health and 
medicine. Chronic illness (Armstrong, 1990; Galvin, 2002), public health (Armstrong, 
1995, 2014; Lupton, 1992; Petersen, 1996, 1997; Petersen & Lupton, 1996), primary 
health care (McDonald, Mead, Cheraghi-Sohi, Bower, Whalley, & Roland, 2007)),  
nursing (Cheek & Porter, 1997; Crowe, 1998; Gastaldo & Holmes, 1999; Holmes & 
Gastaldo, 2002; Lines, 2001; Manias & Street, 2000), intellectual disability (Burrell & 
Trip, 2011), psychotherapy (Hook, 2003; Miller & Rose, 2008; Parker, 2008), 
psychology (Parker, 1992, 2008, 2015a; Rose, 1998b; Willig, 2000) and psychiatry 
(Enoch, 2005; Hacking, 2007; Hamilton & Roper, 2006; Holmes, 2002; Philip, 2009; 
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Rose, 2008; Rose, 1986, 1998a; Terkselsen, 2009) have all proved fruitful areas to 
rethink the relationships between health care institutions and practices, medical 
knowledge, the recipient of health expertise and how people come to make sense of 
who they are. Discourse analyses based upon Foucault’s work and applied as a 
specific research method are to be found across the same range of health and psy-
discipline related fields. Those that have specifically found the exploration of 
subjectivity and governmentality within discourse analysis a useful direction have 
covered areas such as genetic counselling (Leontini, 2010), public health campaigns 
focused on smoking (Gilbert, 2008) and healthy eating (Vander Schee, 2009), 
contraceptive counselling (Hayter, 2006), obesity  (Ruud Knutsen, Terragni, & Foss, 
2011) and aging (Paulson & Willig, 2008). 
Aim 
This thesis seeks to extend how post-structural concepts are applied to health care 
practices by exploring a particular set of mental health practices named as self-
management for bipolar disorder. Using a Foucauldian inspired discourse analysis 
because of its concern with “what kind of objects and subjects are constructed 
through discourse and what kinds of ways-of-being these objects and subjects make 
available to people.” [italics in original] (Willig, 2001, p. 91), this thesis explores the 
productive nature of self-management discourse in terms of the power relations at 
work within it and its ability to shape subjectivity. In doing so it aims to re-evaluate 
the ‘self’ in self-management by identifying the effects of the discourse of self-
management for bipolar disorder upon both how a person makes sense of themselves 
and how they are to live.  
To achieve this aim this chapter lays out the method that lies behind the discourse 
analysis that follows in chapters 5, 6 and 7. It starts with a discussion of the social and 
cultural context within which this discourse analysis has been put to work and then 
moves to a discussion of Ian Parker’s (1992) ‘steps’ of discourse analysis and how 
they were applied to this project. The chapter ends with a discussion of the methods 
used to produce the interview texts for analysis and a discussion of the issue of rigour 
in discourse analysis. While the previous two chapters detailed the theoretical 
position of the thesis in terms of its key concepts of discourse, subjectivity, power and 
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history, this chapter now lays out the methods used to approach a Foucauldian 
inspired discourse analysis; from data gathering through to the process of analysis. 
The Social and Cultural Context of the Analysis 
Contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand society acts as the often unspoken context 
within which much of the texts for analysis and the analysis itself has been 
constructed therefore any discussion of method must first start by making this 
explicit as it will have both knowingly and unknowingly shaped how this analyst 
engages with both the creation and the analysis of discourse. Aotearoa New Zealand 
It is a society deeply shaped by colonialism. In 1840 a treaty, Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The 
Treaty of Waitangi) was signed between the British Crown and Māori chiefs in which 
a broad statement of principles was agreed on which to base a relationship between 
the British Crown and the indigenous people of the land. This treaty became the 
founding document of Aotearoa New Zealand and legitimated the arrival of British 
settlers. While one of the few treaties be agreed between Great Britain and an 
indigenous people, it is now recognised that the version documented in English was 
different to the one in Māori that the rangatira (chief or noble person) signed, but it 
was the English version that became the official document for the Crown. Needless to 
say the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand lost out in the process, losing 
their land and with it their way of life, language and ultimately their wellbeing. Using 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi as a basis for negotiations with iwi (tribe), since the 1980’s the 
Crown has engaged in a process of restitution whereby they acknowledge breaches of 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi and provide compensation to iwi (Bidois, 2013; Network 
Waitangi, 2015; Salmond, 2012).  
Te Tiriti o Waitangi has also become a document that influences the discursive 
practices of health and social services in Aotearoa New Zealand. In an effort to 
reconcile the contradictions between the two versions of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, non-
Māori institutions have looked for principles that can guide government policy. 
Within health and social services the principles drawn upon are those of 
participation, partnership and protection (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988). 
Debates over what these prinicples might mean in practice has led to the 
development of concepts such as cultural safety (Network Waitangi, 2015; Ramsden, 
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1990, 2000) as way to help health professionals enact a commitment to Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi. Despite this, Māori health statistics indicate that there remains a significant 
disparity between the health and wellbeing of Māori in comparison to non-Māori 
(Robson & Harris, 2007). 
By claiming an ethnicity of pākehā (New Zealand European), a position is claimed by 
the writer as someone who is non-Māori and acknowledges Te Tiriti o Waitangi as 
the founding document of contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand society and the 
obligations that it creates. In doing so Te Tiriti o Waitangi is also being constructed as 
an invitation to non-Māori to enter into a relationship with Māori as the indigenous 
people of the land and not perpetuate the colonial oppression of the past. Both the 
interviews and the process of analysis will therefore have been shaped by this 
position. As pākehā based research no authoritative claim is made to Māori 
knowledge9 but as a researcher who seeks to engage actively with a Māori worldview 
from a position influenced by social justice, these perspectives can be seen to have 
influenced the discussion of the findings in Chapter 8.  
This discourse analysis is as culturally situated as the discursive resources drawn on 
in the texts under study and in making explicit a stance in relation to the social and 
cultural context of the discourse analysis, a discourse of biculturalism is being drawn 
upon. This is seen in the choice to refer to the nation state of Aotearoa New Zealand 
by both its English and Māori names, the claims made with regard to how the term 
‘pākeha’ is being used and the choice to use the Māori name for the treaty. These are 
discursive strategies being used for the explicit purpose of in some small way, 
resisting the longstanding technique of oppression by devaluing a Māori world view. 
But despite intentions motivated by notions of social justice and with an awareness 
of how oppression is maintained in language (Parker, 2015), the data has none-the-
less been interpreted by an analyst ‘brought up’ within a dominant white-Western 
world view and this will likely have impacted upon how the texts were both 
generated and analysed.  
                                                          
9 Whenever Māori concepts became apparent in the data guidance was sort from appropriate Māori 
sources. Specifically this was my supervisor Dr Cameron Lacey (Māori and Indigenous Health Institute, 
University of Otago, Christchurch) and Mr Ruru Hona (Ngati Kahu, Ngaa Puhi; Pukenga Atawhai, Youth 
Forensic Team, Canterbury District Health Board) 
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‘Doing’ Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis as a research method is perhaps best described as a sensitivity to 
language and its productive capacities.  As such the attention is upon what discourse 
is doing rather than grasping at the meaning a ‘speaker’ is using language to convey 
(Crowe, 2005; Willig, 2001). As a means to understand how discourse can be 
analysed, Parker proposes twenty ‘steps’ to be worked through, though not 
necessarily sequentially (Parker, 1992, 1999b, 2004). These ‘steps’ are firstly 
described and then their application to this thesis is discussed. 
1. Treat the objects of study as texts which can be put into words.  
2. In a process of free association, consider the symbolic connections, different 
subject positions and alternate meanings that may be present for different 
readers of the text. 
These can be seen as preliminary steps that identify the texts for analysis and any 
additional texts that need to be included to help make sense of the material.  
3. Identify the objects that are being referred to. 
4. Treat the discourse as if it were an object. 
As discourse is understood as the system of statements and practices that construct 
objects, these need to be named, most usually by focusing on the nouns used but also 
by word combinations and adjectives. As with all aspects of discourse analysis, the 
choice of which objects to identify is an interpretive process but in the process of 
doing this connections and patterns in the text can begin to be identified. In treating 
the discourse as if it were an object, the text analyst is required to put themselves at a 
distance from the text in order to not get drawn into the truth claims or taken for 
granted assumptions at work within the text. 
5. Specify the types of person being talked about in the discourse. 
6. Speculate on the rights and responsibilities being expected of these people. 
This process is concerned with the construction of subjectivity within the discourse, 
the subject positions being made available to the reader or audience of the text. What 
and how are they called into being, what rights to speak do they have and in what 
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way may they speak. This is a particularly pertinent aspect of the process of this 
thesis as it is concerned with subject positions available to people within a self-
management discourse and the implications of this for their construction of their 
ethical self. 
7. Map the network of relationships that are constructed, the picture of the 
world that this discourse presents. 
8. Imagine how this picture of the world might respond if attacked or criticised.  
In order for a discourse to systematically construct objects of which they speak, there 
is a set of cultural understandings being put to work by the reader/audience that 
enables them to make sense of it. These stages seek to identify what cultural 
understandings or picture of reality is being used to give the discourse coherence and 
make it make sense. 
9. Identify the points of contrast between the different ways of speaking and the 
different objects they create in the process. 
10. Identify the points where these different ways of speaking seem to speak 
about the ‘same’ object but in different ways. 
Discourse entails the use of other discourses to explain, understand or articulate it. 
These questions seek to explore and identify the other discourses at work; to 
consider the relationships between them and make these explicit. 
11. Consider how the different discourses identified at work in the previous two 
steps address different audiences. 
12. Consider how I as the analyst have chosen to name or interpret these different 
discourses and the moral or political aspects of the interpretation. 
This stage is interested in the reflexivity of discourse, it’s way of folding back on itself 
to reflect on its own way of speaking in order to draw attention to the contradictions 
and potential other discourses or ways of speaking about things that are so taken for 
granted that are not seen. 
13. How have the discourses emerged historically. 
14. How have the discourses woven in their own story of their origin. 
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Texts are located in time and the objects to which they refer have been written and 
spoken of previously in other texts and discourses that have gone before therefore a 
discourse analysis must include a consideration of the historical nature of discourses, 
the subject positions made available within them and how this “lays out a field of 
action” from which people can come to know themselves (Parker, 2004, p. 152).  
15. What institutions are reinforced by the particular discourses identified. 
16. What institutions are subverted or attacked by these same discourses. 
These questions signal a move to a focus in the analytic process on the role of power 
in discourse. Institutions reproduce particular social practices that are sanctioned by 
social norms through their discursive practices. This makes consideration of the 
relationship between discourse and institutions one way to begin to consider how 
power is at work. 
17. Look at which categories of people gain or lose from the identified discourses. 
18. Who would promote or oppose these discourses. 
In line with the earlier discussion of power’s both productive and coercive nature, 
this stage is concerned with the subject positions and the types of knowledge 
associated with them that have the most to gain or lose, and how dominant 
discourses might be resisted as a result.  This aspect of the analytic process is another 
of particular relevance for this thesis with its interest in how self-management 
practices act as a form of self-surveillance and an enactment of governmentality.  
And finally; 
19. Explore how the discourses connect with other oppressive discourses. 
20. Consider how the discourses allow dominant groups to justify the present. 
With these final questions Parker is concerned with the ideological effects of 
discourse and the relationship between discourse and those manifestations of power 
that are interested in promoting certain sets of beliefs and ideas that are central to 
“the whole social order” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 8) through the means of “social 
domination …in an inherently non-transparent way” (Zizek, 1994, p. 8). Discourse, 
discursive practices and the people that use them are both the instrument and the 
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result of power (Hook, 2001) therefore any analysis of discourse must include a 
consideration of how power is put to work. 
Applying theory to method 
In order to explore the effects of the discourse of self-management for bipolar 
disorder upon how a person makes sense of themselves and how to live, Parker’s 
(1992) ‘steps’ have been applied in the following manner. 
As a precursor to the analysis and as detailed in chapter 3, the first step as to engage 
with the questions of how the discourse of self-management has emerged historically 
as a way to understand how other discourses and circumstances have, over time, 
come to shape self-management discourse and the subject positions it makes 
available. To do this a search of the literature was undertaken to collect together 
articles with a focus upon psychoeducation as the name given to the structured 
educative process of providing people with information about their condition, 
teaching self-management skills and promoting their ability to make more informed 
decisions about their own treatment (Smith et al., 2010). The first approach was to 
locate the earliest possible use of the term in the field. This was then broadened to 
articles that talked about concepts of both education and group based treatment of 
people understood to have bipolar disorder. In the process of reading, other articles 
were identified that gave an indication of the ideas shaping psychoeducation so they 
were also incorporated into the collection of articles. This process generated 20 
articles ranging from 1975 through to 2006. A template was created to bring focus to 
the reading and interpretation of the articles which included identifying the type of 
intervention being discussed and for whom, how psychoeducation was defined (if at 
all), how the intervention was thought to work, and any references (both implied and 
explicit) to theories or authors shaping ideas. Because the authors’ intention in 
writing was usually not for the purposes of critique of the concept of 
psychoeducation, the assumptions and theories upon which they base their 
discussions of psychological and education interventions are implied. This means the 
judgements and interpretations made have required a degree of ‘reading between the 
lines’ in order to make sense of text through texts that have gone before.  
84 
 
The first foci of analysis following this was then to consider how discourse was being 
used to construct ‘bipolar disorder’ and ‘self-management’ as objects and then how 
discourses positioned people with bipolar disorder and the type of person they are 
‘called’ to be. Whilst engaging in this process attention was paid to identifying the 
discourses of which self-management discourse itself seemed to be made up of and 
the implications of this for how a person may come to understand and act upon 
themselves. Throughout the analysis specific attention was also paid to identifying 
the power relations at work within discourses with a particular focus upon applying 
the concept of governmentality. This resulted in the concepts of subjectification (how 
others are governed and objectified by discourse) and subjectivation (how people 
govern themselves) (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2009) being used to provide a structure 
to both the process and write up of the analysis. 
In chapter 5 the concept of subjectification is used to approach an analysis of the 
Psychoeducation Manual for Bipolar Disorder (Colom & Vieta, 2006) which is an 
expert produced text designed to educate mental health professionals about how best 
to promote the self-management practices of people with bipolar disorder. The 
approached used in this stage was to ask a number of particular questions of the text 
in terms of how discourse was being used to construct both object and subject. The 
following questions guided this stage of analysis: 
How is bipolar disorder constructed as an object and on the basis of what 
knowledge? 
What subject positions does the text make available to people with bipolar disorder? 
What sort of relationship are people diagnosed with bipolar disorder expected to 
have with the object? 
What metaphors are implied or explicit in the text that allow the statements ‘bipolar 
disorder is...’ and ‘a person with bipolar disorder is...’ to be completed. 
In chapters 6 and 7 processes of subjectivation (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2009) - how 
people with bipolar disorder govern themselves and turn themselves into particular 
subjects – is used to analyse the transcripts of interviews with people understood to 
have bipolar disorder. Chapter 6 approaches the relationship between discourse and 
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self-formation by considering how people use discourse to construct bipolar disorder 
as an object and from this make an informed interpretation of what this might mean 
for how subjectivity is being shaped by discourse. To this end textual statements 
were grouped according to how they seemed to answer four questions;  
How is bipolar disorder constructed as an object? 
How is self-management constructed? 
How is life with bipolar disorder constructed? 
What discourses are being drawn upon in these processes? 
Chapter 7 then approaches the relationship between discourse and self-formation by 
considering the subject positions that self-management discourse makes available to 
people with bipolar disorder and the implications of this for processes of self-
formation. Using the findings detailed in Chapter 6 which explored processes of 
subjectification, a framework within which to understand self-management discourse 
is developed that identifies three particular elements to the discursive practices of 
self-management; 1) acceptance and recognition, 2) examine, confess and change, 3) 
moderate and regulate. These elements were then used to group textual statements 
and determine what subject positions or ways of being in the world are made 
available to people with bipolar disorder through self-management discourse. While 
these three elements create a conceptual tool for making sense of self-management 
discourse they also become a way to make sense of the subject positions on offer. 
This focus upon processes of subjectivation seeks to take the exploration of the 
discursive construction of subjectivity beyond something purely descriptive and 
consider how people use discourse to construct themselves (Petersen, 2003; Willig, 
2000). When done in conjunction with an exploration of power relations it allows this 
thesis to enacts its aim of exploring the productive nature of self-management 
discourse and practices and their ability to shape how a person with bipolar disorder 




Writing as analysis 
This discussion of the process of analysis leaves out thus far a vital stage; that of 
writing in order to analyse. The grouping and categorizing of statements was just the 
start of a creative and interpretive process of thinking and writing. In the words of 
Elizabeth St Pierre “...analysis [is] the thinking that writing enables...”(St Pierre, 2011, 
p. 621). The act of writing allowed ideas to be developed, explored, sometimes kept, 
most often rejected or modified into another train of thinking and writing. The 
feedback of supervisors, conversations with colleagues and a continual reading and 
re-reading of theory then allowed further thinking and rewriting.  
When interpretation is understood as “...widening the angle of vision...” rather than 
detective work to find the truth, the aim of analysis is “...to perceive more of what 
presents itself, by adding layers of meaning rather than to ‘boil things down’ to their 
underlying meaning” (Willig 2011, p. 267). Given the fluidity of meaning in language, 
this analysis is but one attempt to explain why things are as they are using some very 
particular assumptions about the nature of human beings and the world in which we 
live.  
Context and Production of Interview Text 
When this project was first conceived and gained ethical approval, the process to 
recruit and collect interviews with people living bipolar was one whereby people 
where to be approached via direct advertising and by mental health workers passing 
on information about the project. Having begun the process of recruitment by 
engaging with local providers of mental health services, the opportunity arose to link 
this project with a larger study that was interested in testing a model of care for 
people with bipolar disorder using psychotherapy (Interpersonal Social Rhythm 
Therapy) and medication management as a means to improve self-management and 
reduce health service use. With the permission of the Ethics Committee10, the 
                                                          
10 Ethical approval for the Bipolar Clinic study was granted by the Upper South B Regional Ethics 
Committee, NZ. Approval no: URB/10/11/044 
Ethical approval for this discourse analysis titled “Living with bipolar disorder: Using Discourse Analysis to 
explore the impact of self-management practices upon the self was granted by the Upper South B Regional 




collection of text for analysis now happened as part of a semi-structured interview 
that research participants engaged in as part of entry to the Bipolar Clinic Study.  
The Bipolar Clinic study is a Health Research Council (NZ) funded project that is 
investigating the clinical effectiveness of an intervention that incorporates 
psychotherapy and medication management in comparison to usual general practice 
care. The primary hypothesis is that those people randomised to the intervention will 
have lower rates of inpatient admission and acute assessment at 12 months than 
those people randomised to usual follow up care after discharge from specialist 
mental health services. One hundred people aged 18-64yrs with Bipolar I or II will be 
recruited at their point of discharge from the local specialist mental health service 
and following consent, will be randomised to either treatment as usual within general 
practice or treatment within the Bipolar Clinic. Exclusion criteria is limited to a) 
having a concurrent diagnosis of schizophrenia, b) having a concurrent diagnosis of 
severe alcohol or drug dependence or c) meeting DSM IV criteria for a depressive, 
manic or hypomanic episode. 
The decision to use the Bipolar Clinic as a source of data was primarily a pragmatic 
on as the author of this thesis worked as both a mental health professional providing 
psychotherapy to participants and as a research fellow who completed all the 
baseline data gathering with participants. These roles allowed the opportunity to 
combine both my interviewing role and my PhD project to gather data. 
The process of gathering baseline data from participants in the Bipolar Clinic study 
began with an audio-recorded, semi-structured interview that explored participants’ 
experiences of living with bipolar disorder. The interview schedule asked questions 
of interest to several members of the research team (including this PhD thesis) which 
resulted in a wide ranging conversation covering how they lived with the condition, 
what they thought of the notion of self-management, their experience of taking 
medication, their views on the helpfulness of health services and the subjective 
experience of different mood states. The semi-structured interview was the start of a 
lengthy process of data gathering using a mixture of structured, semi-structured and 
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self-report questionnaires.11All interviews took place in the offices from which the 
Bipolar Clinic study operated and were held during the day at a time mutually 
convenient to both participant and researcher. 
Choosing the transcripts for analysis 
At the point of starting this discourse analysis, 69 semi-structured interviews had 
been completed. The first 14 interviews where transcribed and read through a 
number of times to ‘get a feel’ for how people spoke about self-management and to 
learn to read a text with a focus on discourse rather than attributing meaning. After 
this, interviews were chosen for transcription on the basis of a growing awareness of 
how discourse was being used at the time of the interview and when interviews 
might include moments of contradiction and ambivalence.  
In line with the assumption that meaning making through language is culturally and 
socially situated and dependent upon the particular discursive resources available to 
a person, all the interviews with those people who constructed their identity as Māori 
were also included. As a pākehā researcher producing a discourse analysis shaped by 
a pākehā world view, the intention in ensuring that all interviews with Māori were 
included was not in order that claims could be made regarding how discourse is 
influenced by ethnicity but rather to ensure both due respect to the bi-cultural nature 
of Aotearoa New Zealand society and to gather a diversity of views about self-
management. Twenty five interviews in total formed the corpus of interview-based 
text as at this point saturation had been reached with no new discourses or 
constructs presenting themselves. Six of these participants identified as Māori, 
sixteen as New Zealand European, one white Englishperson, one white South African 
                                                          
11 Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996); Study 
specific demographic questionnaire; Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire (Broadbent, Petrie, Main, & 
Weinman, 2006); The Beliefs About Medication Questionnaire (Horne, Weinman, & Hankins, 1999); Bipolar 
Self-Efficacy Scale developed by Centre for Clinical Interventions 2008 Perth, Australia; External Influences 
on Attitudes to Bipolar Disorder and Medication Adherence, developed specifically for this study; Health 
Care Climate Questionnaire (Ludman, Simon, Rutter, Bauer, & Unutzer, 2002); Hopkins Symptom Checklist 
Revised (Derogatis, 1983; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973); Medication Adherence Rating Scale (Thompson, 
Kulkarni, & Sergejew, 2000); Quality of Life Questionnaire  (Michalak & Murray, 2010); Social Adjustment 




and one white American. Six of the transcripts were generated by males and nineteen 
by females. 
Transcription process 
To transcribe the audio recordings, a transcriber contracted to the University was 
used to create an initial textual account. All audio recordings were passed securely to 
the transcriber who then deleted any digital copies or shredded any paper copies of 
transcripts as per their confidentiality agreement with the University. The movement 
of audio to transcriber and the return of the transcript were logged by the researcher 
to ensure that each was completed and returned. The researcher then listened to 
each audio recording and checked the transcript for any errors. 
Transcription conventions were kept to a minimum in order to avoid over 
interpretation by the transcriber of the audio material. When portions of the audio 
could not be heard or there was any doubt about the accuracy, the text was placed in 
brackets in the transcript and not used for analysis. In a similar vein, when material 
was omitted from the transcript (usually because of the quality of the audio), the 
omission was indicated by square brackets. Noises of assent or dissent were also 
included in the transcript. 
Limitations of the data collection method 
The decision to collect interview data through the Bipolar Clinic was a pragmatic one 
as it enabled more straightforward access to people with bipolar disorder which 
streamlined the recruitment process and gave access to a larger data source than 
might otherwise have been possible. Given the Bipolar Clinic is a trial of a 
psychotherapy to improve levels of wellness, it’s focus was not incompatible with this 
project’s interest in self-management constructs but linking to this larger study did 
produce limitation in terms of the nature of the interview text that was generated. 
Firstly, it could be argued that participants were motivated to enact the ‘good patient’ 
in their interviews. While research participants often used the concept of altruism 
and the notion of ‘the greater good’ to explain their interest in taking part in a 
research project, there was also both an explicit and implied reason for participating 
in the study which was that of wanting to take up the opportunity it presented to 
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obtain psychotherapy for no fee which is a mental health service not routinely 
available to people with bipolar disorder in this area of Aotearoa New Zealand. This 
was particularly evident in the disappointment that some expressed at being 
randomised to the control group. For the participants then, the baseline interview 
process could be seen as an opportunity to perform in such a way that might 
somehow increase their chances of accessing something perceived to be of value, 
regardless of the information given prior to signing the consent form that emphasised 
the random nature of the allocation process.  
Secondly, in seeking to understand how people with bipolar disorder use and 
respond to the discourse of self-management, those who express opposing, 
disinterested, ambivalent or supportive views are all equally valued but the context 
of the interview was such those people wanting to participate in the Bipolar Clinic 
study were those who willing used the discourse of bipolar disorder to construct 
their experiences. This is not to suggest that any one account by a participant can be 
seen as more accurate or truthful than another as in a post-structurally orientated 
discourse analysis it is not the intended meaning of the speaker that is the focus of 
analysis but rather the discourses to which they are responding. Neither is the intent 
to search for a variety of views so that findings can be generalised, but instead the 
intent is to be able to explore the range of discourses that people are engaging with; 
to explore the variability there is in how people respond to a particular discourse, 
how people are positioned by discourse and how discourse is being used to act as if it 
is the truth. In this discourse analysis it is likely that those who openly resist the 
construction of bipolar disorder as illness are not represented in textual form. 
Despite this a person may not overtly resist a particular construction of subjectivity 
or object but they can still position themselves in contradictory and diverse ways. 
In response to both of these issues, the art of the research interview would seem to 
be in creating a space that allows contradiction and ambivalence to be spoken of so 
that the analysis can take into consideration what was said as much as what could 
have been said but was not (Hook, 2001). While the semi-structured interview format 
generated a wide ranging discussion, it is possible that in ensuring that all questions 
were asked and being mindful of the length of time taken to complete the interview, 
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opportunities to explore such things were not taken up as they might have been had 
the interviews been undertaken solely for the purposes of this thesis. 
Rigour 
Regardless of its theoretical underpinnings, discourse analysis is a highly interpretive 
process and there is a general tendency by those who use it to being averse to a 
recipe based approach of how to ‘do’ discourse analysis (Cheek, 2004; Crowe, 2005; 
Parker, 1992). That said, this does not mean that ‘anything goes’ when it comes to 
undertaking a discourse analysis. There can be seen to be a series of questions that 
good quality discourse analysis needs to be able to address. Crowe (2005) separates 
these questions into issues of methodological and interpretive rigour and the same 
structure is used here. 
Methodologically it is essential that the theoretical framework on which the 
discourse analysis is based is clearly articulated. This includes the meaning and use of 
terms such as ‘discourse’ as they can mean different things in different versions of 
discourse analysis. Does the research question then ‘fit’ this discourse analysis and is 
there a clear rationale for the choice of texts that ‘fits’ with both the research 
question and the theoretical framework. In addition, is there a detailed description of 
both the data gathering and analytic processes and have these happened in a manner 
that is congruent with the theoretical position? Finally is the description of method 
detailed enough to allow readers to understand the context within which it was 
carried out (Crowe 2005, Cheek 2004, Parker 2015, Nixon 2007)? 
In terms of interpretation, it is not the aim of discourse analysis to provide a 
definitive answer or way of making sense of the data. To seek closure in the 
interpretive process can be thought of as “to do violence to the variety of possible 
interpretations…” (Parker, 2015a, p. 78). That said, the interpretive process needs to 
be explicitly and coherently underpinned by the theoretical position of the discourse 
analysis. To determine interpretive rigour then, the reader needs to be satisfied that 
the links between discourse/s and findings have been adequately described and that 
the links between discourse/s and interpretation are both plausible and supported 
with enough detail. In addition, is there enough actual text material to support the 
findings and have the findings been related to existing knowledge on the subject 
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(Cheek, 2004; Crowe, 2005; Nixon & Power, 2007; Parker, 2015a)? By approaching 
rigour in this manner interpretations may vary but the process taken to get there will 
be reported in a way that is coherent and congruent with the theoretical stance 
(Cheek, 2004). 
Summary 
This chapter has sought to detail how post-structuralist concepts of discourse, power, 
subjectivity and history have been applied as a method to this discourse analysis. 
Parker’s (1992) approach to discourse analysis has been described in line with what 
are understood to be the key characteristics of the nature of discourse. These form 
the foundation for how the text materials have been approached and are used in 
conjunction with ideas of subjectification and subjectivation. Details of the context 
within which the interview texts were generated has been discussed exploring the 
practicalities of how the interviews came about and a broader social and cultural 
positioning of both the interviews and the analysis as a whole. What follows these 
considerations of methodology and method is the first stage of the discourse analysis 
and an exploration of processes by which others are governed and objectified by 
discourse. To do this the text under analysis is the Psychoeducation Manual for 
Bipolar Disorder (Colom, 2006) as an example of self-management discourse as 





Analysis: Governing Through Psychoeducation 
 
“...we should not be surprised that health has replaced salvation in our ethical 
systems, that the doctor has supplanted the priest, that the discourse of medicine 
has become saturated with questions concerning the meaning of life. For while 
medicine constantly reminds the inhabitants of our present of the possibilities of 
disease and death that they carry with them, it offers them the possibility of 
vanquishing the sufferings of the flesh, or at least postponing them, through the 
instrumentalization of life by medical criteria and procedures...”  (Rose, 1994, p. 
68) 
The chapters thus far in this thesis have introduced the constructs of self-
management and bipolar disorder and made a case for the use of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis as the means to explore the effects of the discursive practices of 
self-management upon the subjectivity of those understood to have bipolar disorder. 
They have also set the scene for the analysis by providing a theoretical and historical 
context to this discourse analysis and a detailed exploration of the methods used. As 
part of this process of scene setting, psychoeducation has acted as an exemplar of a 
specific tactic of self-management discourse which in turn has acted as a means to 
treat the discourse as a historical object. As made evident in chapter 3, psychological 
constructs can be seen to have acted in a comprehensive way over time to shape 
what is currently understood as self-management for people understood to have a 
mental illness. From moral treatment to behavioural psychology and on to 
contemporary public health campaigns, self-management discourse can be seen to 
have grown out of spheres of action based on psychological norms of what it means 
to be a person and the malleability of human conduct through the application of 
science such that the subjects of these spheres of action become people who lack 
skills and knowledge and are therefore in need of instruction by psy-experts. 
Based upon these theoretical and historical contexts and an explicit method of 
approach to discourse analysis, this chapter now moves to the analysis itself and is 
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the first of three such chapters. This chapter starts the analysis process by focusing 
on processes of subjectification i.e. how people with bipolar disorder are governed 
and objectified by knowledge and power. To do this, the thesis once again returns to 
psychoeducation as a tactic of self-management discourse and analyses a book for 
mental health professionals, written by people understood to be experts in the field 
of bipolar disorder to provide detailed guidance on how to run a psychoeducation 
group for people with bipolar disorder. After making a case for the choice of this 
particular text for analysis, the chapter moves on to examine first how the text 
constructs bipolar disorder as an object, then how it constructs the subjectivity of 
those people with the condition and finish with an examination of the power 
relations at work within the text. 
Psychoeducation and Bipolar Disorder 
Best practice guidelines for the treatment of bipolar disorder (National Collaborating 
Centre for Mental Health, 2006; Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Psychiatrists CPGT for Bipolar Disorder, 2004; Yatham et al., 2013) whilst focused on 
medications as the primary form of treatment, now include discussion of the 
importance of interventions that address the psychological and social ramifications of 
the condition. This includes developing people’s capacity to play an active role in the 
management of their own condition. Psychoeducation is one such psychosocial 
intervention for which there is now a significant amount of research that claims to 
support its use in mental health services for a range of conditions (Bauml et al., 2006; 
Bond & Anderson, 2015; Chien & Leung, 2013; Lucksted, McFarlane, Downing, & 
Dixon, 2012). The most prolific authors on psychoeducation for bipolar disorder have 
been Francesc Colom and Eduard Vieta (Colom, 2011; Colom & Vieta, 2006; Colom et 
al., 2003a; Colom, Vieta, Reinares, Martinez-Aran, Torrent, Goikolea, & Gasto, 2003b; 
Colom et al., 2009; Vieta, 2005) and they have used their research to produce a text 
for mental health clinicians called “Psychoeducation Manual for Bipolar Disorder” 
(Colom & Vieta, 2006). Henceforth referred to here as The Manual, it provides 
detailed instructions on how to run a psychoeducation programme for people with 
bipolar disorder.  
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The Manual was developed out of the research work of the University of Barcelona 
Hospital Clinic Bipolar Disorders Program where Colom is a psychologist and Vieta a 
psychiatrist. While other authors have produced literature reporting on their 
research using psychoeducation as a strategy for treating bipolar disorder (de Barros 
Pellegrinelli, de O. Costa, Silval, Dias, Roso, Bandeira, Colom, & Moreno, 2013; 
O'Connor, Gordon, Graham, Kelly, & O'Grady-Walshe, 2008; Parikh, Zaretsky, 
Beaulieu, Yatham, Young, Patelis-Siotis, Macqueen, Levitt, Arenovich, Cervantes, 
Velyvis, Kennedy, & Streiner, 2012; Poole, Simpson, & Smith, 2012), The Manual is 
currently the only published text that can be found that provides the level of detail 
needed for other clinicians to replicate the programme. This means for any clinician 
wanting to start a psychoeducation programme whose effectiveness is supported by 
research evidence, this would seem to be the most likely one to which clinicians 
would turn. The intention of The Manual is very explicit; to take the “common sense” 
clinical knowledge of the disorder that research has shown reduces relapses of the 
condition and encourage mental health professionals to teach “your patients how to 
manage their disorder better, live with it, progress with it, take their medication 
more effectively and understand why the medication needs to be taken.” (p. xvi) As 
such it is used in this project as an exemplar of a strategy of the discourse of self-
management for bipolar disorder.  
The Manual is broken in to three sections with the first section providing information 
for clinicians on the nature of bipolar disorder, how it is diagnosed and how best to 
treat it; all backed up by claims to scientific research. The second section addresses 
the theory of psychoeducation; why do it, when to do it, the mechanisms by which it 
is believed to work and then consideration of how to run psychoeducation in a group 
setting. The final and most substantial section making up 75% of the content of the 
Manual is a detailed breakdown of the content of a 21 session group psychoeducation 
programme. These 21 sessions are divided into units titled “Awareness of the 
disorder”, “Drug adherence”, “Avoiding substance abuse”, “Early detection of new 
episodes”, and finally “Regular habits and stress management”. Each of the sessions is 
broken down into describing the goal of the session, the procedure, useful tips, 
patient material and then finally an assignment to complete before the next group. 
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The analysis that follows begins by addresses how The Manual constructs bipolar 
disorder as an object and how it positions people understood to have the disorder. It 
considers how bipolar disorder is constructed as a brain illness and how as a result it 
becomes an object that must be medicated, the experiences of which can only be 
named as symptoms and an object that can only be known through the authority of 
medicine and science. As a result it positions those with bipolar disorder as ‘bipolar 
patients’ who are inherently reluctant to take medication and in need of psychiatry to 
provide a simplified version of what their disorder is and how to live with it. Bipolar 
patients are also positioned as problematic on the basis of their thoughts; while 
changing people’s attitudes is understood as central to the endeavour of self-
management, in bipolar patients it is these very thoughts that must be surveilled as a 
sign of illness and a lack of awareness on the part of person that they are ill. Thoughts 
are both the problem to be addressed and the mechanism to fix the problem. 
Bipolar Disorder as an Object 
Bipolar disorder as constructed in The Manual is first and foremost a biologically 
based illness that is located in the brain.  
“Try to explain the bipolar disorders by focusing in particular on its biological 
aspects; in other words, starting by its definition as a brain disorder: the 
bipolar disorder is a disorder that affects the limbic system, 
neurotransmitters, and the endocrine system. In this case, even though this is 
an oversimplification, we will avoid any comment about the interaction of 
these causes with others, of a rather psychological or social nature, because 
this may add confusion.” (p. 55)  
It is also an illness for which there is no known cure and it recurs or relapses 
episodically over a person’s life.  
“In  any event, we have to make it clear to our patients that although it is true 
that they may relapse even if they do everything right, relapses will always be 
less frequent, last less time and be less intense... The term ‘incurability’ is of 
particular concern to patients, because many of them deduce that they are 
always going to be depressed or manic. So we should clarify that the disorder 
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is not curable in the sense that it cannot be ‘erased from the map’, but that it 
can be kept in check – or ‘dormant’, as some of our patients like to say – for 
long periods of time.” (p. 71) 
The Manual is unequivocal in its belief that a medical model is the most truthful way 
of understanding it and while clinicians could “act as defense [spelling in original] 
lawyers for the medical model”, the point is made much more effectively “if it is 
another patient that defines the biological character of the bipolar disorder and the 
need for treatment...” (p. 54) 
As a brain disorder, the experiences of bipolar disorder have no meaning for either 
patient or clinician beyond being symptoms of an illness.  
“What often happens is that mystic or religious exaltation presents itself in the 
context of manic episode and it is nothing more than one of its symptoms, so 
that it goes away when the mania is treated. To explain this point easily and 
amicably, we usually joke about it and say that ‘we don’t have a problem with 
you talking to God through prayer, but we would be worried if you actually 
heard Him answer you’.” (p. 82) 
This means all discussions of how people think or act in the group, particularly if 
their behaviour is indicative of a relapse, can be used as a lesson in how “to locate 
that symptomatology in the disorder” (p. 44).   
The primary feature of bipolar disorder as an illness is the disordered way people 
experience their emotions and mood; 
“The session can begin with this statement: ‘Bipolar disorder results from a 
change in the mechanisms that regulate mood’.” (p. 64) 
Also important is the way people’s experience of disordered mood equates with 
notions of suffering; 
 “In this session, patients tend to ask why we consider bipolar disorder to be 
an illness. Our answer should be simple and clear; it is a biological change that 
has well-described symptoms and that causes people who have it and those 
around them to suffer.” (p. 67) 
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Suffering is constructed as a defining feature of an illness and as an illness, suffering 
would appear to be inevitable in bipolar disorder. 
Depression is a particular experience that is associated with suffering which means 
any experience of suffering can act as a sign of an impending depressive episode; 
“...the majority of patients usually have no difficulty in identifying depression, 
as the psychic suffering (sadness, anxiety, feelings of inadequacy, fatigue) acts 
as a messenger.” (p. 170) 
Depression is also associated with notions of trauma; 
“Since Session 5 was about depression it would not be surprising if its 
contents had worried certain patients and make them recall during the week 
the traumatic or unpleasant experiences of the depressive episodes.” (p. 93) 
On the other hand, experiences of mania and hypomania are constructed as 
pleasurable; 
“It is very important to obtain that our patients do not associate hypomania or 
mania with virtuous or extremely fun periods, especially because many of 
them abandon the mood stabilizing treatment seeking precisely this type of 
relapse...” (p. 144) 
Any attempt to understand mania or hypomania as a positive or purposeful 
experience is a myth to be dispelled; 
“During the session we should stress the pathological nature of both mania 
and hypomania, since many of our patients see hypomania as ‘a blessing’ or ‘a 
gift’. In these instances it would be useful for us to remind them that: (a) 
during hypomania people usually make the wrong decisions, (b) not all the 
symptoms of hypomania are pleasant... and (c) hypomania almost always 
leads to another immediate episode that involves greater  suffering...” (p. 80) 
In this construction of bipolar disorder, the suffering of depression has no meaning 
beyond its place as a sign of an illness while hypomania and mania are pleasurable 
states of mind which people find hard to give up. When experiences such as these can 
only able to be spoken of as symptoms of an illness that episodically recurs, it 
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becomes vital to be able to “differentiate normal emotions from pathological ones” (p. 
85) so that thoughts and feelings can be scrutinized for evidence of a relapse. 
Conversations about what the experiences might mean for the person (instead of or 
as well as their role as symptoms) become impossible in this context. 
As an illness, bipolar disorder must be treated by medication and psychoeducation is 
an intervention that reinforces to people this “fundamental aspect of their treatment: 
its biological nature and the need for drugs.” (p. 53). While The Manual is in the 
business of persuading people that psychological interventions for bipolar disorder 
are important, this cannot in any way be seen to be at the expense of medication. 
Psychological treatments “must always be combined with mood-stabilizer treatment 
and many times with an antidepressant.” (p. 123) and “it is absolutely necessary for 
the therapist to...make it clear that the medication is absolutely necessary, including 
writing it on the blackboard if necessary...” (p. 54) 
Significant time is dedicated in the programme to medication related issues. Three 
sessions are given over to informing patients about mood stabilisers, anti-manic 
drugs, and antidepressants and another session is focused upon the role of blood 
tests to measure levels of the mood stabiliser drug known as lithium. A further three 
sessions address specific problem with taking medications. The first is about taking 
medications while pregnant, the second is on the efficacy of medication/ medical 
treatment versus alternative treatments such as “homeopathy, naturopathy, esoteric 
therapies, etc” provided by “parascientific professionals (clairvoyant, spiritual 
advisors or healers)” (p. 135) and the final session is on the problems that arise when 
people don’t take medications as prescribed or stop taking medications completely. 
Patient’s non-adherence to medication regimes is constructed as a particular problem 
with a section of The Manual dedicated to defining forms of non-adherence, the 
reasons for it and how to combat it; 
“Chart 1. Types of poor treatment adherence 
1. Absolute poor adherence. This refers to the complete negligence of the 
patient in following the indications of the responsible therapist... 
2. Selective partial adherence. Certain patients selectively reject a certain 
type of treatment but not another.... 
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3. Intermittent adherence...Many patients do not completely abandon the 
treatment but neither do they take it as prescribed.... 
4. Late adherence...some patients shom initial resistance to admitting the 
need to receive treatment and decides to start taking the medication 
prescribed after a few relapses... 
5. Late poor adherence. After 2 or 3 years of good adherence, some patients 
start abandoning their mood stabilizers without apparent reason... 
6. Abuse...Taking more medication is also a rather common form of poor 
adherence among bipolar patients... 
7. Behavioural poor adherence. The term ‘poor adherence’...also includes 
aspects concerning the attitude and behaviour of the patient...obeying 
clinician’s instructions as to the regularity of sleep habits and other 
advisable behaviour that may facilitate euthymia, such as not consuming 
alcohol or other toxics...” (p. 105-106) 
Treatment of bipolar disorder with medication is an imperative and a great deal of 
time and text is dedicated to making this point. Through detailing different types of 
non-adherence this problem becomes categorical in nature, constructing particular 
kinds of non-adherent people with particular characteristics that can become the 
focus of attention. When treatment of bipolar disorder with medication is an 
imperative it is perhaps not surprising that problems with people taking medications 
would also be responded to using a medical style categorical approach.  
As a biological brain disorder it is the combination of psychiatric medicine and 
science that holds the authority to determine how best to understand the experiences 
known as bipolar and how best to treat it. It is only those with expertise in matters 
psychiatric who can provide “adequate treatment with drugs and the intervention of 
a psychologist specialised in techniques with proven efficacy [who] may guarantee a 
more positive evolution of the bipolar disorder” (p. 139) particularly as “the 
treatment of bipolar disorders has experienced a spectacular evolution in the last 15 
years, and it may be forseen that this evolution will be even more spectacular in the 
next 15 years.” The particular skill of the psy-sciences has been the way it has made 




In terms of making it knowable, it is the DSM that acts as the means of diagnosis and 
classification and The Manual starts with a section primarily addressed at clinicians 
that considers the symptoms of the different “phases” of depression, mania, 
hypomania and mixed states. The intricacies of diagnosis and classification are 
discussed and the section finishes with a brief discussion of some of the debates 
about new ways of categorising the experience of bipolar disorder. The term “bipolar 
disorder” is used explicitly in preference to the term “manic-depressive psychosis” 
because of the concern that the latter is an inadequate representation of the 
experience and it is a term that is constructed as “highly stigmatized socially…” (p. 
67). 
Having established the boundaries between different types of phases or episodes of 
the disorder, The Manual makes bipolar disorder calculable through ideas of the 
potential to see warning signs of an impending episode. This firstly requires the 
patient to have a detailed understanding of their past history of episodes of illness. To 
achieve this patients are taught the technique of creating a graph of one’s life so that 
periods of illness are represented pictorially with a focus on naming the situations 
that appeared to cause or trigger each episode. 
 
Figure 2 "Life chart in which the patient noted the trigger, certain key treatments and facts." Colom &Vieta (2006), p95 
 
Once a patient has mastered the art of inscribing their life in this way, “it allows them 
to appreciate with a certain perspective the evolution of their disorder, its triggers 
and whether, for example there are times of the year when the probability of a 
relapse is higher (e.g. spring, Christmas, final exams, etc.).” Having begun to 
appreciate the context within which their episodes happen, three further sessions are 
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spent teaching group members how to detect a relapse and take prompt action in 
response. This requires lists of signs to be created for each type of episode and an 
intimate understanding of the difference between one’s “normal mood swings and 
those specific to the disorder...” (p. 168). By creating distinct boundaries between 
normal and abnormal mood, developing the idea of early warning signs of impending 
abnormal mood, and providing techniques of inscription, the psy-sciences make 
bipolar disorder knowable, calculable and therefore able to be acted upon(Hodges, 
2002; Rose, 1999a). 
The authority of the psy-sciences to dictate what bipolar disorder is and how to act 
upon it is intensified through the forceful way that language is used in The Manual 
and how language is used to show clinicians how to conduct psychoeducation. During 
psychoeducation sessions, clinicians are not to allow space for any debate about the 
treatment of bipolar disorder; 
“It is absolutely necessary for the therapist to present, from the beginning of 
the group sessions, both treatments not as opposed but as complementary, 
and to make it clear that the medication is absolutely necessary, including 
writing it on the blackboard if necessary. Otherwise, ‘an antipsychiatry’ type of 
thinking may emerge...” (p. 54) 
The text in The Manual often uses interdictory flavoured language when describing 
the role of patients within psychoeducation; “patients are allowed to get involved 
freely when they think it is necessary...” (p. 49), “we will warn them that failing to 
respect some of these rules may lead to expulsion...”, “Any patient who fails to attend 
five sessions will be forced to leave the group.” (p. 58) and “the mood-chart 
technique, that the patient must master by the end of the session.” (p. 93).  
Whenever The Manual refers to alternative views on the nature or treatment  of 
bipolar disorder there is often what can be read as a disparaging tone to the text; 
 “...the first contact between a patient and a psychological treatment can be 
crucial in explaining the subsequent response to treatment. We are not now 
going to digress into mysteries of other paradigms about whether or not to 
shake hands with our patients and look them in the eye. In principle, they are 
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your hands, your patients and your eyes, so do whatever common sense tells 
you.” (p. 40) 
And; 
“Concerning homeopathy and so-called natural treatments, it must be said 
that, for now, it has not been demonstrated that they have any efficacy in the 
treatment of bipolar disorder. The main advantage of these treatments is that 
they produce as few side effects as a glass of water, and their main problem is 
that their therapeutic efficacy is also similar to a glass of water, in others 
words, ZERO...” (p. 139) 
The overt disapproval of alternate constructions of bipolar disorder is complemented 
by a tone of address to patients that suggests the knowledge of the psy-sciences is 
necessary but complex and therefore requires simplification for patients. As an 
example, in the final session of psychoeducation the written advice that is suggested 
be given to patients states; 
“If you are curious enough to read more, here are some informational books 
we can recommend. We do recommend that you stay away from technical 
books for psychiatrists, psychologists and other professionals, which often use 
language that is difficult for non-health-professionals to understand” (p. 200) 
The apparent need to keep things simple for the patient is also exemplified in the way 
the fairytale of The Three Little Pigs is converted into the story of The Three Little 
Bipolar Pigs as a way to illustrate the biological nature of bipolar disorder and the 
importance of a person’s attitude toward it.  
“The first one simply did not believe what his veterinarian told him and 
thought that bipolar disorder was an illness that had been made up by 
psychiatrists or was a fairytale, so he never changed the way he behaved...The 
second little pig in the story agreed to take the medication his psychiatrist 
suggested, even more so at his family’s insistence...The mistake he made was 
in thinking that medication alone would help keep his mood stable...The third 
little pig joined a psychoeducation group for little bipolar pigs. This 
activity...led him to take all the necessary precautions to avoid the dreaded 
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relapses: he took his medication and paid attention to this doctor’s orders and 
those of his psychologist...he tried to get enough sleep...[h]e paid attention to 
his wife’s comments...he even learned to identify the signs of  relapse in 
time...Out of all the little pigs in this story, he was the wisest pig of all, and 
there are some who say that some pigs are smarter than people.” (p. 69-70) 
While the use of this story comes with a caveat that clinicians need to be able to walk 
a fine line between “comical and disrespectful comments”  (p. 68), it is still none-the 
less presented as one way to educate people about bipolar disorder and it does so in 
way that uses simple, almost childlike methods to instruct. It is as if no one with 
bipolar disorder would have the capacity to understand the details of expert 
knowledge which in turn begs the question of what would happen if a clinician had 
bipolar disorder and attended a psychoeducation group. 
It is imperative that people must recognise the importance of medicine to define and 
treat this biologically recurring condition so The Manual enlists a variety of 
discursive techniques to reinforce the authority of the psy-sciences.  Within 
psychoeducation, techniques to inscribe people’s experiences are promoted as a 
means to know and act upon the disorder through identifying and acting upon the 
early warning signs of illness. At the same time, discussion of alternative 
constructions of bipolar disorder and its treatment are actively discouraged. This 
discouragement is aided by the use of childlike forms of instruction and a restriction 
of patient’s access to complex information that can only be fully understood by 
clinicians. If there was any uncertainty about the dominance of psy-sciences in this 
endeavour, The Manual uses its authority to discredit and ridicule any alternate 
constructions that patients may hold. 
The Bipolar Patient – Constructing Subjectivity 
At the same time as the object of bipolar disorder is discursively produced, so too is 
the nature of the person within whom it is understood to reside. As a person with an 
illness they come under the jurisdiction of pys-sciences and within The Manual the 
person becomes a “patient” and a “bipolar patient” in particular. Throughout The 
Manual and as exemplified in the already quoted text, a person with bipolar disorder 
is routinely referred to as a patient. The degree to which a person adheres (or not) to 
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the psy-sciences view of bipolar disorder makes no difference; everyone with bipolar 
disorder participating in psychoeducation is a patient. As a patient with bipolar 
disorder they take on unique characteristics and these next sections consider how 
The Manual positions the bipolar patient as someone who has difficulty regulating 
their own emotions, who understands their thoughts as both a sign of illness and a 
means to act upon themselves, who has the capacity to be highly reflexive in their 
self-examination and who has the ability to continually defer to experts. 
Emotional regulation 
Throughout The Manual there are textual references that construct people with 
bipolar disorder as having difficulty managing their emotions without the assistance 
of others; 
 “We must warn our patients that making their own life chart is an intense 
emotional work, which implies stirring-up things from the past, so that we ask 
them to abandon it immediately if they start feeling uncomfortable, and to give 
them an opportunity to complete it in an individual session with the 
therapist.” (p. 96-97) 
As a result there are regular references to what clinicians need to do to help people to 
manage their emotional state. Sometimes this is about using humour;  
“We prefer to end sessions with a funny, educational story that takes the 
dramatic feel out of a session’s content.” (p. 67) 
Or changing the topic for discussion; 
“But sometimes you might hear more serious comments like ‘they’ve done me 
a huge injustice, and I’m not going to forgive them for it.’ The therapist must 
be aware of that possibility and be able to redirect the subject matter if he 
detects a hostile reaction.” (p. 74) 
Feelings of guilt are constructed as particularly problematic for bipolar patients so 
are something that clinicians should pay attention to; 
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“ ..to understand what prejudices they have in connection with the disorder, 
since they are often dominated by guilt.” (p. 54) 
And try to act upon; 
“Information about the pathological nature of depression is usually very guilt 
releasing, because patients have often been accused of being ‘weak’ or ‘lazy’ by 
the people around them while they were depressed.” (p. 88) 
Difficulty regulating one’s own emotional state is constructed as a norm for bipolar 
patients and something others, and experts in particular, need to pay attention to in 
order to make up for this deficit. 
Attitude, insight and intentions 
The ability to recognise both the problems and potentials associated with one’s 
thoughts, attitudes and intentions is an important attribute of the bipolar patient. 
Thoughts are constructed as problematic due to the way they indicate the presence of 
actual or potential illness; 
“The handling of depressive or negative cognitions, which also appear in some 
euthymic patients, is extremely delicate during a group psychoeducation 
session, because having the patients begin to sympathize with such cognitions 
must be avoided, especially those that have to do with the disorder (‘we’re a 
bunch of losers’, ‘what lousy luck – we’d be better off dead’, ‘we’ll never do 
anything good,’ etc.)” (p. 42) 
To have an attitude that values the pleasure of hypomania is also problematic; 
“Many patients tend to ‘give themselves permission’ to live through their 
initial hypomanic signs without taking action to abort the episode, and this 
happens because very often the patient has a near-addictive relationship with 
mania.” (p. 157) 
This makes the examination of thoughts and attitudes a priority with an attitude of 
spontaneity towards ones thoughts also a problem; 
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“The first thing to bear in mind is that the majority of problems or important 
decisions should be taken slowly. Haste and impulsivity are poor guides.” (p. 
194) 
While a bipolar patient’s thoughts are important because of the way they act as a 
signal of illness, when thoughts are spoken they also act for others (and clinicians in 
particular) as an indicator of the degree of awareness that a patient holds about what 
is happening to them. Once again thoughts become problematic as they demonstrate 
in bipolar patients “high rates of lack of illness insight” (p. 53). But while constructed 
as a problem, they also seen to offer a way to work upon themselves; 
“The attitude toward the disorder and the health beliefs of each patient play a 
highly significant role in the emergence of poor adherence; obviously, bipolar 
patients who firmly believe that they can control their mood by themselves 
will have a worse degree of adherence.” (p. 107) 
Bipolar patients are therefore called upon to intervene in their thoughts; 
“We can propose that the group debate blame vs. responsibility, by 
contrasting how thoughts of blame are useless and unproductive, and how 
useful, on the other hand, feelings of responsibility are.” (p. 74) 
And change their attitude toward themselves; 
“He was aware that this attitude involved scarifies [spelling mistake in 
original], but since he was a smart little pig, he understood that it was 
worthwhile to live a moderate life in exchange for something as important as 
his happiness and personal stability.” (p. 70) 
Bipolar patients understand the importance of their thoughts and the way thinking 
can both act as means to measure illness, demonstrate self-awareness and as a means 
to bring about change in themselves. 
Reflexivity 
A crucial attribute of a bipolar patient is their capacity to examine what they think, 
feel and do and in the light of this examination, make changes in themselves. The first  
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stage in being able to do this is the ability to separate the normal for abnormal. Firstly 
for hypomania and mania; 
“We always recommend differentiating between hypomania and non-
pathological happiness.” (p. 80) 
And then again in the next session on understanding the symptoms of depression; 
“We will again insist on the need to differentiate normal emotions from 
pathological ones.” (p. 85) 
Then group members are expected to learn to recognise their unique version of 
bipolar disorder; 
“...always emphasize the need to individualize the knowledge of the disorder: I 
am trying to learn not about the illness of bipolar disorder but about my 
bipolar disorder.” (p. 163) [italics in original] 
These skills are particularly pertinent to the process of learning to predict and 
respond to signs of relapse. A patient who can individualize can take the generic 
information about bipolar disorder they have been given and apply it to themselves; 
“Step 2: Individualization – identification of one’s own warnings or 
operational warnings. The goal of this step is to individualize, that is adapt the 
information from Step 1 to everyone’s particular case. We try to have the 
patients to identify which warning signs appear regularly in each type of 
episode.” (p. 158) 
A patient who can specialize can take their ability to examine themselves one step 
further; 
“Step 3: Specialization – prodromes of prodromes, or early warning signs...in 
this step the patient claims ‘specialization’ in their own case, beyond 
knowledge of their own relapse signs. The point is to identify the signals that 
precede the warning signs – ‘warnings of warnings’.” (p. 159) 
Each of these steps now needs to be completed for each abnormal mood state; 
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“Once the patient has made up a list of about 10 items for hypomania/mania, 
another for depression and is some cases where absolutely necessary, a third 
for mixed episodes...we have to work out with the patient (and if he agrees, the 
support person as well) how to use this list.” (p. 162) 
The list is then to be used daily as a means to examine oneself and determine what 
needs changing; 
“If after reviewing the list, you match one or one of the items, do not do 
anything to change behaviour.  
If you match two items for 3 days in a row, you should consult with your 
support person. 
If you match three or more items in a single day, it is time to put an emergency 
plan into effect.” (p. 162) 
A bipolar patient becomes a prudent planner who can separate the normal from the 
pathological, name, list and rank symptoms by their importance, monitor themselves 
via their lists of warning signs and plan for the inevitable relapse. 
This attribute of reflexivity also requires the capacity to examine and change one’s 
daily routines and habits, a subject to which a whole session is dedicated; 
“Session 18 
Regularity of habits. 
...The goal of this session is to enter into greater depth on a point that has 
come up indirectly in almost all session: the need for regular habits.” (p. 182) 
For bipolar patients this means paying attention to sleep habits; 
“Observing how we sleep can give us information on the status of our bipolar 
disorder...We can use this information to help us; if we notice we are starting 
to feel depressed, it may be useful to reduce the number of sleep hours to 
improve our mood. On the other hand, a good way to head off a hypomanic 
decompensation is to make sure we are sleeping a good number of hours for a 
few days.” (p. 185) 
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To work habits; 
 “It is desirable for people suffering bipolar disorder to have a job with a strict 
habit schedule, hence jobs with constant shift changes, or no schedule, are not 
advisable.” (p. 187) 
And also to eating habits; 
“...many of our patients are worried about their weight gain as many of them 
binge when they are anxious, or are sedentary; also some psychoactive drugs 
affect weight. It is advisable for a bipolar patient never to go on a very strict 
diet which involves going hungry, and in any case it is advisable for the diet to 
be monitored by a dietician and a psychologist.” (p. 184) 
On the other hand, habits related to physical exercise are constructed as problematic 
because while physical exercise is health inducing it is also seen as risky behaviour 
for bipolar patients; 
“Doing physical exercise is highly advisable for a person suffering from bipolar 
disorder, but we must bear in mind that sports are highly stimulating, so it is 
best to practice sports during euthymia and, still better, during a depressive 
phase even though one does not feel like it.” (p. 187) 
The level of attention that bipolar patients must give to examining their habits is 
significant, especially if habits are thought of as “repetitive patterns of behaviour that 
structure our lives and permit ordinary action of daily life to unfurl without effort of 
attention.” (Gray, 2014, p. 139). For the bipolar patient there would seem to be much 
work to do if there is any chance of their habits becoming effortless. 
The bipolar patient does not always act as he or she should so this requires them to 
be able to recognise their mistakes and then tell others; 
“This session, and one of the previous ones, is rather propitious for 
confessions of poor adherence by the patients, which is very positive both for 
patients who speak sincerely and for their group mates. If this happens, we 
will try to have patients explain their reasons without being interrupted by 
the rest of the group and we will not adopt under any circumstances an openly 
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critical attitude. Our first reaction must always be to thank the patient for 
their sincerity and for showing us enough trust to explain such a significant 
problem both to (we) therapists as well as to the other members of the group.” 
(p. 140-141) 
The importance of the admission of wrong doing and the opportunity it offers people 
with bipolar disorder as means to come to know, examine and change themselves is 
underscored by the strong directive given to clinicians about how they must act in 
this situation. Through the practice of confession the group member takes “the role of 
the self-examinatory, self-reflective subject who needs both [to] tell and recognize 
the truth” (Hook, 2003, p. 612) of their self.  
While the capacity for reflexivity can be understood as an attribute of contemporary 
subjectivity for all people (Giddens, 1991) for bipolar patients it is constructed as a 
central attribute to be cultivated. There appears to be an intensified expectation that 
a bipolar patient can and will examine their thoughts, emotions and behaviours in 
line with the doctrine of psychiatry, confess mistakes and then adjust themselves 
accordingly. 
Defer to the expert 
The norms of subjectivity for a bipolar patient appear to centre on deficits in 
emotional regulation, the recognition of the problem and potential of thoughts and 
attitudes and the intensified capacity to be reflexive. All of these attributes rely upon 
the ability of the bipolar patient to defer to expert knowledge on what it means to 
have bipolar disorder. 
People who defer to the experts will comply with a psy-science way of understanding 
what bipolar is and voice this to others; 
“Participation in this group implies ‘confession’ in front of the other member’s 
own diagnosis, in this case bipolar disorder.” (p. 62) 
Most importantly, they will take medication and encourage others to do so; 
“Once again, it will be very positive if it is not the psychologist or psychiatrist 
who appears to be the only defender of the need to take medication, even 
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though obviously he would already have taken this position in front of the 
group; it is appropriate for patients themselves to advise [spelling in original] 
good adherence.” (p. 140) 
If psychoeducation has been successful, they will recognise themselves as the third 
little pig in The Three Little Bipolar Pigs tale.  
“The third little pig joined a psychoeducation group for little bipolar pigs. This 
activity, in addition to reasonable behaviour and being highly motivated not to 
relapse (he knew he enjoyed life a lot more during periods of euthymia), led 
him to take all the necessary precautions to avoid the dreaded relapse; he took 
his medication and paid attention to his doctor’s order and those of this 
psychologist.” (p. 70) 
And recognise the ability of the psy-sciences to know them; 
“Patients included in a psychoeducation group on the other hand, are able to 
sense from our explanations about their disorder that psychiatry has already 
described and understood situations that they may be living through with 
shame, isolation or convinced that they are unique and non-transferable. The 
psychoeducation patient ‘knows that we know’.” (p. 28) 
Deferral to experts is particularly important because of the way a bipolar patient’s 
thinking is prone to error; 
“One of the mistaken ideas that are rather common among our bipolar 
patients is to believe that the bipolar disorder is a ‘lack of lithium in the blood’. 
This obviously a false myth, but we must explain it to all our patients because 
it has become quite popular among the persons who suffer from bipolar 
disorders and even among non-specialist professional.” (p. 113) 
It is also important because bipolar patients are constructed as being susceptible to 
misinterpreting what they need; 
“Many of our patients do not make rational use of sports and simply exercise 
when they feel like it – which is usually when they are starting to be 
hypomanic, and exercise makes things worse.” (p. 184) 
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This means bipolar patients need very specific instructions about how to manage 
themselves; 
“Never try to overcome your hyperactivity and increased energy by trying to 
exhaust yourself, doing lots of physical exercise to tire yourself out and so get 
back to normal. This is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline...” (p. 177) 
Those who do not defer to the expert knowledge of the psy-sciences are positioned as 
rebellious for which education will be the cure; 
These are more ‘open’ session; in other words, sessions in which the patients 
are invited more to give their opinion concerning the topic discussed. The 
purpose of this approach is merely for us to get an idea of which beliefs and 
attitudes are being handled by our patients in order to find out exactly on 
what point we must emphasize, and to understand what prejudices they have 
in connection with the disorder, since they are often dominated by guilt. 
Certain patients react [to] explanations with resistance; in this case, the better 
strategy is to allow the members of the group to discuss between them the 
contents of the sessions rather than for us to act as defense [spelling in 
original] lawyers for the medical model, since if we do so quite a few patients 
will accuse us of having corporate-like attitudes. In exchange, if it is another 
patient that defines the biological character of the bipolar disorder and the 
need for treatment, the ‘rebel’ patient is left without weight arguments. (p. 54) 
Problems of lack of understanding are constructed as part of the disorder which can 
in turn be rectified by psychoeducation; 
Incomprehension is an opportunistic illness that exacerbates the course of 
psychiatric disorders…[p]atients who do not know their disorder do not know 
their lives… (p. 27)  
For those who don’t defer to expert knowledge, their resistance is to be explained by 
the brain disorder that they have. They are positioned as displaying the characteristic 
“high rates of illness insight” (p. 53).  What does not seem to be on offer to the non-
conforming bipolar patient is a position as a person with multiple and conflicting 
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motivations and beliefs; everything about them would seem to be explained by the 
disorder they are understood to have. 
As a bipolar patient both their emotions and thoughts become signs of pathology and 
need to surveilled as such using psychiatric knowledge as the basis of their self-
examination. At the same time a patient’s thoughts and attitudes also become the 
point of influence for psychoeducation as once a patient is able to be persuaded that 
what they have is bipolar disorder, that it needs to be treated with medication and an 
appropriate regime for living and the patient can reproduce these ideas in speech 
then they are understood to have good insight into their situation. When positioned 
in this way, for the bipolar patient it becomes a circular discursive endeavour; 
disordered thinking and emotions are symptoms of bipolar disorder which psy-
experts determine the existence of. To speak outside of the psy-science version of 
bipolar disorder is to risk being labelled as both ill and insightless. Once defined as ill 
or insightless a person does not have a legitimate voice and the presence of 
disordered thinking and emotions confirms the truth of the expert’s diagnosis.  
Absent subjectivity 
The Manual makes very explicit use of and is dominated by the use of a medical 
scientific discourse so it could be said that science and medicine form a significant 
part of the social and cultural context of the text’s creation. But there are other 
aspects of the social and cultural context of discursive practices within the Manual 
that are conspicuous by their absence, rather than overt presence, which in turn 
raises questions about the implications of this for issues of subjectivity. 
All of the research and clinical work upon which The Manual is based has been 
carried out in Spain. The people taking part in the psychoeducation groups both 
clinician and patient alike can be assumed to most likely identify as Spanish or 
Catalan. No mention is made of this beyond an acknowledgement of The University of 
Barcelona Hospital Clinic Bipolar Disorder Program at the start of The Manual. It is as 
if there is no cultural context to psychoeducation. Yet there are aspects of the way 
language is used within the text that suggest that the cultural context has a strong 
influence upon how the discourse of self-management has been produced and how it 
might be read. Firstly, there is a strong tone of authority throughout the text with 
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many instructions for the way things must be done by clinician and patient alike. 
Words such as ‘exclude’, ‘allowed’, ‘expulsion’ and mandatory are peppered 
throughout The Manual. In addition there is the way humour is used explicitly by the 
authors to ‘lighten’ the tone of emotionally difficult conversations. The combination 
of these two linguistic tools allows space for a female, pākehā mental health nurse to 
read a patronising and patriarchal tone to the text but it could also be that this way of 
speaking is a reflection of the value Spanish culture places upon the authority of 
experts in matter of health and welfare. 
Perhaps Spanish culture places a high value upon the authority of medicine and its 
right to dictate how things should be done and to read it as the dominating discourse 
of science and medicine is excessive. Perhaps the use of paternalistic styles of power 
relations in The Manual say more about the conditions of possibility for 
psychoeducation in a country with a long history of Catholic Christianity shaping the 
social fabric and as a result it is unwise to make a case to apply them to any other 
cultural context. In the gap left by these undiscussed elements it would appear that 
the subject positions The Manual makes available are done so in the context of the 
dominant white, western cultural basis of science and medicine. What this means for 
the subjectivity of those who position themselves as ‘non-white’ or ‘persons of colour’ 
is unclear. 
Power Relations 
The discourse of self-management as it is seen to operate in The Manual can be seen 
to construct bipolar disorder as an object of illness that must be medicated whilst 
also positioning those with bipolar disorder as the patient who has difficulty 
regulating their own emotions whilst also being able surveill their emotions, thoughts 
and actions against the norms of psychiatry in order to detect the presence of illness 
and take appropriate action. The production of both object and subject is aided by the 
disciplinary styles of power relations that can be seen to be at work. 
Though the process of psychoeducation people are objectified and categorized on the 
basis of psychiatric knowledge. Clinicians examine the group members while at the 
same time teaching them to examine themselves and in doing so, people are called to 
see themselves as patients in need of the expertise of psychiatry, responsible for 
116 
 
choosing how to respond to their illness. The Manual is also an exemplar of what 
Foucault called pastoral power (Foucault, 2003e) and how pastoral power relations 
have acted as one of the conditions that has made it possible to think that the art of 
governing should become concerned with the welfare of populations (Foucault, 
2003c). 
As exemplified historically in the Christian clergy but with a history that takes it back 
to Hebrew society (Foucault, 2003d), the notion of the pastoral creates an image of 
the pastor who acts as shepherd in charge of a flock. He (as it was a highly gendered 
role historically) holds responsibility for watching over the flock as a whole while 
also knowing each one intimately. He acts as an intermediary between the flock and a 
higher power which therefore imbues him also with authority. It brings together 
notions of salvation, self-sacrifice, attention to the individual and the importance of 
knowing the individual’s inner world (Foucault, 2003f; Toll & Crumpler, 2004). In 
contemporary times it is a style of power relations that is seen particularly within 
health and welfare practices of care (Toll & Crumpler, 2004). Instead of saving the 
soul it is a person’s physical and psychological health that is in need of saving while it 
is the knowledge of the psy-sciences that acts as the authority and means by which to 
know a person’s inner world. It is all “...those tender and beneficial forms of attention 
and regulation operating on the basis of the mechanism of love, or some heart-felt 
‘calling’, which nonetheless serve state power-interests even whilst facilitating 
greater well-being.” (Hook, 2003, p. 617)  
Throughout The Manual, the clinician is constructed as teacher, therapist, authority 
figure, and an evaluator of norms who is also firmly focussed upon on wanting the 
best for their patient. To this end, dedication and a certain amount of self-sacrifice is 
required by the clinician as it is important to make oneself available to patients at the 
earliest sign of trouble although “of course, I am usually busy, but I prefer to spend 5 
or 10 min talking on the phone with one of you, that than not being able to talk to you 
and to have to hospitalize you, let’s say, 2 weeks later. This gives us much more 
work!” (p. 61).   
In a group setting all members of the group are important but it is the individual who 
is the ultimate focus as each member needs to be able to apply their general 
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knowledge about bipolar disorder specifically to themselves.  The practice of 
confession has already been highlighted as an important element of psychoeducation, 
but in the context of pastoral power it becomes the means by which the expert comes 
to know more of a person’s inner secrets so that both they and the individual can 
know and examine in more detail.  The salvation on offer is the opportunity to be 
saved from the inevitable despair and distress of bipolar disorder as exemplified by 
the tale of third little bipolar pig described earlier.  
Following Hook (2003) and his discussion of power relations in psychotherapy, The 
Manual can be seen as an expression of disciplinary power in which ‘its subjects 
adopt subject-positions in which reflexive, self-surveilling relationships are 
reinforced” (Hook, 2003, p. 611) through the objectifying work of medical science at 
the same time as expressing “those positive and seemingly altruistic motivations” 
(Hook, 2003, p. 617) to care for others in ways that requires those ‘others’ to practice 
forms of self-examination and self-disclosure. What on the surface appears to be an 
uncomplicated expression of care for others becomes emblematic of the anonymous 
and hidden nature of power relations as well as governmental power relations where 
the individualizing and normalising objectives of disciplinary power are linked with 
broader governmental aims of the management and welfare of the population 
through the work of psy-pastoral care expertise. 
Summary 
Within The Manual, bipolar disorder is constructed in an unequivocal fashion; it is an 
illness located in the brain that will inevitably recur over the course of someone’s life 
and for which a person must always take medication to control it. In this context 
bipolar disorder is an object that must be medicated. With the aid of the DSM, it is 
possible to describe and categorise the experiences so normal and abnormal mood 
states can be separated from each other. The experiences associated with bipolar 
disorder are constructed as symptoms of an illness such that there is no meaning in 
the experience beyond its role as a sign of the presence of illness. While depression is 
related to suffering and trauma, mania and hypomania are constructed primarily as 
pleasurable states of mind which people intentionally allow to happen despite the 
inevitable negative consequences. Within these constructions there is no room for 
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disagreement or debate about nature of bipolar disorder and it is only those with 
expertise in matters psychiatric and psychological who can provide appropriate 
treatment.  
As an exemplar of self-management discourse The Manual positions the person with 
bipolar disorder as a ‘bipolar patient’ and it is a subject position that has its own set 
of norms. Bipolar patients are constructed as having problems managing their 
emotional state on their own, they recognise their thoughts as a means to measure 
and bring about change in themselves, they display a high degree of reflexivity and 
self-surveillance which in turn requires the capacity to apply detail, effort and 
declarations of wrong doing and finally, bipolar patients will defer to the expert 
knowledge of psy-sciences when understanding who they are and how to live. This 
discourse analysis of The Manual demonstrates how everything about the person 
with bipolar disorder is interpreted in terms of the condition they are understood to 
have.  
This analysis demonstrates the tightly regulated way the psy-sciences produce the 
experience of bipolar disorder and the people understood to have it. To speak outside 
of the psy-science version of bipolar disorder exposes them to the scrutiny of experts 
who determine if their speech is a symptom of a relapse of their condition for which 
they require treatment or alternatively if their speech shows a lack of insight which 
reinforces the notion that they require treatment. For the person with bipolar 
disorder, the notion of treatment always carries with it the possibility of being 
detained and given medication against their will on the basis that their thought 
processes demonstrate their lack of self-awareness and their inability to recognise 
that they are ill such that they risk becoming the “voiceless object of scientific 
discourse.” (Halperin, 1995, p. 39). 
Given the earlier exploration of the historical conditions that make psychoeducation 
possible and shape its sphere of actions, it is perhaps not surprising that this analysis 
has demonstrated the tightly regulated way that the psy-sciences construct bipolar 
disorder and the people understood to have it. Psychoeducation draws on a long 
history of psy-shaped discourse as the means to understand how to change the 
thoughts and behaviour of others and how to use thoughts as the means to transform 
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one’s self.  What this analysis demonstrates though is that while psy-science expertise 
strongly shapes the practices of those who exercise authority over others, in 
psychoeducation for bipolar disorder the psychological is used in the service of the 
medical. For people with bipolar disorder, psychiatric (and therefore medical) 
science takes priority with psychological science taking a role in support of medicine. 
Within self-management discourse, the different psy-sciences are not of equal status. 
This discourse analysis also highlights the asymmetrical nature of power relations 
within The Manual’s version of psychoeducation practices for bipolar disorder. Only 
the psy-sciences can know what the experiences categorised as bipolar are and how 
to respond to them and as such people with bipolar disorder become bipolar patients 
with their own set of norms. Using techniques of a secular pastorate, people 
participating in psychoeducation are called to take on a way of understanding and 
caring for the self that relies only upon the authority of medical science because of its 
truthfulness and trustworthiness.  Any attempt by people with bipolar disorder to 
think and speak outside of these positions them as lacking self-awareness and 
therefore potentially suffering a relapse and lacking insight into the true nature of 
their situation. There is no room to misunderstand what a ‘good’ bipolar patient 
looks like and the ways of being a person with bipolar disorder that are most highly 
valued.  
Through the way The Manual uses language to sanction its view on the truth, it takes 
on the appearance of a rule book, a list of do’s and don’ts and as such brings with it a 
sense of it as a moral code – this is the only way to understand and live with bipolar 
disorder. As ideas of pastoral power suggest, health care practices including 
psychoeducation are provided from a desire to heal suffering and not exacerbate it. 
What this analysis suggests is that while that may be the stated intention, 
psychoeducation practices have the potential to cause harm through the way they act 
upon subjectivity. What does it mean for a person’s sense of self if they are 
ambivalent about psychiatry’s views on bipolar disorder? What about those who 
recognise themselves in the tale of the three little bipolar pigs but are not able to live 
to its standards? How else are they to see themselves? How can they show both 
themselves and others that they know right from wrong?  
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Those deemed successful at self-management as per The Manual get to construct 
themselves as responsible, thoughtful and self-aware while those who don’t 
“participate in this shepherd-flock game” (Toll & Crumpler, 2004, p. 397) would seem 
to be left with few ways to make sense of themselves beyond unruly, oppositional or 
resistant. The next chapter examines how people with bipolar disorder use discourse 
to speak about the experience of living with it, how they construct bipolar disorder as 
an object, and in the process how they respond to notions of self-management. It also 
seeks to explore processes of subjectivation and how the discourse of self-
management may or may not be shaping processes of self-formation. This first stage 
of analysis identifies how The Manual lays out an expectation of the sort of self that is 
expected when living with bipolar disorder and the second stage now explores how 








Analysis: Constructing Bipolar Disorder 
 
“The mind may well be an illusion, something the brain does to entertain us 
while it goes about its business, whatever that business is, but it’s a gorgeous 
illusion and very convincing” (Greenberg, 2013, p. 345) 
Having explored in the previous chapter processes of subjectification and the way 
others are objectified and governed through the discourse of self-management, this 
chapter and the next are concerned with processes of subjectivation and how 
individuals use the discourse of self-management to govern themselves and turn 
themselves into particular forms of subjects (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2009). In doing 
so these next two chapters seek to deepen the analysis of self-management discourse 
as both a technology of power and of self and to look beyond “official discourses” so 
as to not “overlook the messy actualities of how people respond to ‘strategies of rule’” 
(Petersen, 2003, p. 197-198). As the previous chapter examined how The Manual 
constructed the object of bipolar disorder and the subject within whom it is 
understood to reside, so too do these analysis chapters but using the text produced 
by people understood to have the condition. This chapter focuses upon how 
discourse is used by these people to construct bipolar disorder as an object while the 
final analysis will approach the relationship between discourse and self-formation by 
considering how a self-management discourse makes available particular subject 
positions for people with bipolar disorder to step in to and the implications of this for 
processes of self-formation. 
The texts under analysis in the next two chapters are the transcripts of interviews 
with 25 people who live with bipolar disorder. Through a semi-structured interview 
process, they were asked about what bipolar is like to live with, what they think 
caused it, their views of medication and what they think of the idea that people can 
learn to manage the condition themselves. In this chapter the text is explored to 
consider how people with bipolar disorder use discourse to construct it as a 





formation. This approach is based upon an understanding of discourse as a system of 
statements based on specific bodies of knowledge (McHoul & Grace, 1998; Parker, 
1992) such that they describe and categorize our social world, making it possible to 
think and say particular things so that “once an object has been elaborated in 
discourse it is difficult not to refer to it as if it were real.” (Parker, 1992, p. 5). 
Whether or not the object named by psychiatric discourse as bipolar disorder is ‘real’ 
or not is not what is being judged.  Rather the concern in this chapter is with how 
discourse makes it possible to think and say certain things about bipolar disorder as 
an object and the people who are understood to ‘have’ it. In the process of 
constructing the object, discourse is understood to be constructing the subject, giving 
the person particular attributes, making available particular ways of thinking about a 
person and their relationship with bipolar disorder, calling people to recognise and 
make sense of themselves in particular ways (Mansfield, 2000; Parker, 1992). This 
quality of discourse to shape both object and subject is a process intimately tied to 
relations of power as discourse makes it “virtually impossible to think outside them. 
To think outside them is by definition, to be mad, to be beyond comprehension and 
therefore reason.” (Young, 1981, p. 48). In the context of power relations, people use 
discourse to not just represent ideas in language but to also turn themselves into 
particular sorts of subjects based on what is taken to be ‘true’ about the nature of 
being human. 
This chapter approaches the relationship between discourse and self-formation by 
considering how people with bipolar disorder use discourse to construct it as an 
object and from this make an informed interpretation of what this might mean for 
how subjectivity is being shaped by discourse. The chapter has four sections.  The 
first one examines how bipolar disorder is constructed as an illness object while the 
second considers how discourse is used to construct bipolar disorder as an unreliable 
mind. The tensions generated by these two constructions are examined in the third 
section while the final section summaries the findings and considers the implications 






Bipolar Disorder as a Brain Illness 
Throughout the transcripts people turn to medical discourse as a means to construct 
the nature of bipolar disorder and how to respond to it. Medical discourse is 
understood here as all those theories, ideas and practices based within the institution 
of medicine that are concerned with making comprehensible bodily problems 
through notions of disease and illness and “…a faith in the superior scientific status of 
measurable information…” (Anspach, 1988, p. 372) over subjective experience. At its 
most simplistic the medical paradigm can be thought of as the process of deciding 
which organ is sick, explaining how it became sick and then determining what is to be 
done for the illness to end whilst taking into account both the cause of the illness and 
the ongoing effects of its symptoms (Foucault, 2003a). 
Contemporary medical discourse can be understood as operating on the basis of 
some key assumptions; 
 For a disease to be treated it must first be named, “…given an organization, 
hierarchized into families, genera and species.” (Foucault, 2003a, p. 3). This 
makes classification a central feature of medical practice. 
 The focus is the disease or illness and not the person. Therefore in order to 
understand, diagnose and work upon the disease the person must be 
separated from their organs and tissues (Anspach, 1988; Verhaeghe, 2008). 
The primary concern is with the object (the physical materiality of the body 
and its disease) not the subject. 
 The objects known as symptoms, signs and illness are in a relationship with 
each other and with the body. Symptoms are understood as the marker of 
illness as experienced by the patient and signs are the physical indicator that 
are found through close examination using techniques ranging from 
percussion, palpation, x-ray, and analysis of blood through to autopsy 
(Armstrong, 1995).  
 The body is a biological system and as such its ‘normal’ state is understood to 
be one where it regulates its own function and therefore acts in an involuntary 





and tissues that are connected to one another so there is also a mechanistic 
notion to bodily function (Blackman, 2008; Harvey & Adolphs, 2012). This has 
a dual effect; firstly it requires those who engage in medical practices to know 
techniques for curing illness as well as the nature of the ‘healthy’ self-
regulating body (Foucault, 2003) and secondly it assumes bodily mechanisms 
operate based upon ideas of cause and effect.  
 The relationships between objects of illness and their treatment can be 
measured with the aid of scientific methods. 
These collectively work to create a hierarchy of knowledge within medical discourse 
which places diagnostic technology as the most important form of knowledge (and 
the ability to interpret this technology), followed by the doctor’s observation and 
finally the patient’s account (Anspach, 1988). 
In constructing bipolar disorder as an object, medical discourse locates it in a brain 
with malfunctioning brain chemicals that need chemical interventions in the form of 
medication. Medical discourse constructs illness as a thing of the body and therefore 
involuntary in nature so bipolar disorder too takes on this quality such that it is not 
the person’s fault that they have it, but as a condition that cannot be cured the issue 
becomes how they live with and respond to it. 
Medical discourse acts as a resource to construct bipolar disorder as a problem 
located in the body which can be classified like any other disordered bodily process; 
I got diagnosed with coeliac disease at the same time as being diagnosed with 
bipolar and it wasn’t til then that we kind of went ‘oh, that actually explains all 
that behaviour’. I wasn’t just an out of control teenager. I actually had an 
illness. (13) 
More specifically, it is located in the brain as the problem is malfunctioning brain 
chemicals;  
…as for why it happens to me I really, I do really feel like it’s just a chemical 
thing or neurochemical thing, you know a chemical thing in my brain. I feel 





my cycle and I have a really vague idea of some of the hormones and 
neurotransmitters involved in that…(22) 
As an illness, its presence is to be found through experiences named as symptoms; 
Umm an elevated mood is umm lots of head noise real physical symptoms like 
I can tell when I walk if I feel like I am walking I am bouncing along…(6) 
As an illness it is a bodily process and therefore involuntary in nature as it is 
constructed as developing outside of a person’s direct control; 
…but maybe the OCD and the anxiety was learnt behaviour got picked up as I 
was growing up from home quite possibility but the bipolar I think is more it’s 
more of a disease it’s like…(6) 
Just like other illnesses, taking medications is central to the experience of bipolar 
disorder; 
…if its [medication] that keeps me well, it what keeps me well you know. A 
diabetic doesn’t stop taking the daily insulin or whatever. If it’s what I have to 
take, that’s what I have to take...(31) 
As a medical intervention, medications don’t just treat a faulty brain, their ability to 
change the body confirms that what is being treated must be an illness; 
…they decided I wasn’t responding to the medication for schizophrenia so 
they put me on lithium and I began to come right within two weeks so they 
changed the diagnosis to bipolar as it was working…(4) 
A medical discourse of illness as malfunctioning bodily organs, in this case the brain, 
the symptoms this causes and the need to treat it with medications acts as a 
significant discursive resource when people with bipolar disorder describe what it is 
and how to respond to it. As an illness of the brain and therefore the body it becomes 
involuntary in nature, something outside a person’s direct control. They didn’t cause 
it so it is not their fault that they have it but as incurable illness the issue become how 






I made a conscious effort to think well how big do I want to make this and my 
like is it going to be this big or this big and I kinda didn’t want it to be, I didn’t 
want to have such a massive impact, I didn’t know then that it would but I just 
didn’t want I wanted to still maintain my own identity and you know, the same 
as somebody will treat it as having epilepsy like it doesn’t prevent you from 
doing stuff you know the only thing that I could do was research it and 
understand it and look for triggers…(10) 
The discourse of self-management acts as a resource for thinking about the object of 
bipolar disorder such that in the face of something like ‘epilepsy’ that is of the brain 
and therefore outside of one’s direct control, the only thing to do is ‘research it and 
understand it and look for triggers’. It is the knowledge of science and medicine that 
must be turned to if a person is to live with a brain disorder.  
This analysis demonstrates how discourse works to create objects and then also 
subjects. Using medicine as a discursive resource, the texts show people constructing 
an understanding of the object called ‘bipolar disorder’ as an illness located within an 
individual’s brain and as an illness, it is an object that acts of its own accord. As an 
illness it requires medication and then the taking of medication becomes a discursive 
practice that reaffirms the presence of an illness. At the same time discourse is 
creating subjects and in these pieces of text people are positioned by medical 
discourse as being subject to an illness that while not of their creation requires them 
to find a way to live with it. Self-management practices in the form of learning about 
bipolar disorder and looking for the things that ‘trigger’ the illness to manifest 
becomes a common sense response through the unspoken notion of personal 
responsibility. It is the construct that allows both the speaker and reader to bring 
coherence to the joining up of medicine and self-management as ‘speakers’ and 
‘readers’ within societies that are governed through neo-liberal mentalities ‘know’ 
that people who are active in their own health care – researching it, understanding it 






Bipolar Disorder as an Unreliable Mind 
Medical discourse can be seen to be a dominant discursive resource for people with 
bipolar disorder when they work to make sense of experience but it is not adequate 
to fully explain the object of bipolar disorder. There is something different about 
bipolar disorder such that it is an illness that creates an unreliable mind but this 
bringing together of psychological and medical discourse creates significant tensions 
for the person with bipolar disorder to manage. 
Psychological discourse is understood here as those sets of statements that cohere 
around the understanding of an individual’s mind as the central point from which a 
person’s thoughts, feelings and actions originate and an attention to how these might 
be altered, managed or shaped. It is a discourse concerned with using science to ask 
‘how do we learn to think as we do?’ and ‘what are the connections between our 
thoughts, feelings and actions?’ and then engaging in practices that apply this 
knowledge for the therapeutic benefit of the individual. It is a discourse that is based 
upon the assumption that the ‘mind’ and therefore the ‘self’, is a psychologically 
shaped space and as such it therefore constructs the things of which it claims to 
speak as ‘real’ objects (Rose, 1998b). Through concepts such as ‘personality’, 
‘attitude’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘self-esteem’, it acts in a normalising way to categorise 
and examine a person’s mind and determine the degree to which it conforms to the 
norm the discourse has created. In its contemporary form it is arguably a discourse 
that is concerned with working from the inside out; that working on one’s inside 
space of thoughts and feelings i.e. the mind, will transform a person’s behaviour and 
interactions with others. The psychological theories that inform the discourse are not 
necessarily a coherent set of ideas and practices (Parker, 2015b). This can be seen in 
the tension between more mechanical models that seek to change behaviour through 
systems of rewards and punishments and those concerned with ideas about the mind 
and its thoughts and feelings as shaped by past events that continue to effect the 
present. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to talk of psychological discourses in 
the plural as Burman (1996) does or use a notion of strands of psychological 
discourse as a way to think about the multitude of ideas about the mind and how it 





As Rose has argued, psychological constructs have come to form the essence of the 
truth we hold about our nature as human beings (1998b, 1999a) so it is hardly 
surprising that people with bipolar disorder turn to psychological constructs to talk 
about how the object of bipolar disorder acts upon the person to create an experience 
of the mind as unreliable. What becomes evident within the analysis is the way 
psychological discourse works in tandem with medical discourse to position people 
as having an illness that by its nature is assumed as a separate entity to the person 
themselves, but an illness that has the power to remove awareness of oneself and 
that must then be managed through the skill of determining the difference between 
self and illness. 
Psychological discourse operates on the basis of assumptions about the nature of 
‘normal’ psychological functioning and in the texts, people evaluate themselves on 
the basis of norms of self-control and self-awareness to position themselves as 
abnormal. Firstly the psychologically normal person can control their own conduct 
and bipolar disorder interferes with this capacity; 
P…it [bipolar disorder] plays on your mind, it takes your control, it takes your 
control away from you yeah 
I: So that’s what makes it difficult to live with? 
P: Yeah it does and you just feel you feel a lesser person that other people a lot 
umm especially when something stupid happens…(2) 
With the ability to exert self-control as an important psychological norm, any inability 
to enact this changes a person’s status when measured against others. Secondly, 
bipolar disorder has the capacity to generate behaviour that is not in keeping with 
how they would usually present themselves to others; 
 ...and there I was standing there like a fucking naked person statue really 
weird he said like he couldn’t believe it it was just like bang I went into this 
other persona..(11) 
Using the notion of ‘persona’ this text turns to a psychological construct to try and 
explain how the person could demonstrate a lack of self-control such that they can act 





by moment awareness of how their mind is working which bipolar disorder again 
interferes with; 
 P: Oh, bit of insight. It’d be great... 
I:    You can’t manage it though without insight? 
P: I can’t no, because I just sort of thinks it’s just me. I just  go with it, you 
know but also I think if I’ve got to, if I’m getting down, getting depression sort 
of side of things, that I have to kind of lift it up. You know and that’s what it, 
and that’s what it feels like as when I’m starting to feel like ‘come on, get 
yourself up, get yourself up, get yourself up walking’, you know…(21) 
It could be that the notion of insight is being used to describe how bipolar disorder 
acts upon the person or that this is how the self responds to its presence – either way 
the mind is constructed as the centre of self-awareness and a person with bipolar 
disorder as unable to identify that a change has taken place in their mind. 
In a similar vein, this person uses the notion of something mysterious happening 
within her in response to bipolar disorder’s presence; 
My Mum, my Mum’s very, very supportive though and she, she knows me so 
well. She’ll just go, like I’ll turn up at her house and about 10 minutes later 
she’ll go ‘right, what’s going on? You’re either high or either low or something. 
‘  You know, she’ll always know and it could like the very first stage of being 
high and she’ll go ‘right’ or the very first stage of being low and she’ll be like 
‘right’. So, um, but the other thing is I, I’ve got really good at avoiding her when  
I’m like that (laugh) because I don’t want her to point it out. I don’t know, it’s 
like a psychological, um, ah, in my head but I don’t actually realise that I’m 
doing it. I’m avoiding her because I don’t want her to point out that there’s 
something wrong with me (laugh). (13) 
Thus people can be seen to be adopting psychologically based constructs to explain 






With the mind constructed as unreliable, this person turns to her body as the means 
to understand her mind; 
I’ll play with the baby and it will be quite hyperactive play and that’s when I 
kind of realise that ah, there is something wrong here…(13) 
Habitual use of the body also becomes a way to act upon unhelpful ways of thinking; 
 ...if I dwell on things it will eat me alive really so I just try and do, I have a 
really structured, routine life and that’s the only way I can get my head around 
what I need to do...(10) 
With psychological discourse being used to construct bipolar disorder as an 
unreliable mind, the body is constructed as offering a means to act as a conduit to the 
mind; a means to both know and act upon the self even when the mind is unreliable 
and awareness of the self is limited. 
When bipolar disorder is constructed as an illness, it is done so on the basis that it is 
an illness that is located in the brain for which medications are therefore the most 
appropriate response to a presumed brain deficiency. At the same time it is an illness 
that effects a person’s mind, limiting their capacity for self-awareness and control of 
how they present themselves to the world such that they might do things which are 
at odds with how they think of themselves. While illness may be something that 
everyone experiences “normal people don’t have any idea about bipolar” (13) so 
those with it can question their status as a person; 
…over the years I look at [a bipolar disorder support group] and go no I am 
not going to you know, sit there with a bunch of nutters you know, I have been 
in hospital with nutters and it’s not going to do me any good…it all depends 
where my head is at, you know I actually like funny enough going through this 
I get on quite well with nutters you know I can related to them, you know they 
don’t scare me you know…(9) 
It is at this point that a medical discourse is expected to alleviate the stigma 





Place more emphasis on the medical symptoms (tiredness, fatigue, loss of 
appetite...) rather than on the psychiatric ones, since the latter are usually 
associated to the black legend they generate in the media. Nobody will be 
amazed or surprised if you say that, because of a disorder, you had a period 
when it was difficult to leave your bed...but everyone will open their eyes wide 
and may even look at you strangely if you say that you thought that your life 
was senseless and that you wanted to die (Colom & Vieta, 2006, p55). 
But while a person may name their condition an illness, it doesn’t necessarily feel to 
the person like a proper illness because of its associations with the mind; 
… the one thing that I really that did make me feel good was the fact that I 
actually did feel ill and confined to bed rather than some kind of undefined 
umm feeling of unhappiness or just not a clear mind if you like…(8) 
Bipolar disorder is constructed as lacking legitimacy as an illness because of its action 
upon the mind; 
People get a broken arm or they even get epilepsy or diabetes but they don’t 
get this because it’s like, and I have seen the look on people’s faces when they 
know you have got it and they almost kind of, there are two looks that they 
get, one is confusion and the other one is pity and I try to explain that its kind 
a genetic thing and it’s like a chemical imbalance but it doesn’t matter it is still 
a mental illness… (10) 
The call to see oneself as suffering from an illness does not necessarily provide the 
promised antidote to a sense of oneself as a person with an unreliable mind. Using 
psychological norms as the basis of self-measurement, people end up positioning 
themselves as abnormal regardless of the potential offered by the body to act as a 
conduit to a mind that periodically lacks awareness of itself. In the stigma stakes, the 
unreliable mind ends up trumping a construction of bipolar disorder as an illness. 
While psychological discourse plays an important role in how people construct their 





discourse. This co-joined construction of bipolar disorder as both an illness and an 
unreliable mind is illustrated here;  
…Well, you know, I think it’s pretty easy to say you’re diabetic. I mean, sure, 
you know I’m sure a diabetic, I mean’ just get it, you know, just do it’ that kind 
of thing. No, your body requires insulin, you know your body can’t produce 
insulin, you need to take insulin or whatever. Or you know, you’ve got a heart 
or whatever and you need to do things about it and yes, you can, everyone 
tries to be hard or macho or whatever but when personality, what changes is 
your mental illness changes your personality, you know, or your thought 
processes or your how you deal with something, how you manage something. 
It’s a lot more intrinsic. It’s a lot more that actually changes. It’s you that starts, 
you know. It is you who starts to change. You aren’t yourself necessarily, 
you’re not yourself anymore. You lose that for a bit and at that point it’s like, 
you know, shouldn’t I just be able to shake myself up and change this (31) 
Once again a notion of ‘personality’ and bipolar disorder’s capacity to change it 
without the direct control of the person themselves is used. The mind as the location 
of thought and rational action is constructed as unreliable so that a person is no 
longer themselves. At the same time a medical discourse is used to construct ‘illness’ 
as an object  characterised by its lack of interference in rational decision making and 
a notion of cause and effect. Using diabetes as illustrative, illness is about a deficiency 
in the body that is rectified by taking a medication to address the deficiency; ‘…your 
body requires insulin, you know your body can’t produce insulin, you need to take 
insulin or whatever…’ While it is an illness it is also an unreliable mind because it 
causes you to lose yourself and the ability to control your mind and therefore your 
actions such that a person can no longer ‘shake myself and change this’ as they would 
if it was a proper illness. 
A notion of cause and effect is also drawn on here; 
…I had never heard of a condition like this before, I never knew you could take 





Taking medication for an implied deficiency is constructed here as having the 
capacity to fix a person’s faulty emotions.  
As illustrated here, people use versions of psychological constructs at the same time 
as drawing on a medical scientific framework that uses models of illness based on 
ideas of cause and effect; 
…it comes from unresolved pain you know…depressed people can’t look at it 
and that’s why people get into addictions and stuff like that if we’ve got these 
problems and we can get medication to help us open up and look at stuff and 
see what it is that we are feeling (5) 
When this co-occurrence of both psychological and medical constructs is put together 
with the issue of bipolar disorder’s lack of legitimacy as a ‘proper’ illness discussed 
earlier, it suggests that people with bipolar disorder are routinely having to find ways 
to manage persistent tensions between ideas of mind and body and the relationship 
between the two. 
Mind or Body 
The earlier discussion of the characteristics of medical discourse identified the 
importance of notions of the body as machine-like and the separation of the person 
with the disease from the disease itself. These can be seen as long-standing remnants 
of Cartesian thought in medicine.  
Cartesianism is the name given to the movement that arose during the Enlightenment 
based upon the writings of the seventeenth century philosopher Rene Descartes. The 
main feature of this philosophical movement that remains in evidence today is 
Descartes’ theories of the mind that place the mind or the soul as a completely 
separate substance from the material body within which is resides. The body is a 
thing in space while the soul or mind is a thing that thinks and as separate entities 
there is no significant interaction between the two. The inner psychological12 is 
separated from the outer physical (Bracken, Thomas, Timimi, Asen, Behr, Beuster, 
                                                          
12 While the term psychological is used here to describe the nature of the mind or self, it is done so while 





Bhunnoo, Browne, Chhina, Double, Downer, Evans, Fernando, Garland, Hopkins, 
Huws, Johnson, Martindale, Middleton, Moldavsky, Moncrieff, Mullins, Nelki, Pizzo, 
Rodger, Smyth, Summerfield, Wallace, & Yeomans, 2012; Honderich, 2005; Turner, 
1992). Descartes argued that rationality was the key characteristic that defined 
human existence with the phrases such as “I think therefore I am” and “mind over 
matter” continuing to hold meaning. The mind is subject to voluntary control through 
the will while the body is subject to processes that do not require conscious effort 
and so are fixed in nature. The body becomes passive matter that operates as a 
machine while the mind becomes the source of action and intention (Blackman, 2008; 
Leder, 1992). 
While it is a way of thinking that does not go unchallenged (Blackman, 2008; Bracken 
et al., 2012; Honderich, 2005; Turner, 1992), “modern medicine is profoundly 
Cartesian in spirit” (Leder, 1992, p. 21). A cartesian strand of medical discourse 
allows medicine to treat problems of the body with minimal reference to the mind, it 
creates the space for the ongoing division between health care for physical illness and 
mental illness, and it creates a division in forms of knowledge that ‘know’ each 
substance; medicine belongs the natural sciences and the mind belongs to the social 
sciences. It is a way of thinking that operates through processes of separation and 
hierarchy which are in turn supported by the scientific search for truth and error. 
The constraints that these ideas impose can be seen in the tensions that people are 
negotiating as they speak about their experiences with bipolar disorder and are 
perhaps best illustrated through the way bipolar disorder is constructed as a 
separate entity to the self; 
I am often unsure of which is me and which is illness (8) 
The norm of illness within a medical discourse is to construct it as an object that can 
and should be a separate entity from the self and this is in turn how this person 
constructs it. 
The notion of a hierarchy of mind over body identified earlier as a feature of 





I’ve never ever been suicidal. That is one thing about me that I just, I don’t 
know, I think I have enough control of my brain to not go that way. Um, I, I 
mean I have views of suicide and I guess that’s why, um. Like I feel that 
suicide’s very selfish and I wouldn’t want to do that to other people. (13) 
As this person works to make sense of why she has never experienced suicidal 
thoughts which are understood to be part of bipolar disorder and in doing so she 
gives primacy to the capacity of her mind to control her actions. 
But despite being an assumed norm, enacting this capacity to separate the self from 
the illness can be problematic. This person illustrates this by ascribing to themselves 
personal characteristics that can also be read as symptoms of bipolar disorder;  
I have an extrovert nature anyway, people have misconstrued my extrovert 
nature as being manic umm which has been really difficult because I am quite 
bubbly and vivacious anyway and then when you are quiet and busy it’s like 
are you a bit depressed so there are all those context that really annoy me and 
I have ended up snapping at people and said if I am unwell you will be the first 
to know (10) 
This problematic enactment of the process of separating entities is evident as this 
person tries to work out if her response to life events is ‘normal’ or not; 
I just can’t stop crying but I don’t know if that is grief that I am still dealing 
with about the trauma from what happened in 2006 and also the grief and 
trauma over the whole relationship not working out with [husband] so I don’t 
really know if that is just like a normal person getting upset over a normal 
thing that is really upsetting or whether it’s a bipolar reaction, I don’t know… 
(11) 
Concurrently working within the confines of psychological and medical discourse 
would seem to result in bipolar disorder being constructed as an object of both mind 
and body. The effect of this is to then position people with an imperative to work out 
which is which because as an illness it cannot be both. This would seem to have 





But this tension can be worked with and the call to separate self from illness can be 
resisted. This person describes how she started with one way of thinking about what 
her experiences meant based on a construct of ethnic identity and then added bipolar 
disorder to the mix;  
“...it’s hard to accept the fact that I have bipolar... diagnosis because I was 
taken to the, what do they call them, the, the Emergency people... when my 
Mum was dying of the cancer so they took me up to [the mental health service] 
to see how, what was happening with me and cause my burden there was the 
fact that I killed my mother...Because I told her of my sexual abuse... Three 
months later she’s got cancer, stomach cancer...and I told them that I believed 
I’d been cursed ... by my oldest birth brother because Mum would have told 
him what I had would have told her... but I believe he had the opportunity, the 
opportunity to put a mākutu13 on me so when I got back down here  I told 
them the whole story again about why I felt my brother had put a mākutu on 
me and then I said to the, the Māori lady who was looking after me here, what 
the outcome was, what was the diagnosis and she said bipolar. I said ‘oh, 
bipolar, oh’. This is the first of me hearing of bipolar but a Māori, coming from 
a Māori perspective.” (M14) 
While this could be read as the dominance of a psychiatric discourse in the process of 
meaning making, it can also be read as a resistance to a dualist way of thinking. She 
acknowledges the authority of the discourse of psychiatry;  
I: Do you still think that way, that you triggered it? 
P: No because I, I’ve been counselled too in that area... (M14) 
She continues to retain a sense of herself through her ethnicity whilst also 
constructing her experiences as something psychiatric in nature; 
                                                          
13 In a traditional Maori world view, mākutu is a spiritual act more complex in nature than the usual 
western interpretations of giving someone the evil eye. It an act intended to debilitate another person but 
not as a form of punishment. This is not necessarily the meaning that this person places upon the term 





“...the first time it really confused me to be able to that’s that, bipolar with 
mākutu so when the people say, well if I have to say I’ve got bipolar I say ‘oh 
but from the Māori experience’.” (M14) 
Even in the context of an interview for a research project about bipolar disorder, this 
person is able to resist the power of psychiatric discourse to produce bipolar 
disorder as purely illness whilst simultaneously becoming subject to the categorical 
practices of psychiatry and becoming a subject of a secular pastorate of ‘counselling’. 
This analysis identifies how people use discourse to make sense of bipolar disorder 
as an object of illness that is a separate entity to their sense of themselves while at 
the same time constructing it as an object that interferes episodically with the mind’s 
capacity to know itself and a person’s sense of who they are. This would seem to be a 
significant tension for people to negotiate as they work to understand themselves 
and how to live with bipolar disorder.  
The analysis also demonstrates how discourse operates as a productive power 
through both the way if forms the objects of which it speaks. In this case how 
discourse is acting as resource to make sense of the objects named as ‘illness’ and 
‘self’ and the relationship between the two. In both the interview transcripts and the 
expert driven Psychoeducation Manual for Bipolar Disorder (Colom & Vieta, 2006), 
medical discourse is used to reinforce an apparent reality between illness and self 
such that they are best handled by treating them as separate entities. In so doing 
medical discourse is creating “a reality as coercive as gravity” (Parker, 1992, p. 8). Yet 
at the same time as constructing it as an illness the requirement to separate self from 
illness can be resisted.  While power relations may be everywhere and anonymous, 
the discursive networks of connections and strategies always leave open the 
possibility of resistance (Foucault, 2003f). This is power functioning as a network of 
relations; flowing from both above and below with localised points of resistance at 
the same time as power being “actively adopted and practiced by its subjects upon 







When it comes to constructing bipolar disorder it is medical discourse14 to which 
people turn when they understand themselves to have this condition. It is an illness 
located the brain and as with all illnesses, the body is faulty which can be rectified by 
the use of medications. The taking of medication can in itself become a discursive 
practice as the success or otherwise of medications in changing how a person thinks 
and feels confirms that bipolar disorder is indeed an illness located in the brain. 
But medical discourse does not act alone. When combined with a silent partner of 
neo-liberal discourse the subject position on offer is that of prudent and responsible 
health consumer. With the health professional positioned by medical discourse as 
technically responsible for providing accurate information, it is the person who 
becomes ethically responsible for the choices they make about how to incorporate 
this knowledge into their day to day life (Helén, 2004). As a person with an incurable 
brain disorder, the individual is called to recognise themselves as having the ability to 
both exacerbate and limit the expression of bipolar disorder through their own 
actions. While they are not to blame for their condition, they are instead called to see 
themselves as accountable for how they choose to respond to the knowledge of 
science and medicine. 
With the aid of psychological discourse bipolar disorder becomes an illness that takes 
away self-awareness and leaves in its place an unreliable mind. To combat its 
unreliability, some people construct their body as able to act as a conduit to the mind, 
something that a more embodied notion of bipolar disorder could arguably 
accommodate. Regardless, as an illness, it takes away one of the central 
characteristics of a proper illness; the capacity of a person to act in a rational way 
toward the condition. This results in a loss of legitimacy as an illness object that is not 
necessarily cured by medical discourse as it promises, with biological explanations 
offering “less refuge from guilt than one might imagine” (Martin, 2010, p. 378). 
                                                          
14 It could be argued that the discourse of psychiatry is conspicuous by its absence, but alternately this 
can be thought of as the result of psychiatry’s efforts to align itself with medical science such that 





Also notable in this analysis is how medical and psychological discourse act in 
tandem to first construct the object of bipolar disorder as an illness that is both a 
separate entity from the person’s concept of themselves and as an illness entity that 
can take away self-awareness. It then makes it an imperative to work this distinction 
between disorder and personal volition, self and illness such that the person becomes 
responsible for using their understanding of themselves as a psychological shaped 
being to act upon their troublesome brain and to use psychological norms of the mind 
in the service of medicine and the management of illness (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). 
Medical and psychological discourses are both based upon the notion of the 
knowledgeable expert providing the distressed, unreliable and unknowing patient 
with the wisdom they need in order to live successfully. The imperative to separate 
self from illness can be seen as a discursive practice that bolsters the authority of 
both medicine and psychology by patrolling the boundaries between mind and body. 
In terms of processes of subjectivation and how people govern and relate to 
themselves, the discourses being put to work in these texts suggest that one’s 
relationship with one’s self is always to be mediated by psy-expertise. That how a 
person understands the object of bipolar disorder and responds to the unreliable 
mind to which it is tied is to be done by turning to the authority of medical and 







Analysis: Enacting Self-Management Discourse 
 
“People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but 
what they don’t know is what what they do does”   
(Foucault cited in (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 187) 
 
The overarching concern of this thesis is how the discourse of self-management 
operates to create particular subject positions for those people understood to have 
bipolar disorder and then consider the implications of this for how people with 
bipolar disorder come to understand and act upon themselves. The discourse 
analysis that has been applied to answer these questions has been done in three 
stages with this chapter now the final stage of analysis.  
The process began with an analysis of a psychoeducation text written for mental 
health professionals about bipolar disorder. It identified how the discourses of 
psychiatry and self-management construct bipolar disorder as a brain disorder that 
can only be known and treated by the expertise of psychiatry. As such, taking 
medication for this condition is an imperative and there is no place to understand the 
experiences associated with bipolar disorder as anything other than symptoms that 
need treatment. In the process of determining what bipolar disorder is, The Manual 
also constructs the person with bipolar disorder such that they become first and 
foremost a bipolar patient whose thoughts and feelings become a site of surveillance 
for the presence of the disorder and then as the means to change how a bipolar 
patient relates to the condition. When a bipolar patient can reproduce the psychiatric 
construction of bipolar disorder they are understood to have insight which is an 
important prerequisite for any self-management practice. The bipolar patient also 
needs to develop their ability to be reflexive and make changes to themselves in light 
of their self-examination – all the while deferring to psychiatric expertise. Using 
techniques of a secular pastorate, processes of normalization are at work throughout 
The Manual as the text works to identify ‘normal’ human experience, how people 





themselves in line with these norms. Those people unwilling or unable to participate 
in these disciplinary processes are positioned by discourse as unruly and 
oppositional. 
Chapter 6 documented the second stage of analysis by examining text produced 
through interviews with people understood to have bipolar disorder as a means to 
look deeper at the work of discourse upon subjectivity and consider how those with 
the condition use discourse to construct bipolar disorder as an object and what this 
might mean for how people come to think about and therefore govern themselves. 
This stage found that medical discourse dominates how bipolar disorder is 
constructed but it acts in conjunction with psychological, Cartesian and neo-liberal 
discourses. This combination would seem to make available a way of being in the 
world based upon a moral construct of responsibility – it is not a person’s fault that 
they have this illness but they are now accountable for how they take the knowledge 
of medicine and psychology and apply it to the management of their disordered brain 
and unreliable mind. 
This final analysis chapter focuses specifically upon the discourse of self-management 
within the speech of people with bipolar disorder to consider in more detail the 
subject positions the discourse makes available and importantly, how people with 
bipolar disorder use, respond to and engage with these subject positions. What ways 
of being in the world does the discourse of self-management make available to those 
understood to have the condition? On the basis that a sense of self is constructed 
through the repeated performance of subject positions (Crowe, 2005), what might 
this mean for processes of self-formation in people understood to have bipolar 
disorder? 
Throughout the texts there is little direct reference to the practices named by experts 
as self-management so in order to consider the work of the discourse of self-
management, a framework for understanding the enactment of self-management has 
been taken from the analysis of the psychoeducation text in Chapter 5. On the basis of 
this work, the enactment of self-management discourse can be seen to have three 
distinct but at times overlapping elements to it. Firstly, to practice self-management a 





an object known and understood only by psychiatry. Secondly, it requires a person to 
undertake a reflexive process of self-examination where a person surveills 
themselves for signs of becoming unwell so that once found, the person can identify 
how their own actions contributed to this relapse so they can then commit to making 
changes and learn from their mistakes. The third element to practicing self-
management is the capacity to moderate oneself so that excess can be guarded 
against. Each of these elements relies upon the person knowing and applying the 
knowledge of psy-expertise.   
While this conceptualisation of self-management allows a way to think about the 
discourse of self-management and how it is enacted, the analysis has also identified 
that these three elements of i) accept and recognise, ii) examine, confess and change 
and iii) moderate and regulate also act as significant subject positions within the 
discourse of self-management. As well as describing a process, they are also 
characteristic ways of being in the world that can be understood as the effect of a 
discourse of self-management. As such, this stage of analysis is specifically concerned 
with how discourse acts to construct subjectivity; that the discursive resources 
available to people in particular social, cultural and historical contexts shape how it 
becomes possible to think about oneself. This was illustrated earlier by discussions of 
how psychological discourse acts as a resource for how people can think of their 
inner world and the nature of their self (Rose, 1998b, 1999a). But discourse does 
more that act as a resource as this could suggest that it is a simply a matter of choice 
that people make to speak in different ways about experience. Discourse also acts by 
requiring people to adopt particular subject positions in order to hear the messages 
on offer as “the discourse is hailing us, shouting ‘hey you’ and making us listen” in 
particular ways (Parker, 2015c, p. 158). When discourse positions a person as a 
subject it also grants particular rights to speak (Parker, 1992, 2015c). Again, as 
illustrated in the previous chapter, the discourses of medicine and psychology grant a 
particular authority to those with psy-expertise and while ‘lay’ people still readily 
access the discourse, when they do so, it positions them in a particular relationship to 







Acceptance and Recognition 
As a person who understands themselves as having a mental disorder named and 
known by psychiatry, the taking up of this way of being in the world is not something 
that happens automatically, rather it is position that a person would seem to be 
drawn into. For this person, having a diagnosis that they accept allows them access to 
psy-experts and the potential they offer to provide relief; 
I suppose the difference between then and now is that I have a diagnosis and I 
am on medication that is finally working for me after years of being on so 
many meds that just weren’t doing the trick…(6) 
Rather than a desire to feel differently, this person is drawn into an acceptance of the 
psychiatric discourse of illness and treatment by the desire to take up the subject 
position of ‘good mother’; 
.. it wasn’t until [son] was born, well was conceived that I really started 
looking at myself and questioning like when you get into a manic episode 
suddenly it is all focussed on what you are focused on, and like blinders on and 
I was scared that would affect his being raised and I was scared that it would 
affect you know that he wouldn’t get what he needed if I got into that... I 
decided that I would rather be treated at this point than risk losing [son]. (7) 
As someone with bipolar disorder who is about to become a parent, her talk of her 
acceptance of the need for treatment draws upon both a discourse of what it means 
to be a good parent and a discourse of risk; that by not accepting and engaging with 
treatment she will put her child at risk and so come to the attention of state 
authorities.  
The act of bringing people together with the same diagnosis to share their 
experiences with each other also acts as a means to draw people in to the subject 
position; 
... I’ve heard all the other experiences that people have and they are quite 
different to mine, um, but then when we had like the peer support group right 





about a lot of experiences, I realised that some of the thoughts were, were 
quite similar to the others and there were a lot of similarities and I sort of 
accepted that, yeah, I did have a psychotic episode for this period of my 
life...(14) 
In settings where people can meet others with the same condition as themselves, 
people use discourse to construct their experiences. In the process, this person 
recognises the way this ‘calls’ to them as a person whose experiences are best 
understood through the psychiatric construct of psychosis and in doing so gives up 
on some of their previous resistance to this position. There seems to be something 
particularly powerful in hearing the discourse of psychiatry out of the mouths of 
people who are thought of as peers.  
The active patient 
Once drawn in, it is a way of being that is active rather passive in nature; 
I know that I have been on a massive learning curve with it and umm that has 
been the beauty of it it has been the learning, actually being in a space where I 
am willing and able to learn umm when I got discharged the other week [the 
case manager] said ‘you’ve been a model patient’ (laugh) (and like then she 
said that I was ready and umm so bit) you know I just plant so many seeds  
from them [Dr and case manager] you know [case manager], I nicknamed her 
the voice of reason and every little gem that she had I just grabbed hold of it 
and planted it and grow it and yeah I didn’t waste any of their resources I 
suppose you would say, I didn’t waste any of it cause I so badly wanted to get 
better...(6) 
It is a subject position in which the person becomes a patient who defers to 
psychiatric knowledge and wisdom on the basis that their own ideas, their own 
‘voice’, is lacking in reason. The task of the patient is then to act upon the knowledge, 
‘to plant it and grow it’ and actively apply it to themselves. As a patient with an 
illness, ‘to get better’ means actively taking on the wisdom of psychiatry on the basis 





In order to take on a sense of self as an active patient, this subject position requires a 
person to give up aspects of their sense of self; 
…it’s about like, kind of accepting and I think guys find it hard that they have 
to, you know, accept it that’s them and they have to listen to other people 
cause they don’t want to but ‘no, no, no I’m not unwell’ cause they want to be 
strong. But with me I accepted it, it is what it is. (35) 
In order to make sense of how ideas about ‘acceptance’ and one’s gender may be 
linked requires both reader and speaker to draw on a culturally available narrative 
adopted from psychological discourse that one’s gender affects one’s capacity for 
emotional expression (Gray, 2012).  Despite a lack of empirical evidence that biology 
can account for emotional expressiveness (Shields, 2013; Wester, Vogel, Pressly, & 
Heesacker, 2002) there remains a preoccupation in psychological science with the 
notion of difference between male and female (including the reproduction of the 
norm of human beings as either one gender or another) and it is this norm of 
assumed difference that this person would seem to be drawing on in order to make 
sense of how a person engages in self-management practices. And they do so in a way 
that suggests that self-management discourse requires a person to give up an idea of 
themselves as strong and independent. The implication is that no longer is a woman’s 
assumed ‘natural’ tendency to express emotion and rely upon others a failing – in 
self-management discourse it can become an asset. 
Obligations and responsibilities 
One way that this subject position is enacted is through the taking of medication, as 
medication to treat the condition is an imperative in the discourse of psychiatry and 
medicine; 
Well she’s [family doctor] trying to help me and I think I’ve got to play my part 
by helping as well. I mean I’ve got no time for people that say they’ve been to 
the doctor but they’re not taking those pills because they won’t help. It’s like 
why spend, why spend the doctor’s time if you think you know it all. (M3) 
But the act of deferring to the expertise of psychiatry to know and treat one’s mental 





I think it’s easy to know that you have got bipolar but it’s hard to follow the 
treatment and the umm consistency that I think is important to achieve a level 
of wellness...(8) 
This suggests a moral quality to a subject position based upon acceptance and 
recognition. A person may both accept and recognise themselves as a subject of the 
discourse of psychiatry but also be unable to practice its requirements in a consistent 
manner. This would seem to bring with it potential for a sense of self based upon 
failure through not being able to live up to the notion of the ‘model patient’. 
The moral quality is intensified by the way this subject position relies upon ideas of 
personal responsibility. While the psychiatric discourse may bring relief by 
explaining the cause of distressing events, it brings with it obligations; 
Oh yeah, and I think there was after I was diagnosed there was a big sense of 
relief. Well, now you know why this is, you know, why you behaved in this way 
and why we’ve had these issues, um, you know... In some ways a sense of 
closure but then you, there’s a new challenge. You have to monitor it. (M2) 
Acceptance and recognition acts as a foundation for ideas of personal responsibility 
as described by this person; 
Yeah, cause if you don’t accept it then you’re always conscious, I don’t have it 
and then, therefore you won’t want to do the things to prevent it coming 
on...(35) 
And while others may aid the process of acceptance it is ultimately something a 
person does on their own; 
My Dad is probably just at the moment being going to be diagnosed with it so 
you can’t really talk about it with him... but he’s just absolutely refused to get 
any help or refused to talk about it or acknowledge anything or, yeah. He’s not 
come to the party and nobody else can, um, take him to the party...(31) 
It is a way of being in the world that appears to be tied strongly to a discourse of neo-
liberalism. The individual is called to accept and recognise themselves as the subject 





as a patient with bipolar disorder  to take responsibility for their health and ‘to do the 
things to prevent it coming on’.  
People living with bipolar disorder actively engage with a subject position that values 
acceptance and recognition but they do so in a way that is beyond the 
straightforward replication of the bipolar patient that is proposed by The Manual. 
In these texts it is not a way of being in the world that appears naturally or 
automatically, rather it is a way of being that a person appears drawn in to over time 
and in the context of their relationships with others. Just as in The Manual, it is a 
position that requires an active response on the part of the patient to plant and tend 
the garden that grows through the wisdom of psychiatry. In the process, it may 
involve for some people a giving up of ways of seeing the self based upon notions of 
strength and independence in favour emotional expressivity and a dependence upon 
others.  
As in the earlier discussion that identified the place of neo-liberal and medical 
discourses acting collectively to shape how people construct the object of bipolar 
disorder as an illness object toward which they hold a responsibility, this subject 
position of accept and recognise is enacted using the discourse of neo-liberalism and 
the active and responsible health consumer (Brown & Baker, 2012) . Having 
recognised the authority of the psychiatric discourse to name and act upon their 
distress as a brain based illness, the person is now responsible for how they act 
toward it.  
Self-Examination and Change 
The enactment of the discourse of self-management can be seen to be tied to a 
reflexive style of practice upon oneself; a process that entails self-examination, 
admission of mistakes and then changing behaviour so the mistake is not repeated. 
This thesis argues that through its repeated enactment, people step in to a way of 
being in the world that is characterised by detailed self-examination and judgement, 
the admission of guilt and then committing to change oneself to prevent wrong doing 
in the future. This reflexive relationship with oneself is performed with a level of 





Within the discourse of self-management this reflexive form of attention to the self is 
rigorous and detailed; 
...I know myself well enough to know to know [name] would you have behaved 
like this normally and the answer if no ok so what do we need to do next time 
in order for you not to do this well the question is I need to stay well, how do 
you do that? Take the medication ok what are your triggers? How do you 
know you are becoming unwell? Loss of sleep, crazy thoughts, you know I 
know myself well enough to know when things are starting to go down for me 
so that is the key for me...(10) 
It is a form of attention to the self that is constant and ongoing as there is always the 
risk of forgetting the lessons of the past; 
... I have some hiccups every now and then because I think I have got it all 
sorted and then I do something...(11) 
It is a way of being that requires high levels of self-awareness and, as identified in the 
previous chapter, a dualist way of thinking about oneself – is this me or is it not? 
... so I don’t really know if that is just life a normal person getting upset over a 
normal thing that is really upsetting or whether it’s a bipolar reaction, I don’t 
know...(11) 
Even the ordinary things of life, in this case becoming a parent, are subject to 
separation into either/or. 
I kept going “ok is this because I have got a new baby or is this because I am 
unwell “and most of the time the answer was it’s because you have got a new 
baby so it was tricky differentiating and umm you know having a new baby is 
not easy (3) 
Discourses of medicine and self-management combine in such a way that a reflexive 
approach to bipolar disorder requires practices of self-examination that are based 
upon separation of self from illness.  
As well as negotiating a world of binaries, this subject position also invites a person 





 ... you know how you get these feelings in your heart and your tummy that 
something is not right in the early days and you are supposed to listen to them 
and I had all of those warnings, I had all of those bells going off but I chose to 
ignore them because I put it down to my bipolar and I never knew whether to 
trust my instincts or whether it was just me being crazy and imagining stuff 
and so I just ignored it...(11) 
It is a subject position characterised by a rigorous and detailed form of reflexivity 
whilst at the same time relying upon a construction of the mind and the self as 
unreliable and not to be trusted. Bipolar disorder is constructed as an object that 
works upon the mind to make it untrustworthy and the discourse of self-
management positions the person with bipolar disorder as someone who enacts 
reflexivity on the basis that they are indeed unreliable readers of their own mind yet 
also able to separate self from illness. 
Learning from experience or wrong doing? 
In the discourse of self-management of bipolar disorder, processes of self-
examination and judgement are tied to the capacity to identify how one’s own 
thoughts and actions contributed to an actual or potential relapse. This can be framed 
as the capacity to learn from experience; 
Every episode for me is learning, I look back over the ten years since my 
diagnosis, the first admissions to hospital were really long, where I had no 
insight whatsoever, I was driving blind really so every time I have been unwell 
out of that has come a learning...(10) 
Identifying the part one’s actions played also has the potential for a person to be 
focused upon finding fault with themselves; 
I:  So do you take your medications as prescribed? 
P: At least 90% of the time. 
I: Ok. The other 10% what happens during those times? 
P: Laziness I suppose. Depends, yeah, yeah. I think laziness, um. The 
laziness, this doesn’t help going in, into a medication adherence study 





Saturday night and Sunday night and Monday night I took nothing. I 
didn’t tell my partner til I’d got some more off my doctor. So on 
Tuesday I went to the doctor and said ‘right, this is what I’ve done’. .. It 
was stupid of me to forget it but I did forget it. There was nothing I can 
do until, but I should of probably had a spare. (M2) 
This person’s act of forgetfulness is not just described here as a mistake that they 
made, it takes on a critical tone as they examine their actions against the norms of 
what counts as responsible behaviour for a person with bipolar disorder. 
For some people the reflexivity that characterises this subject position requires the 
ability to admit mistakes and then make amends for wrong doing; 
Sometimes I,’ ah well, hello, you only live once’ but I sometimes do a little bit, 
push it... I have to make sure if I have a really late night, late night and drink a 
lot of stuff I try and make sure that that week I get good sleep and try and fix 
what I’ve done. (35) 
A subject position based upon characteristics of reflexivity and self-examination 
would seem to walk a fine line between a management of the self based upon an 
openness to learning from the mistakes a person inevitably makes in life and a 
relationship with oneself based upon fault finding and making amends for wrong 
doing.  As identified in The Manual, the discourse of self-management is easily tied to 
practices of confession which can be understood as illustrative of disciplinary style 
power relations where a person comes to know and act upon themselves on the basis 
that “words and rituals that govern these confessions are those prescribed by an 
authority, albeit one who has replaced the claims of god and religion with those of 
nature and the psyche.” (Rose, 1998, p. 96). This subject position characterised by 
reflexive self-examination and change would seem to promote a notion of ones 
relationship with oneself as based upon making amends for an inability to keep to the 
rules of living with bipolar disorder as determined by psy-sciences. 
The problem and potential of thoughts 
If a person is to demonstrate that they have learnt from a mistake in how they live 





avoid a repeat experience. It is here that a person’s thoughts present both a problem 
and an opportunity.  
A medical discourse once again draws people into a form of self-examination built 
around thoughts as an expression of oneself or of one’s illness; 
...and I doubt often whether or not my choices of what to do and the way I go 
about doing things whether or not they are actually, whether its illness or 
whether it’s me or where the two kinda meet cause they do, I am not my 
illness but my illness does influence my thoughts, my decision, my way of deal 
with things in life...(8) 
Both medical and self-management discourse positions thoughts as problematic. 
They are a symptom of an illness and so a person must judge if their thoughts are a 
reliable expression of themselves or if they are a sign of illness and therefore 
unreliable. 
While thoughts are constructed as problematic in this subject position, they are also 
constructed as the means by which a person can bring about change in themselves; 
That’s what they teach you, is just like strategies to cope with it yourself and I 
use that pretty much  day to day, especially like the breathing and the, um, just 
like being aware and watching thoughts rather than being clingy to stuff and 
you, you just let stuff sort of go through and just go past it so long as you, um, 
become aware of, you know, what’s going on around you and, and say ‘ok, 
maybe I need to do this differently and I want to stay stable’ then it’s easily 
manageable. (14) 
Thoughts need to be managed in order to bring about change; 
That’s, that’s one that I mean I haven’t done it for probably since I got out of 
hospital because I’m very aware. I either go into a shop now and go ABC, 
action, behaviour consequences. I’ve got to, cause otherwise, honestly, I could 






Thoughts need to be worked upon for change to occur; 
I: What is it that you most want to give other people? 
P: A taste of freedom cause a lot of people are I suppose are slaves to their 
problems and their illnesses I guess umm 
I: So what is it that you see that they need to be able to do in order to stop 
being a slave? 
P: One thing would probably be to kick out their inner critic which seems 
to be a real common thing that people have with mental illness, they 
beat themselves up a lot you know like the coulda, woulda, shoulda 
hmm...like I am not without my fears like something’s really you know 
like some things in the future kinda little bit but then I remind myself 
don’t futurise, don’t futurise...(6) 
This subject position draws attention to the tensions that exist around a person’s 
emotions and thoughts; they are inherently untrustworthy and unreliable yet at the 
same time, managing and disciplining ones thoughts is understood to be the way to 
bring about change in oneself. 
This analysis also draws attention to the particular ‘flavour’ of reflexivity that people 
with bipolar disorder can engage in; a form of self-examination and self-critique that 
is based upon ideas of wrong-doing and a way of being that positions a person as to 
blame for any relapse in their condition because of things they did not do but should 
have. It is a way of being in the world that likely intensifies feelings of guilt and shame 
and a way of being in the world that is shaped by a constant state of self-critique and 
risk mitigation on the basis of psychiatric norms. In line with ideas that 
contemporary subjectivity is strongly based upon notions of reflexivity and choice in 
identity construction (Giddens, 1991), these people with bipolar disorder actively 
engage with the idea that reflexivity is central to how they operate in the world. For 
some, a reflexive way of being seems to have become second nature and while The 
Manual would construct this as a rational response to an unpredictable condition, 
this analysis suggests that a subject position based upon reflexivity can also be 
understood as an effect of the discourse of self-management and as such it is not 





Moderation and Regulation 
Just as processes of reflexivity are promoted by a self-management discourse as a 
means to reduce relapse, so too is the ability to moderate the self. The enactment of 
moderation shapes subjectivity as people are called to see themselves as someone 
who can control and restrain their thoughts, feelings and actions and regulate 
themselves using the norms of psychiatry. 
As with a subject position that values acceptance and recognition, this is a way of 
being that does not necessarily come ‘naturally’ to a person; 
...I did the WRAP course but often that is, self talk doesn’t come to the fore 
umm like I guess you know I am slowly learning not to drink coffee after 6pm 
in the evening um lay off drinking alcohol on a work night and that kind of 
thing...(8) 
It is constructed as a process of learning to enact new habits and giving up old ways 
of being for fear of becoming unwell; 
 …um, it’s quite, it’s gutting cause like, especially when I first like got bipolar, I 
was only 20 and I wanted to go and experience a whole lot more stuff that I 
know I can’t risk now. Like I wanted to be naughty, you know, try some A class 
cause my friends, they all are going to go, go have E. I wanted to try it out just, 
you know, just to see what it was like but there’s just, I just don’t want, I just 
don’t want to risk it now. It’s just, it’s scares me too much cause I don’t know 
how they would set me off...(35) 
It is also a subject position that people can be drawn into on the basis of obligations 
to others; 
Stephen Fry umm I read a book that he wrote the foreword to which was quite 
a good quite a funny book about bipolar umm but the single best thing you can 
do he said to help manage bipolar is to get a dog so I got a dog and I think 
there is an element of truth to it because even if you don’t have routines 





The fear of becoming unwell and the obligations a person has to others are 
constructed as important motivators for this way of being; 
...so everything has to be measured and everything has to be I mean 
everything involves thought, I just can’t throw caution to the wind... it’s what 
people do like they go out and enjoy friends company and do that stuff and 
now that I have learnt and as I have continued to learn that this is far more 
important because the consequences are too big and the consequences impact 
not just me but they impact on a lot of people around me so it’s what I have to 
do…(10) 
Active engagement with this subject position takes significant effort, attention to 
detail and persistent attention to oneself. Moderating experiences requires both 
action and effort; 
To manage my depression I will walk or I get out and do things like I bike 
around Bottle Lake every weekend. I walk every night. I make sure that I get 
up and walk up that valley every night... the worst time for me is first thing in 
the morning. It’s like a nightmare cause everything comes rushing in so the 
longer I sit and lie in bed the worse it is so you, I just literally have to get 
myself out of bed. If I wake up six in the morning and can’t go back to sleep 
then that’s out of bed because otherwise I start manifesting all this stuff in my 
head and it, it takes a lot of affirmation to get me to stop doing it. Better that I 
get in the shower and go for a walk. (21) 
It requires diligence and attention to detail; 
... you know like alcohol is an issue like obviously I can’t go out and get 
absolutely shit faced so I have to be very monitored of that umm late nights 
aren’t an option for me which is  big struggle for work because I work after 
hours, I am on call from 5.00pm until 8.00am so I can get called out so that is 
an issue but then I have to counteract that the next day if I do get called out 
that I have to sleep umm, I can’t take my medication after 8.30 otherwise I 
have a stupefied feeling the next day umm which limits me from going to the 
movies at 8.30 or going out for dinner or like people might get home at 10.30 





regularly like I might do it once a fortnight but I never do it on the week night 
it would always have to be on a Friday or Saturday so I could sleep the next 
day…(10) 
It requires a constant focus upon the self; 
... it’s always in the back of my head like ‘if you do this could you get unwell’ 
which is probably a good thing, it’s always there cause it’s sort of like a safety 
barrier net saying, you know, ‘do you really want to do this’. (35) 
These examples of active engagement with the subject position that values 
moderation and regulation also highlights the place of fear, and fear of becoming 
unwell in particular, in motivating people to take up the call to moderate themselves 
on the basis of psychiatric wisdom. 
Moderation through medication  
In the transcripts, moderating and regulating the self is done primarily through the 
use of medication and attention to ones habits of daily living. Medication is described 
as offering protection against a lack of self-regulation; 
 ...I feel like the only thing keeping me really stable is the medication cause I 
don’t think I’m eating healthy. Definitely not eating healthy and I don’t have a 
very good sleep pattern which they said was very important but now kind of 
like doesn’t seem to be as important. It’s just mainly keeping, um, keeping my 
medication stable. I think if I had a few days, few nights without sleep, stop my 
sleep, I would have problems...(35) 
While medications may comfort and protect, they can also restrict; 
Citalopram made me feel like I was wrapped in cotton wool all the time...It was 
quite nice. I liked it. I understand some people don’t, um, and it just, it stopped 
the bottom from falling out of my world really, um, and Lithium um, um, made 
everything kind of flat. Like I was flat. I sort of, I didn’t feel like hugely 






While medications may be valued, it also requires a person to manage a sense of 
being totally reliant upon them; 
I was always worried that I would get hooked on them and I am, I guess I am 
hooked on them... I don’t want to go without them and I think that I would 
actually probably panic if I didn’t have them. (13) 
A willingness to feel reliant upon medications may be central to the experience of 
taking medication but to see oneself as dependent upon something outside of oneself 
effects how this subject position is taken up; 
...I’m willing to take Olanzepine...I don’t want to do anything else...If there’s any 
other way of doing it I’d rather exhaust every single way before I would even 
go there and also then it drives, it drives me a little wild and I can understand 
that the brain is a very sensitive thing, you know, a computer after all in some 
ways, um, that any medication would take a lead in time of a month or six 
weeks or something or two months or something like that before the levels 
would start working and so, um, I just didn’t want to be dependent on any 
medication. I think dependency is the other thing. (20) 
Medications can act as a sign of personal weakness; 
... I haven’t reached that desired confidence to not be without them just yet 
because I am still learning a lot about the damage, yeah the damaged impact of 
all those influences and that that have done and encroached upon my way of 
thinking yeah I haven’t got that ability to be strong to cope without them not 
yet...(46) 
A person using medications can be constructed as someone who is not strong enough 
to cope without them, just as a person using medication is constructed here as 
somehow putting themselves at risk by taking them; 
I used to be absolutely anti medication, anti pills, this time I am not mucking 
around, it’s not that I came off medication at all I just didn’t want to take it 
because it wasn’t natural to the body but you can’t help it when you have got 





Through talk about medications, the discourse of self-management can be seen to 
become entangled in ideas about what it means to be self-reliant; 
I: What do you think of the idea that someone with bipolar disorder can 
learn to manage their condition? 
P: Yeah, I, I’ve kind of heard about that but, um, without, without taking 
medication? (M2) 
Medication can be experienced as central and even essential to a person’s ability to 
engage in regulating and moderating themselves but with it can come a sense of 
oneself as dependent and lacking in self-reliance. If self-management is constructed 
as ultimately about a demonstration of one’s capacity for self-reliance this presents a 
subject position infused with contradictions as a person is called to see themselves as 
both responsible and lacking in self-reliance at the same time. In this context 
ambivalence toward medications would hardly seem a surprising response to 
contradictions within this subject position. 
Moderation through habits 
Like medications, habits are constructed as a particular form of practice that helps a 
person to enact a subject position that values moderation and regulation. While the 
next piece of text was used earlier to demonstrate the effort of active engagement 
with this way of being, it also demonstrates how habits are understood to moderate 
mood; 
To manage my depression I will walk or I get out and do things like I bike 
around Bottle Lake every weekend. I walk every night. I make sure that I get 
up and walk up that valley every night (21) 
Habits are also constructed as helpful in moderating distressing feelings; 
I also tend to compartmentalise stuff because otherwise it is too big and I can’t 
deal with it like ahh every episode I have had I try and put it somewhere like 
try and put it where it belongs and it’s kinda in the past cause if I dwell on 





routine life and that is the only way I can get my head around what I need to 
do…(10) 
Disciplining the body through habits becomes a way to discipline the mind but the 
difficulties generated by this notion of the body as a conduit to an unreliable mind 
once again draws on psychological constructs, this time constructs of will power and 
self-control; 
... and it’s that willpower you know because sometimes we just don’t have the 
willpower to do it and sometimes we are just blatantly stubborn, no ears type 
attitude… (46) 
Without the ability to manage one’s will, habits are understood to remain 
undisciplined. 
In the context of living with bipolar disorder, the experience of elevated mood 
presents particular difficulties to the display of willpower as the pleasurable 
sensations it can bring are constructed as difficult to resist; 
I guess because it is hypomanic rather than full-blown manic I guess it was a 
really good place to be and it was always hard to finish to kind of lose that 
energy and then kind of hang up... Kind of like a high, kind of like you know 
you are taking drugs I guess.  I have never taken drugs so it is not a very good 
comparison but, you know that would be how I imagine people feel when they 
take drugs they just go right up there and live to the extreme...(7) 
Talk of habits incorporates ideas about the limits to self-control and the resulting 
sense of failure that can accompany a lack of willpower;  
... an hour after I take them [medications] I have a window a thin hour window 
where sleep just takes over and I have to be really mindful of that because 
about 9.30 I get really hungry, really hungry and nine out of ten I will succumb 
to that I will go down and grab an apple or biscuits or a sandwich and its 
terrible and I know that eating at that time is not good but it’s like a craving, 






A failure to enact the norms of willpower and self-control can generate a circle of 
intensification of habits to address a lack of willpower; 
 ...sometimes I do a little bit, push it...I have to make sure if I have a really late 
night, late night and drink a lot of stuff I try and make sure that that week I get 
good sleep and try and fix what I’ve done (35) 
Deficiencies of willpower result in temptation being given in to, which in turn 
requires an intensified focus upon habits in a way that suggests a need to make 
amends. 
Within the discourse of self-management, habits are constructed as practices that 
help people moderate themselves yet they also require of people significant levels of 
diligence and self-control. Habits cannot be effective without displays of willpower so 
a person’s relationship with themselves has the potential to be based upon a self-
surveillance that searches for inadequate levels of willpower and then attends to this 
deficit through increased conformity and rigidity. This in turn would seem to increase 
the likelihood that a discourse of self-management can perpetuate a sense of self as a 
failure and in need of making amends for one’s deficits. 
Summary 
This analysis demonstrates that a self-management discourse makes available to 
people understood to have the condition subject positions that are characterised by 
the enactment of acceptance, reflexivity and moderation. Acceptance is not an 
automatic or instinctive endeavour; rather people are drawn into an enactment of 
acceptance that then requires an active response. This subject position is tied to a 
neo-liberal discourse of responsibilization; once psychiatric discourse is 
acknowledged as having the authority to know a person’s mental distress, the person 
then becomes responsible for the choices they make about how to respond to expert 
knowledge. The person is not the cause of bipolar disorder but they are to be held 
accountable for how they live with it as how they live with it is constructed as a 
matter of choice (Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose, 1998b). It becomes a subject position 





people who believe they are suffering from an illness, and those who don’t believe are 
likely to fail in their attempts at self-regulation (Blackman, 2007). 
A reflexive relationship with one’s self is, in this analysis, a way of being that is 
enacted with a level of intensity beyond ‘normal’ others and this rigorous attention to 
the detail of one’s internal world is performed through a lens of medical-cartesian 
discourse such that people are positioned as having to choose between naming 
experiences as either self or illness. There is no option in this version of reflexivity for 
it to be both. This subject position calls people to a reflexive relationship with the self 
that is both rigorous and detailed while also creating the conditions for a relationship 
with the self that is based upon fault finding, shame and making amends for wrong 
doing. 
These are ways of being in the world that highlight some of the tensions between the 
discourse of self-management and how people come to understand their experiences. 
On the one hand a person with bipolar disorder is understood to have thoughts and 
feelings that are unreliable and untrustworthy as they could be an expression of 
illness rather than a person’s ‘real’ internal state. On the other hand, the discourse of 
self-management positions the person with bipolar disorder as adept at both self-
surveillance and disciplining one’s thoughts in order to avoid relapse by not 
repeating the mistakes of the past. The demand for a reflexive way of being is 
intensified and it must be enacted with a diligence that recognises one’s self as 
unreliable. 
As with a subject position characterised by reflexivity, a position characterised by 
moderation also requires an active engagement with a persistent attention to oneself. 
Medications and habits form the backbone of the enactment of moderation and they 
are practices that are not free of side-effects. While medications can be effective aids 
to moderation, they can bring with them a sense of oneself as lacking in self-reliance 
such that a self-management discourse calls a person to see themselves as both self-
reliant and dependent at the same time. A focus upon one’s habits of daily living can 
also be an effective practice in the name of moderating the self but ideas of habit are 
tied to ideas of willpower and whether one has enough will power to change one’s 





lost by a focus upon habits as an expression of conformity, rigidity and a sense of 
failure. 
As a technology of self (Foucault, 1988), the discursive practices of self-management 
for bipolar disorder invite people to see and act upon the self in ways that are 
characterised by dividing practices and contradiction. Separated from ‘normal’ others 
by an unreliable self it becomes imperative that people can and should separate self 
from illness. At the same time as they are positioned by discourse as unreliable, 
people with bipolar disorder are also positioned as the responsible choice maker. In a 
similar fashion a person’s thoughts are constructed as both a problem to be 
surveilled in search of illness whilst they are also constructed as the means to bring 
about change in oneself; all of which would seem to leave people negotiating 
contradictory ways of being in the world.  As a technology of power (Foucault, 1988), 
the self is governed through the caring ministration of psy-experts such that the 
discourses of medicine and psychology become the only way to make sense of one’s 
self. The diligence and intensity that characterises the discursive practice of self-
management as a technology of self overlap with a technology of power so that the 
self governs the self through and by regimes of living sanctioned by authoritative 
others. 
A note on absent constructs 
In completing this analysis of how individuals use the discourse of self-management 
to govern themselves and turn themselves into particular forms of subjects it is 
important to note the absence of some particular textual themes in the analysis. 
Given the explicit stance taken to note the social and cultural context of both the 
creation of the interview text and the analysis, conspicuous by its absence or rather 
its very limited appearance, is the use of a Māori worldview as a discursive resource 
within the texts. This is not to suggest that people did not draw on concepts of self 
and the world taken from or inspired by a Māori worldview, but when it came 
specifically to the discourses being used to construct the object of bipolar disorder 
and the subject positions within the discourse of self-management they made a very 
limited appearance. This could be taken as a limitation of the study and a reflection of 





could also say much about the dominating influence of white-Western concept in the 
discursive resources that people draw on to make sense of who they are – regardless 
of how they might construct a notion of ethnicity. The reason for this limited 
appearance is unclear and it is an area for further study as currently no research 
could be located that analyses the discourses of medicine, psychiatry, or psychology 
with an attention to how people who name their ethnicity as Māori (or indeed any 







Discussion: Re-Evaluating the Self in Self-
Management 
 
It is often the case that an important idea is not important because it is true (in 
some absolute sense) still less because it is indubitable, but because it is fruitful 
(Fulford, Thornton, & Graham, 2006, p628). 
There is thus no effacing the poetic dimension of the processes at hand: historical 
interpretation, whether of self or other, far from simply finding what is already 
there, immanent in the data, relies through and through on the imaginative 
capacities of those doing the interpreting (Freeman, 1993, p229-230). 
This thesis has sought to explore the effects of the discourse of self-management for 
bipolar disorder upon how a person makes sense of both themselves and how to live. 
In doing so, it has also sought to investigate the nature of the self in self-management 
discourse.  After reviewing the key assumptions of language and discourse upon 
which this Foucauldian discourse analysis is based and summarizing the findings of 
the analysis, this chapter moves on to consider the implications of the findings for 
processes of self-formation in people understood to have bipolar disorder. It does so 
firstly by using Foucault’s four ethical dimensions of one’s relationship with one’s self 
and then uses this discussion to suggest alternate styles of relationship with one’s self 
using concepts of ontological pluralism and the management of the abject. The 
implications of both analysis and ensuing discussion are then considered in the 
proposal of an alternate model of psychoeducation before the chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the limitations of this discourse analysis. 
Language and Discourse 
This Foucauldian inspired discourse analysis based also on the work of Ian Parker 
(1992) has prioritised an understanding of the productive capacity of language to 
shape what can and cannot be said, and therefore what can and cannot be thought, 





been based upon several key assumptions about the nature of language and 
discourse. Firstly, that language cannot act in representational way to capture and 
describe the ‘real’ world. Rather people use language to construct the world and the 
ideas and meanings it conveys shift depending on historical and social context. 
Secondly, language is understood to govern how we can speak about objects through 
the action of discourses i.e. large sets of statements gathered together according to 
sets of rules that shape what can and cannot be said about particular objects. Thirdly, 
discourse is assumed to be historically shaped – what can be said about an object at 
this point in time is a reflection of what has been said in the past by the same or 
related discourses. Fourthly discourse shapes subjectivity through the creation of 
subject positions; that in order to make sense of what is being said a ‘reader’ must 
recognise that they are being ‘called’ to in some way and positioned as a certain sort 
of subject in relation to the discourse. When these assumptions are collected 
together, discourse is understood to act in a productive way making it possible to say 
certain things but not others such that it becomes difficult to think otherwise. This 
leads to the final assumption made here about discourse – that it is tied to wider 
networks of social institutions and power relations. This discourse analysis is 
concerned with how power works through discourse to produce particular subject 
positions and then how people use these to govern others and govern themselves 
without the need for overt coercion. To this end the concept of governmentality has 
been useful as a means to think about how technologies of the self shape how people 
govern themselves whilst also being tied to broader strategies of government aimed 
at the management of the nation state in the name of such things as health, welfare 
and productivity.  
These assumptions have been applied to analysing the discourse of self-management 
as found in an expert based text on bipolar disorder and in the talk of those people 
understood to have bipolar disorder. As a result, the discursive practices of self-
management have been shown to act as both a technology of power and of self; they 
are practices that allow people to both govern others and govern themselves based 
upon the knowledges of the psy-sciences that have taken on a truthful status when it 
comes to matters of the mind. They are practices that shape how people with bipolar 





of relationship between people with bipolar disorder and others, in particular mental 
health professionals.  
Summary of the Findings 
The first stage of the analysis detailed in Chapter 5 takes a text produced by psy-
experts in the field of self-management of bipolar disorder, the Manual of 
Psychoeducation for Bipolar Disorder (Colom & Vieta, 2006), in order to first 
investigate processes of subjectification (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2009) and the ways 
others are governed and objectified through relations of power and knowledge. The 
analysis identified that the discourses of self-management and the psy-sciences 
tightly regulate how bipolar disorder can be understood and what a person must do 
in response to it. As an object, bipolar disorder is constructed as a brain disorder that 
will always recur so it must be treated with medication. As a technology of power, 
The Manual is emblematic of a secular pastorate that acts to create a space where in 
the name of care and concern for the good of a person’s health, the conduct of people 
with bipolar disorder is shaped around reflexive, self-surveilling ways of being in the 
world that are based upon the norms and authority of the psy-sciences. Regardless of 
a person’s degree of conformity to the psy-science version of their experience, 
everything about a person with bipolar disorder is to be explained by their brain 
disorder. 
Both Chapter 6 and 7 approach the analysis of discourse with a concern for processes 
of subjectivation and how individuals use the discourse of self-management to 
govern themselves and turn themselves into particular forms of subjects (Milchman 
& Rosenberg, 2009). Chapter 6 comes to subjectivation through a focus upon how 
people with bipolar disorder use discourse to construct bipolar as an object and what 
the implications of this might be for subjectivity. Chapter 7 builds upon this by then 
paying specific attention to self-management discourse and the subject positions it 
makes available to people with bipolar disorder.  
When people with bipolar disorder construct the condition they understand 
themselves to have, they turn predominately to medical discourse while also drawing 
on psychological and neo-liberal discourses to make sense of experience. First and 





something that they have brought on themselves but it is constructed as an object for 
which they hold the responsibility for how they choose to live with it, particularly as 
it is understood as something a person can exacerbate by their own actions. While 
medical discourse is used to construct bipolar disorder as a brain illness, 
psychological discourse is used to at the same time construct the mind as unreliable 
and abnormal such that bipolar disorder is an object that marks a person as different 
from ‘normal’ others because it is an illness with less legitimacy than non-mind 
related illnesses. With the mind constructed as unreliable the body is able to offer a 
conduit to this hidden world and a way to read the mind. An effect of medical 
discourse is to place the body in a life with bipolar disorder in the more limited role 
of the display of symptoms of an illness while the person with bipolar disorder is 
forced to choose between understanding their experiences as either part of their 
‘true’ self or as part of their illness as it cannot be both. By drawing on this 
combination of medical, psychological, and neo-liberal discourses to construct the 
object of bipolar disorder, the subject positions made available to people are 
characterised by notions of choice, accountability, and a self that is unreliable. This 
results in a relationship with oneself that is always mediated by and with the experts 
of the psy-sciences. It also suggests that people with bipolar disorder are being 
drawn into an intensified version of contemporary personhood whereby a person’s 
psychological self is to work in the service of managing a person’s neurochemical 
biological self (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). 
Self-management discourse calls people with bipolar disorder to subject positions 
based upon practices of acceptance, reflexivity and moderation. While the analysed 
text suggest that these are positions that people with bipolar disorder actively 
reproduce, they do so in a way that identifies some of the complexities and 
contradictions within them; being responsible while also unreliable, being diligent in 
one’s self-governance and surveillance while also relying upon expert others, being 
self-reliant while also dependent, being not at fault yet faulty, and monitoring ones 
thoughts for signs of illness while also using ones thoughts as a mechanism of self-
transformation. Weiner (2011) also identifies these same tensions; how self-
management practices for bipolar disorder simultaneously require a person to 





toward their present thought and emotions, and distrust of an imagined future self.” 
(Weiner, 2011, p. 448) These are contradictions and tensions that in The Manual 
have a minimal  presence and when they do appear, are dealt with by offering the 
salve of the medical model and the relief from suffering presumed to lie with knowing 
that one has acted responsibly.  
The Ethics of a Life with Bipolar Disorder 
Within health care settings neo-liberal norms of subjectivity that are based upon 
choice, independence and personal responsibility are particularly potent and they, in 
conjunction with the subject positions within a discourse of self-management bring a 
moral domain to self-management practices. When a person has a long-term health 
condition, in this case bipolar disorder, there are particular styles of living and ways 
of conducting oneself that are valued and rewarded more than others. Dean (2010) 
uses the example of that “ubiquitous exercise in self-government, the diet” (Dean, 
2010, p. 26) to highlight how a person draws on expert knowledge from a range of 
sources to determine why and how they will go about the practice of dieting. There 
are many ways to be on a diet; choices need to be made about what knowledge to 
base our actions on, the part of ourselves we wish to work upon and who we hope to 
become as a result of a diet. Importantly, these multiple ways to be ‘on a diet’ are 
ways that are not stable in nature and inevitably come up against each other. 
“Techniques of relating to oneself as a subject of unique capacities worthy of respect 
run up against practices of relating to oneself as the target of discipline, duty and 
docility.” (Rose, 1998b, p. 34). Just as in self-governance through one’s diet, in self-
governance through one’s bipolar disorder there are always points of conflict and 
contestation about how to be in any given context, always judgements to be made 
about how to conduct one’s life. 
It is these processes of self-formation through the ways of acting and thinking that a 
person uses “to monitor, test, improve and transform...” (Foucault, 1990b, p. 28) 
oneself, that Foucault is referring to when he uses the term ethics. Moral codes define 
desirable or undesirable behaviour while ethics refers to the numerous practical 
ways that a person determines the proper conduct of their life, the kind of selves they 





this. (Foucault, 1990b; Rose, 1998b). Ethics in this context is focused upon the 
process by which the individual thinks about and then acts upon the self, the process 
by which people construct preferred subjectivities or ways of being. What sort of life 
should I lead? How am I to be concerned with my self? Is my self something that 
requires care, if so, what is the nature of this care? It is this practical application of 
‘codes of conduct’ that this discussion now focuses on. In seeking to tease apart the 
nature of the relationship one is expected to have with oneself, Foucault proposed 
four dimensions to explore; 1) the ethical substance, 2) the mode of subjection, 3) the 
self-forming activities and 4) the telos. These dimensions are now used to explore 
how self-management practices shape how a person understood to have bipolar 
disorder makes sense of their self and the nature of a life with bipolar disorder. 
The ethical substance: This is the part of oneself or one’s behaviour that is the 
focus of moral conduct, the aspect of oneself that is being singled out as the focus of 
moral work (Foucault, 2003d, p111). 
Within a discourse of self-management for bipolar disorder the part of the self most 
relevant to one’s moral conduct is the unreliable mind. Neither thoughts nor feelings 
can be relied upon to guide a person’s behaviour because the source of those 
thoughts and feelings is an unreliable mind. While the brain too is implicated as the 
source of problems with regulating one’s conduct, within the discourse of self-
management people with bipolar disorder turn to the mind and the thoughts and 
feelings it generates as the focus of moral conduct. By surveilling thoughts and 
feelings for signs of illness and working upon how one thinks, a person is seeking to 
act upon a mind that always has the potential to lose the ability to know itself which 
in turn can result in behaviour that is socially unacceptable or morally abhorrent, for 
example sexual promiscuity. Neither thoughts, nor intentions nor feelings can be 
singled out as the focus of moral conduct because of their unreliability which results 
in the person having to construct the whole mind as in need of close attention if a 
person is to demonstrate moral conduct.  
Indeed because of the mind’s ability to produce conduct of dubious morality, working 
on one’s mind (primarily thoughts and attitudes) is constructed within a discourse of 





that that a person really does know right from wrong regardless of how they might 
have behaved. In this context, feelings of shame become an important indicator of a 
person’s ability to know right from wrong. Shame is evidence that a person knows 
they have behaved in unpleasant, hurtful, or socially unacceptable way. It could be 
argued that shame is an essential means by which a person can construct themselves 
as an ethical subject, a ‘necessary evil’. But this could also be seen as a way of 
understanding shame as pathological, a sign of a malfunctioning individual who 
cannot manage their own behaviour. Shame in this context becomes unwanted; 
something to be avoided at all costs. While it might affirm a person’s ability to 
determine right from wrong, shame would seem to be more potent as a sign of being 
a faulty individual. 
What if shame was instead constructed within a developmental frame of reference; 
an emotion through which human beings learn about themselves and their 
relationships with others, an emotion with a productive nature that allows a person 
to learn (Rodogno, 2008)? In this scenario shame, while still not a pleasant 
experience, could instead become something around which we develop rituals of 
redress and reconnection when someone acts in a way that creates shame. Rather 
than it being a sign of a faulty self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) and something to be 
avoided at all costs, it becomes part of processes of self-formation through which a 
person learns to develop a sense of who they are in relation to others with access to 
social rituals to heal the connections with others that get broken as a result of shame 
inducing acts. By thinking and acting in this way it would seem that what could come 
from this is a more integrated sense of oneself where the unacceptable parts of 
oneself have less need to be organised around the notion of shame (Wheeler, 2003, 
p297). 
Mode of subjection: On what basis are people “invited or incited to recognise 
their moral obligations” (Foucault, 2003d, p. 111), what authority or truth is being 
called upon as the reason to act. “[T]he way in which the individual establishes his 
relation to the rule and recognise himself as obliged to put it into practice.”(Foucault, 





At first glance, in a discourse of self-management the mode of subjection would seem 
to be the authority and truth of the psy-sciences.  By recognising him or herself as an 
object of psychiatric discourse and accepting its authority to determine what it is and 
how to live with it, both science and medicine are acting as the basis for determining 
the relationship a person has with their self. But there would also seem to be layers to 
this dimension, with other truths acting in conjunction with the psy-sciences to call 
people with bipolar disorder to recognise their moral obligations. In particular, a neo-
liberal discourse that values subjectivities based upon enterprise, choice and 
personal responsibility adds a layer to the mode of subjection. In contemporary 
Western societies knowledge of what it means to be human is centred on 
assumptions of “humans as selves with autonomy, choice, and self-responsibility, 
equipped with a psychology aspiring to self-fulfilment, actually or potentially running 
their lives as a kind of enterprise of themselves.” (Rose, 1998b, p. 33). These modern 
forms of power relations are not overtly oppressive but instead promote governance 
of self and others through ideas of choice and freedom and have in turn become very 
potent constructs within health care settings (Brown & Baker, 2012). Yet their 
potency is based upon an assumption that responsibility is what an individual person 
enacts by taking ‘personal responsibility’. As demonstrated by Weiner (2011) in her 
ethnographic study of a bipolar support group, responsibility can also be shared with 
others in such a way as to acknowledge “the discontinuous and never entirely 
knowable subject” (Weiner, 2011, p. 480). 
The call to see oneself as both under the jurisdiction of psy-science and as the 
quintessential neo-liberal citizen relies upon another layer to the mode of subjection; 
one of fear. Within the discourse of self-management the call to see oneself as the 
ideal health consumer appears less as invitation and more as incitement on the basis 
of fear. For people with bipolar disorder fear is an important part of their use of the 
discourse of self-management. Bipolar disorder is constructed as an object to be 
feared because of its unpredictability, the distressing emotions is can generate and its 
ability to produce shame inducing behaviour. Psy-experts in turn arguably exploit 
these fears in their use of the discourse of self-management in order to persuade 






“...bipolar disorder is a recurrent disorder [italics in original] which means that 
many of those who suffer from it will present with future episodes. This must 
not frighten us, because the possibility of controlling relapses is in our 
hands...” (Colom & Vieta, 2006, p. 99) 
As a result, the discourse of self-management can be seen to be promoting an ethic or 
way of living tied to choice-making and seeing oneself as responsible on the basis of 
the fear of the consequences of not doing so. Once again this promotes a relationship 
with oneself mediated by psy-experts as they are constructed as the source of 
salvation from fear. 
While fear is a motivating force for people with bipolar disorder to take up a 
discourse of self-management and the subject positions within it, this fear can also be 
understood as arising as much from how others respond to them as from the internal 
experiences of altered thoughts and feelings. What if, for example the places where a 
person might go for assistance with their bipolar disorder e.g. inpatient mental health 
settings, were not in themselves objects of fear? What if the object of bipolar disorder 
itself was not treated in discourse as abject, abnormal and fearful but instead as part 
of the spectrum of human experience? Without the motivation of fear, the driving 
force to act upon oneself on the basis of psy-science and personal responsibility 
would perhaps not be quite so intense. 
Self-forming activity: What are the techniques that one applies to oneself in 
order to change oneself into an ethical subject and to comply with the rules of 
conduct? “What are we to do, either to moderate our acts, or to decipher what we 
are…” (Foucault, 2003d, p. 112). 
This analysis has identified subject positions that the discourse of self-management 
makes available to people with bipolar disorder that are characterised by practices of 
self-surveillance and moderation and in this context can be thought of as techniques 
of the self. Firstly there is a form of reflexivity characterised by intense self-
surveillance, and a rigorous and diligent attention toward one’s internal world whilst 
also making a continuous effort to determine a division of experiences between self 





person’s use of medication and attention to their daily habits. These self-forming 
activities are then enacted within power relations based upon a secular pastorate. 
Self or illness 
As has been identified in Chapter 6, these techniques that people with bipolar 
disorder apply to themselves in order make sense of who they are, are all constructed 
on the basis of a medical-cartesian discourse so as well as being activities that require 
the sanction of psy-experts, they are also activities that assume a distinction can and 
should be made between self and illness experiences. The self being formed as an 
effect of the discourse of self-management is forced to choose between one or the 
other. But people with bipolar disorder can resist this way of thinking by the way a 
narrative of ethnic identity allows a person to construct themselves as both having an 
illness that requires the attention of psy-experts and as having experiences that 
demonstrate their connection to an indigenous view of the world and self.  
“...the first time it really confused me to be able to that’s that, bipolar with 
mākutu so when the people say, well if I have to say I’ve got bipolar I say ‘oh 
but from the Māori experience’.” (M14) 
 
While the discursive practices of self-management are generally dominated by a 
medical-cartesian discourse, this analysis suggests that this does not have to be the 
case when a person has other discursive resources available to them.  
Becoming a creature of habit 
Habits can be thought of as non-reflexive activities where the self is formed through 
training the body and mind to act in routine ways. In the context of self-management 
practices these routines can be understood as based on disciplinary power relations 
that shape the self through the regulation of conduct based on the norms of psy-
science. In this scenario habits are bodily practices concerned with rigidity and 
conformity and the unthinking reproduction of social institutions that supports 
current power relations (Burkitt, 2002). The analysis of the subject positions within 
self-management discourse identified the importance of habits as a means to know 





the confessional allow the patient to reveal their mundane routines and habits 
(without necessarily recognising their importance) which are then interpreted and 
given significance by the psy-expert. In the discourse of self-management habits are 
constructed as both problem and liberation where ‘bad’ habits are the source of the 
problem (in this case relapse of one’s bipolar disorder) while attention to 
implementing ‘good’ habits is seen as liberating a person from the problem of ‘bad’ 
habits. The self being formed is one that is understood to be deficient in will power 
such that the only way to govern conduct in the absence of will is to increase the 
focus upon habit (Bennett, Dodsworth, Noble, Poovey, & Watkins, 2013). 
While attention to habits can be understood as disciplinary based practice, habits can 
also be understood as a way to extend the creative potential of the body and of the 
self. Rather than something that reduces human behaviour to order and conformity, 
Grosz constructs habits as having “a fundamentally creative capacity that produces 
the possibility of stability in a universe in which change is fundamental.” (Grosz, 
2013, p. 219). This creativity can be seen in the way the body alters in response to 
repeated patterns of behaviour, for example in the way repeated patterns of sleeping 
and waking at regular times interacts with the body’s circadian rhythm altering 
hormones and the subjective experience of mood (Dallaspezia & Benedetti, 2011; 
Hickie, Naismith, Robillard, Scott, & Hermens, 2013; McClung, 2013). In addition, the 
transformative quality of habits means that behaviour can become unthinkingly 
regularised so that actions happen without conscious thought, arguably leaving space 
for other things to take one’s attention. When framed this way habits can be 
understood as repeated actions that allow a person to engage with a notion of self 
where learning and change is possible (Blackman, 2013; Grosz, 2013).  
Alternatively, when constructed as a non-reflexive practice that is located on the 
surface of the subject, habits can be altered without rigorous self-examination such 
that repeated patterns of conduct can be a way of resisting the incitement to explore 
deeper within the psyche for truth and meaning. When habits are constructed in this 
way, it extends notions of biology in bipolar disorder beyond the brain. As the body, 
mind and brain interact to generate change, the self is offered the potential to be 





While the discourse of self-management calls people to become creatures of habit, 
this does not necessarily require it to be in the name of conformity and regulation. 
Habits offer self-forming practices that can be both rule and opportunity, growth and 
stasis, as well as resistance to and reproduction of existing power relations. The self-
forming activities of moderation that make up an ethical enactment of self-
management discourse would seem to rely heavily upon forms of body knowledge 
but its value to self-management is constrained by a medical discourse of the body as 
the site of symptoms and a medical-cartesian discourse that seeks to separate the 
mind from the body. The body can be used to coerce as well as  means to come to 
know and care for the self, it is not a choice of either/or despite what our attachment 
to medical discourse might suggest.  
This formulation of the self-forming activities that people with bipolar disorder 
engage in makes a strong case for an embodied notion of bipolar disorder and its 
management that moves beyond the body as the location of symptoms. Using her 
ethnographic research with the Hearing Voices Network, Blackman (2007) explores 
how a person “enters into a dialogue with their experience, and how this process can 
change the embodied experience of voices” ” (Blackman, 2007, p. 16). Through 
discourse members of the network engage in constructing their experience of voices 
in ways that integrate them into their sense of who they are rather than adopting a 
medical discourse that requires the voices to be separated from the person 
symptoms of illness. Through this process people’s experiences of the voices change 
“such that they are embodied as rather different phenomena” (Blackman, 2007, p. 
18). This discourse analysis demonstrates how a medical discourse requires 
particular dialogues about the separation of self and illness and the role of habits but 
this analysis also proposes that these dialogues can be constructed differently and 
result in a different relationship between one’s body and one’s self. 
Pastoral power 
As the analysis of the Psychoeducation Manual for Bipolar Disorder (Colom, 2006) 
identified, relationships based upon a secular pastorate form the basis for how 
clinicians are encouraged to enact the self-management discourse. For the person 





moderation that are being shaped by the psy-expert’s need to know a person’s inner 
world in order to offer individualised routes to salvation. Through discursive 
practices of ‘confession like’ interactions, people with bipolar disorder tell a psy-
expert what is within them which the expert then interprets and constructs meaning 
according the particular ideas which they believe reveal the truth of a person’s 
experience. This confessional style of interaction whereby people learn who they are 
through the mediation of psy-experts is a feature of contemporary health care 
(Mayes, 2009; O'Byrne & Holmes, 2009) but for the person with bipolar disorder this 
requirement to have a relationship with oneself mediated through the truth of psy-
sciences and practices of confession would seem to be intensified.  
Thinking about health care for people with bipolar disorder in terms of pastoral 
power also allows a way to think differently about the drive in contemporary mental 
health care towards providing recovery-orientated, patient centred care that 
promotes the empowerment and self-determination of people experiencing mental 
health problems (Davidson, Harding, & Spaniol, 2005; Lapsley, Nikora, & Black, 2002; 
Sterling, von Esenwein, Tucker, Fricks, & Druss, 2010). From this perspective 
‘recovery’ as a policy of mental health service provision (Davidson & White, 2007; 
Mental Health Commission, 1998; Pilgrim, 2008) becomes less about personal self-
determination and more about institutions of the state shaping how a person governs 
themselves in the name of health. Notions of pastoral power draw attention to the 
way both those people understood to have a mental disorder and those known as 
mental health professionals engage with each other and with themselves through a 
complex web of power relations that both are often blind to (Mayes, 2009). In a 
similar fashion it also provides a way to think about the implications of the growing 
call for psychotherapy as an essential adjunct to medication in the treatment of 
bipolar disorder (Frank, 2007; Miklowitz & Scott, 2009; Scott, 2006; Scott & Colom, 
2008). While psychotherapy can be framed as a beneficial process of self-discovery 
facilitated by a therapist motivated by care and concern for autonomy, notions of 
pastoral power draw attention to how psychotherapy can also create a space for 
discursively produced self-formation based upon practices that valorise the 
revelation of one’s inner world in the context of a caring relationship that is built 





talking based therapies are concepts in mental health care that work on the basis that 
“...to know the truth about oneself requires them to subject oneself to examination 
and expert elicitation and interpretation” (Mayes, 2009, p. 488).   
The telos: What “… is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a 
moral way?” (Foucault, 2003d, p. 112), what sort of person is one aiming to be as a 
result of this ethical work. 
As in the earlier discussion of the mode of subjection that identified neo-liberal 
discourse as one of the ways that people with bipolar disorder are called to recognise 
their moral obligation, it would seem that the ‘kind of being’ that people with bipolar 
disorder are positioned to aspire to through self-management discourse is a person 
who takes responsibility for the choices they make. Contemporary notions of 
subjectivity can be seen to be focused upon the enterprising individual which has 
become a way of being that is played out in a multitude of aspects of daily life; from 
the school, to work, to the family, people living in advanced liberal societies are called 
to see themselves as responsible people living their life through choice and freedom 
(Miller & Rose, 2008, p18). The enterprising individual is understood to work upon 
their life in order to maximise the worth of their existence and will do so in ways that 
pays particular attention to the management of risk (Galvin, 2002; Rose, 1998b). 
Experts, and health professionals in the context of this thesis, concurrently become 
focussed on the individual’s conduct in the name of helping to minimise the risks that 
are constructed as an inevitable part of contemporary life (Brown & Baker, 2012). In 
these ways the state is able to govern its population through the governance of 
individual subjectivity. 
Aspiring to personal responsibility in relation to living with bipolar disorder appears 
to be tied tightly to notions of risk and its active management. The expertise of psy-
sciences constructs bipolar disorder as inevitably recurring and self-management 
discourse constructs these recurrences as linked to predictable factors. Relapses have 
triggers that can be identified and most importantly, people engage in conduct that is 
understood to promote the likelihood of a relapse. The contemporary individual who 
also lives with bipolar disorder will demonstrate their enterprising nature by 





upon these by changing how they live. Once they have worked to control their 
conduct that is implicated in a potential relapse, the next focus is to plan in advance 
the actions that others should take on their behalf when they cannot actively manage 
the risk of lack of rationality. In aspiring to personal responsibility, people with 
bipolar disorder would seem to be engaging in practices that promote notions of the 
risky yet enterprising self (Scott & Wilson, 2011).  
Aspiring toward a relationship with the self based upon personal responsibility is 
driven by a relationship with experts as once “the patient understands their disorder, 
they have the growing sensation of being understood” (Colom & Vieta, 2006, p. 27) 
then allows them to make the correct choices about their conduct. In seeking to 
operationalize concepts of self-management for people with long-term health 
conditions, Lorig & Holman (2003) construct all conduct as a choice such that what 
matters most is educating a person to ensure their choices align with the knowledge 
of science and medicine. Personal responsibility thus becomes about choosing one’s 
conduct on the basis of instruction and advice and not about what a person learns 
about themselves, through their experiences of living. 
While all people in contemporary Western societies can be understood as being 
called to see themselves as exercising personal responsibility, for people with bipolar 
disorder the call to relate to oneself in this way is both intensified and put under 
tension. A biological model of mental illness does not allocate blame to the individual 
for developing an illness in the first place but at the same time a person with a mental 
illness can be held accountable for how they live with it. In the name of recovery, 
people with a mental illness are offered self-determination while simultaneously 
having their conduct regulated by psy-experts through notions of choice and 
responsibility (Brown & Baker, 2012). But importantly, the demonstration of 
personal responsibility allows a person with bipolar disorder to become a citizen like 
everyone else; their conduct has an exchange value such that they become socially 
included rather than excluded. For those who are able to enact personal 
responsibility, aspiring to a relationship with the self based upon notions of 
responsibility and choice therefore has much to recommend it when conduct is 
traded for citizenship. But what of those people who will not or cannot conduct 





people for whom the boundary between illness and personal volition is not clearly 
defined? Aspiring to a relationship with the self based on personal responsibility 
would seem likely to promote a sense of self based on failure or at worst even further 
marginalize and pathologize. Personal responsibility in this reading is not as benign 
as it may first appear which begs the question, are there alternate relationships with 
the self that could be aspired to through self-management practices that allow a less 
restricted ethic of life with bipolar disorder? 
In discussing Foucault’s ideas about an ethical life15, McNay (1994) is critical of how 
he privileges the notion of a relations with the self over relations with others such 
that his stance on ethics is lacking in any context of a life lived embedded in social 
relations. Taking this criticism up, what if the telos of a life with bipolar disorder was 
to prioritise intersubjectivity over subjectivity and to live a life whose primary 
objective is the maintenance and quality of one’s connectedness with others? In the 
context of a telos that aspires to social connectedness, opportunities are provided to 
think differently about important aspects of life with bipolar disorder, in particular 
the experience of shame and the purpose it serves. In a similar vein to Kristeva’s 
(Kristeva, 2002) construct of the management of the abject as a developmental 
process, if the telos of life with bipolar disorder was not about personal responsibility 
but about social connectedness then shame could become less about personal failing 
and more about a disruption in social connectedness. This would also suggest 
processes of self-formation that prioritise the nature and quality of a network of 
relations with others in preference to notions of individuality and independence from 
others.  
Ontological Pluralism 
To find alternative ways to think about the ethics of a life with bipolar disorder is not 
straight-forward when the nature of the ‘self’ in self-management is dominated by a 
notion of the ‘normal’ self as contained, singular, autonomous and rational. To 
privilege processes of self-formation through intersubjectivity over subjectivity 
                                                          
15 Foucault’s work on the constructs of ethics and governmentality as the overlap of technologies of power 
and self were in development over what turned out to be, the end of Foucault’s life. Because of this they 





arguably requires a Western ontology of the nature of existence to be challenged if 
we are to find ways to think differently. Inspired by Salmond’s (2012, 2014) use of 
ontological pluralism as a way to think differently yet wary of misrepresenting or 
misusing indigenous Māori knowledge and practices, this thesis suggests that there is 
useful thinking that can come from applying a Māori relational ontology to this 
discussion of self-management, and in particular to consider how a telos of self-
management practices could prioritise social connectedness instead of an 
individualised personal responsibility. This interweaving of ontologies is put forward 
as a way to create a foundation for alternate ways to practice self-management. 
The notions of self as rational, individual and singular around which self-
management is currently constructed come from a Western ontology that can be 
traced through different strands of thought or conditions of possibility. From the 
creation narrative of the Old Testament, to ideas about human superiority in the 
construct of the Great Chain of Being (Bennett, 2010, p87-88), from Darwin’s theories 
of evolution and on to rationalities based upon the concept of science and the 
essential role of objectivity to determine the ‘truth’ of human existence; these are 
ways of thinking that in each historical context have become taken for granted truths. 
But these ways of thinking about the nature of human existence can also be 
constructed as some of any number of ways to think. They have become ‘habits of 
mind’ (Salmond, 2014, p297) that have become so deeply entrenched that alternate 
views of how the world is ordered are dismissed as superstitious or primitive 
(Salmond, 2012). Salmond instead argues that in the context of Aotearoa New 
Zealand, a pluralist approach that interweaves a modern Western ontology with a 
Māori indigenous ontology is a more useful discursive social practice rather than 
operating on the basis that only one reality is possible. In Aotearoa New Zealand 
society Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi) remains a living example of two 
distinctly different ontological versions of the world which, through restitution 
processes whereby the Crown acknowledges its breaches of the Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
(Treaty of Waitangi) and provides recompense to iwi (tribes), we now see discursive 
practices that seek to bring these world views together (Office of Treaty Settlements, 
2014). It is this concept of ontological plurality that this discussion seeks to be 





In a modernist, Western style ontology the world is a singular entity composed of 
bounded entities; nation states that are marked by boundaries and inhabited by 
autonomous individuals with rights and duties (Bidois, 2013; Salmond, 2012, 2014). 
These autonomous individuals are then divided into cultures and societies. It is an 
ontology built upon dualisms in which one half of the binary is always dominant; 
animate versus inanimate, mind versus body, human versus animal, modern versus 
primitive (Salmond, 2012) and “[i]t is dualism that allows for the conception of air 
tight boundaries, the kind of boundaries that define autonomy.” (Evens, 2012, p. 8). 
From a Māori perspective the world is founded on complementary dualisms; Te Ao 
and Te Po (the everyday realm and the dark realm of ancestors), tane and wahine 
(male and female), tapu and noa (ancestral presence and absence), ora and mate 
(good fortune, wellbeing and illness, misfortune and death) (Salmond, 2012). These 
are pairings rather than binaries so that one cannot exist without the other. With no 
clear division between entities, everything (plants, land, people and object) is 
animated by hau, the wind of life. This is a relational ontology where phenomena 
emerge through a process of reciprocal exchange such that “the negotiations that 
forge and shape relations are the stuff of life.” (Salmond, 2012, p. 121). The self 
(ahau) is constituted by its network of connections to others, always in the context of 
reciprocity. “When the exchanges are in a state of balance, hau flows unimpeded and 
the network of relations are...in a state of ora...If reciprocity fails...[i]t is manifest as 
illness and misfortune, a breakdown in the balance of reciprocal exchanges.”  
(Salmond, 2012, p. 121). 
When the self can be thought of as being formed through the nature and quality of its 
connections to others, experiences of shame and stigma can be thought of as 
processes of relational disconnection that can be healed through reciprocity; the 
everyday ‘stuff of life’ rather than a burden to be carried by one person alone. When it 
becomes possible to interweave different views of the nature of existence and what it 
means to be human, it also becomes possible to experience oneself as both separate 
from and connected to all people and things. Rather than the self needing to be 
rational, singular and bounded it becomes possible to speak and think of oneself as 
both rational and irrational, singular and multiple, bounded and uncontained 





Managing the Abject 
While Salmond comes to her ideas through anthropology, Julia Kristeva also offers a 
way to think differently about self-formation through her engagement with 
linguistics and psychoanalysis. Kristeva takes the work of Sigmund Freud and Jacques 
Lacan to construct her own theory of the formation of self (McSherry, Loewenthal, & 
Cayne, 2015). Freud’s vision of the self was as something that would ultimately reach 
a stable state and that mechanisms of repression allow for the creation of a clear 
dividing line between the conscious and unconscious, between the known and 
unknown aspects of the self. For Kristeva, unwanted unconscious material is always 
on the fringes of experience of the self such that the boundary fence of the self is 
never finished and the dividing line between unconscious and conscious is always 
blurred. The self is always a work in progress and ‘[t]he subject never feels itself to be 
ordered and knowable. It is always under threat, in an unresolved state that is 
exciting as well as dangerous...’ (Mansfield, 2000, p81). 
The body is central to self-formation for Kristeva as despite all our attempts to 
protect ourselves from the unwanted and put a boundary around what frightens us, 
our body provides a constant reminder of our permeability through the physical 
flows of blood, sweat, urine and vomit. The contained, clean and proper body is 
always under threat. ‘I work hard to alienate those parts of myself that disgust me’ 
(Mansfield, 2000, p83) and it is in the process of pushing away the abject part of the 
self that the self is formed but never in a way that is finished or complete. Kristeva 
understands humanness as a work in progress, constantly having to work with the 
unease of permeable and blurred boundaries between inside and outside, self and 
other, mind and body. 
While Kristeva uses the corpse as the ultimate manifestation of abjection because of 
the way it brings together life and death, love and repulsion simultaneously, the 
experiences named as bipolar disorder can also be thought of as a manifestation of 
the abject, a marker of the fragility of humanness and an entity that ‘does not respect 
borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous...’ (Kristeva, 2002, p232). 
Bipolar disorder provokes the process of abjection, it challenges a person’s sense of 





barely contained chaos. For both the person and for others, bipolar disorder makes 
manifest our anxiety about the crossing of boundaries and self-management practices 
can be thought of as a way to rein in that which does not respect boundaries and 
reminds us of our fragility – a way to keep in order that which is a manifestation of 
dis-order and death. 
In Kristeva’s version of self-formation, subjectivity is a process and the management 
of the abject is part of a developmental process of coming to understand the self. 
Shame and stigma in this context are not a sign of a disordered person and therefore 
experiences to be avoided at all costs. Instead shame and stigma can be thought of as 
another way that a person tries to contain the abject within oneself and avoid the 
anxiety created by an awareness of ones uncontained self. Management of the abject 
becomes a developmental process, something to be spoken of as a ‘normal’ part of 
self-formation.  
With this reading, it is perhaps then not surprising that psychiatric discourse would 
focus upon the importance of separating self from illness. Thinking with Kristeva, 
self-management practices become about trying to repress ambiguity and 
contradiction, trying to create a system of order that can contain our anxiety of the 
abject. The constant call to separate self from illness in this context becomes more 
about an expression of our fear of the abject that any actual truth that self and illness 
are indeed separate entities. Yes, bipolar disorder may disturb one’s sense of self but 
when thought of as a manifestation of the abject, this disturbance becomes something 
to be worked with rather than repressed. Abjection is neither good nor bad; it is 
instead a process by which we construct and reconstruct our sense of self. It is not a 
process that can be prevented or avoided therefore what would seem important is 
how we work with the abject. Currently self-management practices evoke the abject 
on the basis of a fear of the abnormal and so reinforce a need to separate self from 
others and self from illness. 
Rethinking the Self in Bipolar Disorder 
What if the self is formed through and by one’s social connections such that the self is 
less individual, more collective and founded on reciprocity? What if the self does not 





boundaries between self and others, time and place, the contained and the 
uncontained, the body and the mind? No matter what the ‘truth’ of these statements, 
it is in the thinking of the possibility that it becomes clear that the problematic self 
around which an ethos of living with bipolar disorder is centred is only problematic 
because people are required to understand themselves as having a singular, 
individual and static self that functions on the basis of binary oppositions. Rather 
than a person being seen as abnormal because they have a body and mind that are 
slippery and not easily contained, or a person being understood to have a sense of 
self that is disturbed by bipolar disorder (Inder, Crowe, Moor, Carter, Luty, & Joyce, 
2011), it is instead our notion of the self that would seem to be the problem and the 
resulting limits it places upon how we can think and speak of the self.  
Within alternate constructions of selfhood, self-management discourse would have 
no need to position people as having unreliable minds as these experiences would 
instead be incorporated within an understanding of how the mind works. Rather than 
prioritising the containment of the body that is always at risk of becoming 
uncontained, moderation practices might instead focus on the opportunities for 
creative change that one’s daily habits can make available. Rather than forcing a 
choice between understanding experience as either self or illness, practices of self-
surveillance might instead accommodate both simultaneously. Rather than subject 
positions being taken up on the basis of fear, a notion of positive liberty and the 
capacity to exercise critical judgement could shape a more thoughtful attention to 
how a person is being called to understand themselves (McNay, 1994). 
To think about social connectedness as the foundation for the formation of the self 
and a style of life requires us to give up ways of thinking based upon binaries - this or 
that, past or present, me or you – and find ways of speaking and thinking that engage 
with multiplicity and ambiguity, connection and contradiction. If the self in bipolar 
disorder was rethought, subjectivity could become a ‘work in progress’ and self-
management practices could become about embracing ambivalence and ambiguity. 
Equally, to engage with ontological pluralism without labelling one as more scientific 
or more primitive that the other comes the opportunity to practice integrating 
multiple world views and multiple ways of making sense of one’s self and one’s 





a relational ontology that might act as a discursive resource for understanding the 
self, it has a particular relevance for mental health professionals providing health 
services in Aotearoa New Zealand. On a daily basis we come into contact with people 
who continue to experience the repercussions of colonisation upon their wellbeing, 
people who are exposed to discursive practices that do not easily allow them to 
integrate multiple worldviews. What could it mean to people if diversity and 
contradiction could be become the guiding norms of self-management practices 
rather than the current approach that is dominated by the notion of deficient self and 
an unending search for the contained, rational, clean and proper body?  
This is not to say that engaging in practices of self-surveillance and self-regulation are 
unhelpful to a person living with bipolar disorder but they are currently practiced 
within a narrow vision of how a person should or could be. Whether or not bipolar 
disorder is both illness and mākutu would seem not to be the issue for debate. Rather 
attention needs to be given to the way the current discourse of self-management 
provides people with limited forms of subjectivity that all fall under the auspices of 
the benevolent eye of medicine and it attendant notions of deficit. Neither does this 
mean that the expertise and knowledge of the psy-sciences is flawed but rather that it 
is only one form of truth that is held in place by relations of power. If people are to 
make sense of a life with the object that shall, for arguments sake, be called bipolar 
disorder, it would seem that the role of mental health professionals is to assist people 
to access a range of discursive resources so that they might firstly question the ways 
of thinking and speaking to which they are exposed and then consider what it might 
mean to be a person and how to live. 
Rethinking Psychoeducation 
With an alternative conceptualization of the self the ethos of a life with bipolar 
disorder could look very different and the discursive practices of self-management 
enacted by mental health professionals in psychoeducation and psychotherapy could 
do much more that reproduce dominant beliefs about the nature of bipolar disorder 
and those who live with it. If it is through discourse that people come to understand 
who they are and what they might become then the discursive practices of self-





Changing how mental health professional enact self-management discourse on the 
basis of alternate constructions of the self is a significant undertaking given the 
dominance of discourses of science and medicine in psychiatry. It is one thing to 
speculate but entirely another to resist dominant discursive social practices. In spite 
of this, this discussion speculates on how psychoeducation might be practiced 
differently in order to allow people space to create a life with bipolar disorder that is 
not tightly regulated by psy-expertise. Given that some people with bipolar disorder 
report a helpfulness from engaging with psychiatric discourse to construct the nature 
of their condition (Fry, 2013; Russell & Browne, 2005; Straughan & Buckenham, 
2006; Suto et al., 2010), how might an approach be developed that makes use of psy-
knowledge while also making space for alternate constructions? How might 
psychoeducation make it possible for a person to consider a range of ways of being 
rather than the tightly regulated version of The Manual? How might we “nourish and 
respect the subjective, embodied and collective expertise of people diagnosed; the 
meaningfulness of feelings and the ‘irrational’…approaches that move beyond illness 
models for engaging with madness…” (Liebert, 2013a, p. 24). 
This thesis proposes an approach within mental health service provision that seeks 
to combine psychotherapy and education but from a critical and deconstructive 
perspective (Kaye, 1999; Parker, 2014), to use principles of group therapy (Yalom & 
Leszcz, 2005) and narrative therapy (Combs & Freedman, 2012) in conjunction with 
principles of critical pedagogy (Matthews, 2013; Smidt, 2014).The intent in using 
these approaches is that the normative and disciplinary practices of both 
psychotherapy and education might be made more visible and actively resisted. This 
makes it possible to acknowledge and address the practical dilemma of those 
facilitating psychoeducation groups of how to provide an optimal relational based 
learning environment whilst also remaining ‘on schedule’ with the curriculum 
(Scaturo, 2004). Arguably the term ‘psychoeducation’ becomes unhelpful given how 
it is linked to the dominance of psy-discourse. In the absence of something more 
suitable it is the term used here but with reservations. 
This alternate conceptualisation of psychoeducation is founded on particular 
assumptions about the nature of the person. Firstly a person’s sense of themselves is 





possibilities for how the self can be thought of are dependent upon the ideas and 
concepts available to a person and the ease with which they can be voiced. Secondly a 
person’s sense of themselves is understood to be relational, performative and fluid 
such that how a person understands themselves cannot exist outside of their 
relationships with others and how others experience them. The performative nature 
of self means that we become ourselves through the actions we take whilst also 
becoming ourselves through how others respond to our actions. Fluidity refers to the 
changing nature of the self such that it is not stable and contained but changes 
depending on context and relationships with others (Combs & Freedman, 2012). 
These assumptions mean that how things are spoken of, the narrative that people use 
to talk about themselves and their problems and how these narratives are created in 
dialogue with others are important tools to be used in the process of developing self-
awareness. Because a person’s sense of who they are is understood to be tied up in 
relations of power, the task of such an approach is to develop the critical thinking of 
participants, unsettle the taken for granted and make space for multiple perspectives 
so that people can develop alternative narratives of themselves and their lives. From 
a critical pedagogy perspective “[d]ialogue is a moment where humans meet to 
reflect on their reality as they make and remake it” (Shor & Freire 1986 as cited in 
(Smidt, 2014, p. 90) while group therapy16 allows a space to be created where stories 
of oneself can be told, reflected upon, questions asked and alternate narratives 
constructed about who person might be and how they might live; all within the 
context of relationships with others.  
Such an approach to psychoeducation is working within a dual perspective; that 
people can understand themselves as having a condition called bipolar disorder that 
has problematic effects both mind and body at the same time as thinking of the 
problem as located outside of the person. The practice of externalizing problems 
(Kaye, 1999) allows a focus upon the relationship a person has with bipolar disorder, 
the discourses that shape that relationship and exploring if there are other ways to 
                                                          
16 Yalom & Leszcz (2005, p1-2) propose eleven mechanisms through which group therapy can bring about 
change; instillation of hope, universality, imparting information, altruism, the corrective recapitulation of 
the primary family group, development of socialization techniques, imitative behaviour, interpersonal 
learning, group cohesiveness, catharsis and existential factors. How these are used depends upon the focus 





speak of it that don’t pathologize identity and that make space for an alternate 
relationship with the object of bipolar disorder. 
Guiding principles  
These critical, narrative approaches to psychotherapy and education in conjunction 
with the interpersonal experience of the group context suggest some potential 
principles that could act as a guide for a re-visioned psychoeducation. 
 The more resources in terms of concepts and ideas that a person has access to, 
the more choice they have about what is most useful to them. Psychiatric 
knowledge may have something to offer to the process of making sense of 
experiences known as bipolar disorder but it not the only form of knowledge 
that can be useful. 
 Both therapy and education are processes that create and reproduce relations 
of power. The intent is not to try to be neutral but to name and recognise the 
workings of power.  
 There is no ‘right’ way to have a relationship with bipolar disorder, instead the 
group is concerned with how a person decides for themselves what works 
best for them at this time in their life. 
 That the group context is an opportunity to stimulate relationships based 
upon collaboration and collectivism rather than individualism. 
 Both facilitators of the group and participants can move in and out of an 
expert role; everyone has something more to learn. 
 Unsettling taken for granted assumptions can be uncomfortable but is still a 
helpful learning tool. 
 The process of learning and developing self-awareness is as important as the 






Learning through social connection 
By bringing people together in groups and given time to be themselves, groups 
members are understood to recreate in the group their unique interpersonal 
universe and it is through this relational approach to learning about self and others 
that group therapy seeks to act (Yalom & Leszcz, 2005). Yalom & Leszcz (2005) 
explicitly adapt the principles of group therapy to different contexts including the use 
of groups for people with long-term health conditions to support adaptation, 
decrease social isolation and provide health related information and name this as 
“supportive-expressive group therapy” (Yalom & Leszcz 2005, p. 511). Using the 
principles of group therapy, narrative therapy and critical pedagogy the goals of the 
psychoeducation programme would become: 
 To create a mutually supportive environment that promotes social connection; 
 To provide an environment where participants feels able to consider their 
relationship with bipolar disorder and how they might want that to change; 
 To provide an opportunity for participants to develop skills of self-reflection 
and critical thinking as a means to grow self-awareness; and 
 To provide participants the opportunity to learn from the knowledge of 
science and medicine whilst also considering other forms of knowledge that 
might be helpful; 
Foundational conversations 
“We are always already embedded in a particular set of perspectives, operating from 
within certain positions when we try to understand ourselves and others. To be 
‘critical’ then does not mean finding the correct standpoint, but it means 
understanding how we come to stand where we are” (Parker, 2014, p. 59). Taking 
Parker’s notions of critical thinking, the content of an alternate psychoeducation 
group would be based around two foundational conversations; firstly about 







Discourse and power  
This conversation is concerned with the taken for granted assumptions that lie 
behind ideas of what bipolar disorder is and how to live with it. Ideas about what 
counts as expert knowledge would be discussed and the concept of pastoral power 
and the role of confession would offer a way to think about relationships between self 
and others, and the person with bipolar disorder and experts. Ideas about language, 
the stories we tell about ourselves and the nature of truth would also be explored as 
would a relational perspective on how we come to know who and what we are. 
Constructing bipolar disorder as an object 
This conversation is concerned with how a person constructs the object of bipolar 
disorder, what it means to them, their relationship with it and how they might want 
this relationship to change. Using narrative therapy concepts of externalization, 
dialogue would focus upon the relationships that people have with the ‘problems’ of 
bipolar disorder rather than thinking of people with bipolar disorder as problematic.  
After these foundational conversations a list of potential other information would be 
offered alongside a discussion of what group participants want to get from the group 
experience. Possible subject matter would include: 
 Exploring how psychiatry understands bipolar disorder and what might be 
both helpful and unhelpful about this. Are there alternate constructions that 
people use? 
 Medications and the dilemmas they present 
 Dialogue about the notion of personal responsibility and it’s place in a life with 
bipolar disorder 
 Debating the notion that experiences are either me or my illness and what this 
means in relation to processes of self-stigma. Choosing between self and 
illness dominates ideas about self-management of bipolar disorder but is it 
helpful to ‘slice and dice’ oneself in this way? 
 Living with shame and guilt; how to manage the unreliable self and the 






 Generating stories of connection and healing disconnection through dialogue 
about the place of other people in a life with bipolar disorder, the place of peer 
to peer relationships, stigma, how memories of others with bipolar disorder 
shapes experiences.  
 The role of circadian rhythms and the place of habits. 
 Responding to depression, hypomania and mania.  
 Relapse and crisis planning. Should one plan for the inevitable relapse? What 
sort of plans work?  
 Mindfulness approaches to managing anxiety and stress 
 How much it too much? Exploring experiences with alcohol and other drugs in 
relation to mood stability. 
 The personal is political; discussion about how one’s personal experience of 
bipolar disorder can be linked to broader social structures and the place of 
social as well as individual change; that personal attempts to find an ethos of 
life with bipolar disorder are also a political action. 
By choosing an approach that seeks to include but not be dominated by a psy-science 
view of what has come to be known as bipolar disorder, this alternate 
psychoeducation could walk a fine line between deconstructing and reproducing the 
dominant discourses  that shape notions of self-management of bipolar disorder. But 
“we will never anyway be able to arrive at something better unless the means we 
employ are consonant with the ends we desire” (Parker, 2014, p. 61) so it would 
seem more important to try something different rather than wait for the revolution 
that is needed in how we can think and speak about experiences understood to be 
bipolar disorder. 
Limitations of this Discourse Analysis 
Despite an understanding in post-structural based research that analysis and 
interpretations are inevitably multiple and partial in nature, there are two factors 
that need to be made explicit as possible limitations to this particular use of discourse 
analysis; the effect of dominant discourses upon interpretation and the author’s role 





Just as this thesis has been concerned with how the discourse of self-management is 
being drawn on by people with bipolar disorder to shape subjectivity, as a researcher 
I too have had to draw upon my own set of discursive resources in order to interpret 
the texts which may have in turn limited my field of vision to a narrower set of 
possible understandings (Cheek, 2000).  As a mental health nurse in clinical practice, 
I live daily in a world that turns to medical, psychological and scientific discourses to 
make sense of reality – discourses that both make particular assumptions about the 
nature of people and legitimate my role as an ‘expert’. While the choice of discourse 
analysis has been an explicit attempt on my part to find different ways to think and 
act, it has none the less been difficult to approach texts without searching for 
meaning and to give up long held beliefs about the ability of language to accurately 
represent authentic experience. This thesis has not explicitly challenged the notion 
that bipolar disorder is ‘real’ so I have arguably tried to have my cake and eat it too; 
to keep the door open to the possibility that something might be called bipolar 
disorder exists at the same time as critique the assumptions that lie behind the 
construct. 
I have taken the role of interviewer and therefore co-generator of some of the text 
and also interpreter of the text and this discourse analysis has not focussed upon my 
discursive practices and how this will have shaped the text. The people who engaged 
in conversations with me about the experiences of living with bipolar disorder did so 
as part of requirements to enter a research project that offered the possibility of 
accessing psychotherapy and a psychiatrist for which no payment was required. This 
suggests that the texts created were part of an exchange; ‘I will tell you what I think 
will get me accepted into a study’. Also, the interviews happened in the context of 
assumptions that bipolar disorder is a condition that exists in reality and that living 
with it can be challenging. The interview questions did not invite people to challenge 
the dominant constructions of bipolar disorder. This means the interpretations are 
limited to the context of people who understand themselves to have the condition 
known as bipolar disorder which does not allow the findings to be extended to the 








This thesis has sought to explore the effects of the discourse of self-management for 
bipolar disorder upon how a person makes sense of both themselves and how to live. 
In doing so, it has also sought to investigate the nature of the self in self-management 
discourse. Foucauldian discourse analysis has been used to tease apart the taken for 
granted assumptions of self-management of bipolar disorder, not so that in the 
dismantling process one becomes paralyzed and unable generate change but rather 
to understand how we come to think and speak of it as we do so its complex nature 
can be made clearer. In the unsettling process of seeing from a new perspective, 
alternate ways of thinking that are less likely to reproduce dominant and taken for 
granted practices become more possible. In the process of this dismantling and 
rebuilding, psychiatric practices have been made more visible and questions asked 
about the nature of its expertise and the power relations at work in a time when ideas 
about psychiatric practice as empowering have come to the fore (Parker, 2014). This 
doesn’t mean that the practices of the psy-sciences are wholly ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’, but 
rather they are all “dangerous” (Foucault, 2003d, p. 104) as they act in ways upon 
subjectivity that are neither benign nor harmless. 
People understood to have bipolar disorder can be seen to be tightly woven into 
discursive practices that construct them as ill and in need of the expertise of 
psychiatry at the same time as part of broader social structures that construct and 
prioritise forms of individuality based upon enterprise and choice, with a person’s 
health just one of the projects upon which to focus one’s enterprising nature. For 
those who actively engage with the discursive practices of self-management for 
bipolar disorder it can act as a form of capital; something they can trade for the right 
to be seen as a neo-liberal citizen, just like everyone else. But this appears to be at the 
cost of processes of self-formation that are driven by practices of intense self-
surveillance, reflexivity and moderation that are motivated by fear and shame. For a 
person understood to have bipolar disorder one’s relationship with oneself is infused 
with practices based on division and contradiction that is always being mediated and 
regulated by psy-experts and their claims to know the truth of what it means to be 
human. This discussion has also drawn attention to how our notion of the nature of 





Using ideas of ontological pluralism and the abject, ways of thinking about the self as 
something ‘naturally’ slippery and uncontained have been proposed. 
In a similar vein to Wenier’s (2011) ethnographic study, this discourse analysis has 
identified the limitations of contemporary self-management practices. As she argues, 
current approaches to the management of bipolar disorder construct a paradox that 
both presumes and eludes rationality as “…we now have a technical means by which 
we can manage ourselves, but those very means also communicate the fact of our 
necessarily incomplete autonomy.” (Weiner, 2011, p. 480). This results in people with 
bipolar disorder enacting forms of responsibility that acknowledge the self as never 
entirely knowable or controllable. This discourse analysis supports but also aims to 
build upon this by arguing that what is needed is a radical rethinking of self-
management practices so that they do not embed the paradox in the first place. 
What this discourse analysis has not done is to consider if or how a discourse of self-
management might be implicated in processes of self-formation for people who 
actively resist or rebel against a psy-science version of their experiences. Perhaps 
they are able to use the discourses of science, psychology and medicine to find helpful 
ways to make sense of how best to live their lives but if so at what price might this 
occur as those considered lacking in ‘insight’ are also likely to be the people 
constructed by others to be the most ‘difficult’ and ‘complex’; the group of people 
often most marginalized by broader social structures and institutions. 
The discursive practices of self-management are not going to disappear any time 
soon as they are tightly connected to the dominant discourses of contemporary 
Western society. If anything, their perceived value will grow as technologies are 
sought that will reduce the escalating cost of health care. It behoves us then to 
understand both the strengths and weaknesses of self-management practices from a 
range of paradigms. A discursive approach allows us to think about how we are all 
positioned by the discourses available to us to make sense of who and what we are. 
By proposing an alternate approach to psychoeducation (for want of a better name 
for the practice), this thesis is seeking to respond to the discursive practices of self-
management for bipolar disorder by changing how it can be spoken of. Given the 





practice this is no small undertaking, but one that none-the-less that seeks to 
contribute to a more liberal psychiatric practice. 
“I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if by that one 
means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct 
of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of 
completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the 
management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practices of self, 
what will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as 
possible.”  
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Māori Glossary  
Ahau: I, self 
Iwi: tribe, nation 
Mākutu: incantation 
Mate: illness, death, misfortune 
Noa: free of ancestral presence 
Ora: health, wellbeing, alive 
Pākehā: New Zealand European 
Rangatira: chief, noble person 
Tāne: male 
Tapu: scared, ancestral presence 
Te Ao: daytime, the everyday 
Te Po: the night, the place of ancestors 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi: The Treaty of Waitangi 
Wahine: female 







DSM 5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) Diagnostic criteria for bipolar 
disorder 
Diagnostic Criteria for Manic Episode (p. 124) 
A. A distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive or 
irritable mood and abnormally and persistently increased goal-directed 
activity or energy, lasting at least a week and present most of the day, nearly 
every day (or any duration if hospitalization is necessary). 
B. During the period of mood disturbance and increased energy or activity, three 
(or more) of the following symptoms (four if the mood is only irritable) are 
present to a significant degree and represent a noticeable change from usual 
behaviour: 
1. Inflated self-esteem or grandiosity 
2. Decreased need for sleep (e.g feels rested after only 3 hours sleep). 
3. More talkative than usual or pressure to keep talking. 
4. Flight of ideas or subjective experience that thoughts are racing. 
5. Distractibility (i.e., attention too easily drawn to unimportant or irrelevant 
external stimuli), as reported or observed. 
6. Increase in goal-directed activity (either socially, at work or school, or 
sexually) or psychomotor agitation (i.e., purposeless non-goal-directed 
activity). 
7. Excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for painful 
consequences (e.g., engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual 
indiscretions, or foolish business investments). 
C. The mood disturbance is sufficiently severe to cause marked impairment in 
social or occupational functioning or to necessitate hospitalization to prevent 
harm to self or others, or there are psychotic features. 
D. The episode is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 







Diagnostic Criteria for Hypomanic Episode (p. 124-125) 
A. A distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive or 
irritable mood and abnormally and persistently increased goal-directed 
activity or energy, lasting at least 4 consecutive days and present most of the 
day, nearly every day. 
B. During the period of mood disturbance and increased energy or activity, three 
(or more) of the following symptoms (four if the mood is only irritable) have 
persisted, represent a noticeable change from usual behaviour, and have been 
present to a significant degree: 
1. Inflated self-esteem or grandiosity 
2. Decreased need for sleep (e.g feels rested after only 3 hours sleep). 
3. More talkative than usual or pressure to keep talking. 
4. Flight of ideas or subjective experience that thoughts are racing. 
5. Distractibility (i.e., attention too easily drawn to unimportant or irrelevant 
external stimuli), as reported or observed. 
6. Increase in goal-directed activity (either socially, at work or school, or 
sexually) or psychomotor agitation (i.e., purposeless non-goal-directed 
activity). 
7. Excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for painful 
consequences (e.g., engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual 
indiscretions, or foolish business investments). 
C. The episode is associated with an unequivocal change in functioning that is 
uncharacteristic of the individual when not symptomatic. 
D. The disturbance in mood and the change in functioning are observable to 
others 
E. The episode is not severe enough to cause marked impairment in social or 
occupational functioning or to necessitate hospitalization. If there are 
psychotic features, the episode is, by definition, manic. 
F. The episode is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 






Diagnostic Criteria for Depressive Episode (p. 125) 
A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 
2-week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one 
of the symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or 
pleasure. 
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either 
subjective report (e.g, feels sad, empty or hopeless) or observations made 
of by others (e.g., appears tearful) 
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities 
most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account 
or observation). 
3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of 
more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day. 
4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by 
others; not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed 
down). 
6. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may 
be delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about 
being sick). 
8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every 





Appendix 2  
Semi-structured interview schedule 
1. What is it like to live with bipolar disorder? 
2. How long did it take for a Dr to tell you, you have bipolar? 
3. Tell me about some of the ideas you had when your mood was high (ie during mania) 
4. How long do you think the condition will last? 
5. How do you deal with it?  
6. How successful do you think you’ve been at living with bipolar? 
7. What do you think of the idea that someone with bipolar disorder can learn to 
manage their condition? 
8. How much difference is there between how you live with bipolar and how other 
people expect you to do it? E.g. are there things you do that others think you 
shouldn’t?  
9. What do you think caused bipolar disorder in you? 
10. What did your family/whanau think was the cause of your illness? 
11. How do you think your bipolar will affect you in the future? 
12. What do you think your bipolar medications are doing for you? 
13. Do you have any worries or concerns about being on the medications? 
14. What do you most want your medications to do for you? 
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The experiences now known as bipolar disorder have a long history as a focus of attention 
for psychiatry; from la folie circulaire (circular disorder) to manic depressive insanity to 
present day bipolar disorder (Goodwin & Jamison, 2007) psychiatry has worked hard to 
know, define and claim expertise in the treatment of the disorder. As with many other 





mental health care there is an expectation that people can learn to live a life that is 
conducive to limiting relapse and when a relapse does happen, an expectation that the 
person can learn to see the early signs of impending illness and take appropriate action 
(Colom & Vieta, 2006; Suto, Murray, Hale, Amari, & Michalak, 2010). As part of this 
movement toward greater self-management by individuals with long term health 
conditions, mental health clinicians have led the development of psychoeducation as an 
intervention. Psychoeducation seeks to integrate a psychotherapeutic and educational 
approach to the way information is shared with people living with long-term conditions so 
that they learn more about the condition they are understood to have and how best to live 
with it (Ryglewicz, 1991). It is an intervention that is now recognised as an essential part 
of mental health care for people with bipolar disorder (Poole, Simpson, & Smith, 2012; 
Stern & Sin, 2012) to the point where it seems ‘common sense’ to expect that a person can 
learn to manage their own condition and to do so offers the possibility of a greater sense of 
control over one’s own life. Who would not want this? 
As a complex set of health practices that rely upon language and specialised knowledge, 
mental health care is an ideal practice for discourse analysis. People who are understood to 
have a mental disorder become part of psychiatry’s discursive practices and as such they 
are called to understand themselves as a patient with an often incurable disorder. It appears 
that by engaging in this process, (whether with agreement, ambivalence or resistance) the 
subjectivity of diagnosed people is being transformed by psychiatric discourse and 
practices (Estroff, 1989; Terkselsen, 2009). This chapter is concerned with investigating 
the practice of psychoeducation for bipolar disorder as a way to ask questions of an 
intervention that seems to have reached the status of ‘taken for granted’ in order to 





By applying a discourse analysis methodology based upon Parker (1992) and the writings 
of Michel Foucault, this chapter will investigate how the discursive practices of psychiatry 
produce our understanding of what bipolar disorder is and in the process, shape what it 
means to be a person with bipolar disorder. The Psychoeducation Manual for Bipolar 
Disorder (Colom & Vieta, 2006) has been chosen as the text for analysis because of its 
place as one of the few published, evidence based guides for clinicians that provides high 
levels of detail about the content of a psychoeducation programme for bipolar disorder. As 
such it provides an example of the psychiatric discourse about the nature of bipolar 
disorder and how people are expected to live with it.  
After providing an introduction to the experience known as bipolar disorder we will 
discuss the theoretical concepts of discourse, power relations, and subject positions that are 
central to our approach to discourse analysis. Then, using illustrations from the chosen 
text, we will show how the discursive practices of psychiatry construct bipolar disorder as 
an illness located in the brain that only psychiatry and science have the authority to treat. 
When constructed as an illness, the experiences associated with it have no meaning beyond 
being symptoms and it is imperative that it must be treated with medication. In the text a 
person with bipolar disorder becomes a ‘bipolar patient’ with attributes of reflexivity and 
deference to experts.  
Bipolar disorder 
Bipolar disorder is constructed as a disorder of mood in which people experience recurrent 
episodes of moods constructed by psychiatric discourse as mania, hypomania, depression 
or mixed episodes. Mania is constructed as episodes of “abnormally, persistently elevated, 
expansive or irritable mood and persistently increased activity or energy” that results in 





2013, p. 124). Hypomania is constructed as a similar state but of a lesser intensity thus not 
requiring intervention in a person’s life, either through hospitalisation or stepping in to 
take over a person’s day to day responsibilities. Depression is constructed as periods of 
persistently low mood, often associated with a loss of pleasure in usual activities causing 
impairment in day to day functioning. Mixed mood episodes are constructed as occurring 
when a person experiences symptoms of mania or hypomania at the same time as 
symptoms of depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
To date psychiatry has no cure for bipolar disorder so those diagnosed with it are required 
to learn skills to manage it over the long-term. Psychoeducation is an accepted practice to 
enable the person to manage their disorder and there are now a significant amount of 
claims to support its use in mental health services for a range of conditions (Bauml, 
Frobose, Kraemer, Rentrop, & Pitschel-Walz, 2006; Chien & Leung, 2013; Lucksted, 
McFarlane, Downing, & Dixon, 2012). The most prolific authors on psychoeducation for 
bipolar disorder have been Francesc Colom and Eduard Vieta  (Colom & Lam, 2005; 
Colom et al., 2003a; Colom et al., 2003b; Colom et al., 2009; Vieta, 2005) and they have 
used their research to produce a text for mental health clinicians called “Psychoeducation 
Manual for Bipolar Disorder” (Colom & Vieta, 2006). Henceforth referred to here as The 
Manual, it provides detailed instructions on how to run a psychoeducation programme for 
people with bipolar disorder. The Manual was developed out of the research work of the 
University of Barcelona Hospital Clinic Bipolar Disorders Program which according to its 
website is “devoted to generating, disseminating and applying knowledge on outcome, 
treatment and prevention of bipolar disorder” (http://www.bipolarclinic.org)  
The intention of The Manual is very explicit; to take the “common sense” clinical 
knowledge of the disorder that research has shown reduces relapses of the condition and 





disorder better, live with it, progress with it, take their medication more effectively and 
understand why the medication needs to be taken.” (xvi) While written for clinicians, it 
contains information about how psychiatry constructs the condition, how psychiatry treats 
it and advice written specifically for the person with the disorder about how they should 
conduct themselves in relation to bipolar disorder.  
Discourse, power and subject positions 
Discourse analysis is concerned with how human experience is structured by language. 
Rather than language being seen as able to represent reality, in discourse analysis it is 
assumed that how we can think about ourselves and our experience of the world is 
determined by the language, ideas, concepts available to us; they shape what it is possible 
to say or not say about a particular thing and they do so within both a social and historical 
context. Discourse analysis is perhaps best described as a sensitivity to language and its 
productive nature such that analysis of text is focused upon what is done by language 
rather than what is meant (Crowe, 2005) (Willig, 2001)). In this methodology language is 
understood as one mechanism by which people come to think and know themselves. 
Our approach to discourse analysis has been shaped by Ian Parker’s work (1992), and he in 
turn has been influenced by the work of Michel Foucault. Discourse analysis is notorious 
as a research methodology without a set of ‘rules’ to follow and Parker is at pains to point 
out that his approach is not a step by step guide. What he does provide is a broad 
theoretical framework for understanding the nature of discourse and its role in human life 
which is then used to shape the questions that can be asked by the analysis. Foucauldian 
inspired discourse analysis is concerned with “what kind of objects and subjects are 
constructed through discourse and what kinds of ways-of-being these object and subjects 





Discourse is understood here as “a system of statements which construct an object” [italics 
in original] (Parker, 1992, p. 5). This includes practices or things that are done that use 
discourse. For example, the discourse of psychiatry constructs the object of mental illness 
in particular ways. One of the ways that these ideas are reproduced and ‘put to work’ is 
through the text known as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of which DSM 5 as the 
most recent edition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Through the discursive 
practice of a comprehensive assessment, clinicians use this text to decide how best to make 
sense of a person’s difficulties and give a diagnosis. This diagnosis is then shared with the 
person and their family, recorded in their file for others to refer to and used to construct a 
letter to the person’s family doctor. Through this assemblage of processes discourse can be 
seen to be shaping what can and cannot be said about the person’s experience. 
As well as constructing objects, discourses also make available particular ways of being in 
the world or subject positions (Willig, 2001). To further our example, the person who sees 
a clinician for a comprehensive psychiatric assessment can occupy the position of ‘patient’ 
or ‘client’ or ‘service user’ or ‘consumer’. Each of these terms ‘call’ to the person in a 
particular way, such that a person comes to understand (not necessarily consciously) that 
particular attributes go with each of these positions. In order to make sense of what is 
being ‘said’ a person must come to see themselves in a particular way (Parker, 1992) and 
the psychiatric discourse makes available a space for different sorts of selves to step in. 
We also understand discourses as reproducing relations of power. The discourse of 
psychiatry dominates our contemporary understandings of what it means to be ‘mentally 
ill’ and people who do not use psychiatric discourse to make sense of their difficulties are 
often named as lacking in insight. In this sense discourse is understood to be productive as 






With these theoretical underpinnings in mind and the methodological steps offered by 
Parker (1992), the following questions acted as the starting point for analysis: 
How does the text construct bipolar disorder as an object? What knowledge is used to 
construct bipolar disorder as an object? To finish the statement ‘bipolar disorder is...’ and 
‘a person with bipolar disorder is...’ as a means to explore the use of metaphor in 
construction of both object and subject. What ways of being in the world does the text 
make available to people understood to have bipolar disorder? And what sort of 
relationship are people with bipolar disorder expected to have with the object? 
Findings 
Bipolar disorder as an object to be medicated 
Bipolar disorder as constructed in The Manual is first and foremost a biologically based 
illness that is located in the brain; 
“Try to explain the bipolar disorders by focusing in 
particular on its biological aspects; in other word, 
starting by its definition as a brain disorder: the bipolar 
disorder is a disorder that affects the limbic system, 
neurotransmitters, and the endocrine system. In this case, 
even though this is an oversimplification, we will avoid any 
comment about the interaction of these causes with others, 
or a rather psychological or social nature, because this may 
add confusion.” (p55)  
The understanding of bipolar disorder as a brain based disorder is a necessary pre-requisite 
for enforcing the need for medication as the only treatment option. As a brain disorder, the 





clinician beyond being symptoms of an illness. The psychiatric construction of the disorder 
is the only permitted construction within psychoeducation sessions. Alternative 
constructions are dismissed or derided; 
“What often happens is that mystic or religious exaltation 
presents itself in the context of manic episode and it is 
nothing more than one of its symptoms, so that it goes away 
when the mania is treated. To explain this point easily and 
amicably, we usually joke about it and say that ‘we don’t 
have a problem with you talking to God through prayer, but 
we would be worried if you actually heard Him answer you’.” 
(p82) 
Any attempt to understand mania or hypomania as a positive or purposeful experience is a 
myth to be dispelled; 
“During the session we should stress the pathological nature 
of both mania and hypomania, since many of our patients see 
hypomania as ‘a blessing’ or ‘a gift’. In these instances it 
would be useful for us to remind them that: (a) during 
hypomania people usually make the wrong decisions, (b) not 
all the symptoms of hypomania are pleasant... and (c) 
hypomania almost always leads to another immediate episode 
that involves greater  suffering...” (p80) 
When experiences such as these can only able to be spoken of as symptoms of an illness 
that episodically recurs, it becomes vital to be able to “differentiate normal emotions from 





relapse. Psychiatric discourse is reproduced in psychoeducation sessions by marginalizing 
any alternative explanations. 
As an ‘illness’, bipolar disorder must be treated by medication and psychoeducation is an 
intervention that reinforces to people this “fundamental aspect of their treatment: its 
biological nature and the need for drugs.” (p53). While The Manual is in the business of 
persuading people that psychological interventions for bipolar disorder are important, this 
cannot in any way be seen to be at the expense of medication. Psychological treatments 
“must always be combined with mood-stabilizer treatment and many times with an 
antidepressant.” (p123) and “it is absolutely necessary for the therapist to...make it clear 
that the medication is absolutely necessary, including writing it on the blackboard if 
necessary...” (p54) 
Significant time is dedicated in the programme to medication related issues and the 
problem of non-adherence to medication regimes is addressed in a section of The Manual 
dedicated to defining forms of non-adherence, the reasons for it and how to combat it; 
“Chart 1. Types of poor treatment adherence 
8. Absolute poor adherence. This refers to the complete 
negligence of the patient in following the indications of 
the responsible therapist... 
9. Selective partial adherence. Certain patients selectively 
reject a certain type of treatment but not another.... 
10. Intermittent adherence...Many patients do not 
completely abandon the treatment but neither do they take 
it as prescribed.... 
11. Late adherence...some patients show initial resistance 





start taking the medication prescribed after a few 
relapses... 
12. Late poor adherence. After 2 or 3 years of good 
adherence, some patients start abandoning their mood 
stabilizers without apparent reason... 
13. Abuse...Taking more medication is also a rather common 
form of poor adherence among bipolar patients... 
14. Behavioural poor adherence. The term ‘poor 
adherence’...also includes aspects concerning the attitude 
and behaviour of the patient...obeying clinician’s 
instructions as to the regularity of sleep habits and 
other advisable behaviour that may facilitate euthymia, 
such as not consuming alcohol or other toxics...” 
(p105/106) 
Treatment of bipolar disorder with medication is an imperative and a great deal of time and 
text is dedicated to making this point. 
The process of subject construction 
Ensuring the authority of a psychiatric discourse to know bipolar disorder and the people 
understood to have the condition is central to the psychoeducation practices described in 
The Manual. To ensure adherence to these constructions the text can be seen to use some 
specific discursive tactics. 
Firstly, The Manual often uses interdictory flavoured language when describing the role of 
patients within psychoeducation; “patients are allowed to get involved freely when they 
think it is necessary...” (p 49), “we will warn them that failing to respect some of these 





forced to leave the group.” (p58) and “the mood-chart technique, that the patient must 
master by the end of the session.” (p93). 
Secondly, it makes no space for debate about the nature or treatment of bipolar disorder;  
“It is absolutely necessary for the therapist to present, 
from the beginning of the group sessions, both treatments 
not as opposed but as complementary, and to make it clear 
that the medication is absolutely necessary, including 
writing it on the blackboard if necessary. Otherwise, ‘an 
antipsychiatry’ type of thinking may immerge...”(p54) 
Thirdly, whenever The Manual does refer to alternative views on the nature or treatment  
of bipolar disorder there is often what can be read as a disparaging tone to the text; 
 “...the first contact between a patient and a psychological 
treatment can be crucial in explaining the subsequent 
response to treatment. We are not now going to digress into 
mysteries of other paradigms about whether or not to shake 
hands with our patients and look them in the eye. In 
principle, they are your hands, your patients and your eyes, 
so do whatever common sense tells you.” (p 40) 
As with the process of excluding any other possible explanation for the person’s 
experiences, the need for medication is positioned as the only possible response.  
And finally, the overt disapproval of alternate constructions of bipolar disorder are 
complemented by a tone of address to patients that suggests the knowledge of the psy-
sciences is necessary but complex and therefore requires simplification for patients. The 





Three Little Pigs is converted into the story of The Three Little Bipolar Pigs as a way to 
illustrate the biological nature of bipolar disorder and the importance of a person’s attitude 
toward it;  
“The first one simply did not believe what h is veterinarian 
told him and thought that bipolar disorder was an illness 
that had been made up by psychiatrists or was a fairytale, 
so he never changed the way he behaved...The second little 
pig is the story agreed to take the medication his 
psychiatrist suggested, even more so at his family’s 
insistence...The mistake he made was in thinking that 
medication alone would help keep his mood stable...The third 
little pig joined a psychoeducation group for little bipolar 
pigs. This activity...led him to take all the necessary 
precautions to avoid the dreaded relapses: he took his 
medication and paid attention to this doctor’s orders and 
those of his psychologist...he tried to get enough 
sleep...[h]e paid attention to his wife’s comments...he even 
learned to identify the signs of  relapse in time...Out of 
all the little pigs in this story, he was the wisest pig of 
all, and there are some who say that some pigs are smarter 
than people.” (p 69,70) 
While the use of this story comes with a caveat that clinicians need to be able to walk a 
fine between “comical and disrespectful comments” (p 68), it is still none-the less 
presented as one way to educate people about bipolar disorder and it does so in way that 
uses simple, almost childlike methods to instruct. It is as if no one with bipolar disorder 





the question of what would happen if a clinician had bipolar disorder and attended a 
psychoeducation group. 
Constructing the surveilling self 
At the same time as the nature of bipolar disorder is discursively produced as a recurring 
brain disorder that must be medicated, The Manual makes available particular subject 
positions or ways of being in the world for the person who is understood to have this 
condition. As a person under the jurisdiction of psy-sciences the person with bipolar 
disorder becomes a “patient” and a “bipolar patient” in particular. As a bipolar patient, 
they are called to be reflexive, to work upon their thoughts and defer to experts. 
Reflexivity 
A crucial attribute of a bipolar patient is their capacity to examine themselves and in the 
light of this examination make changes to what they do and think. The first stage in being 
able to do this is the ability to separate the normal for abnormal. Firstly for hypomania and 
mania; 
“We always recommend differentiating between hypomania and 
non-pathological happiness.” (p 80) 
And then again in the next session on understanding the symptoms of depression; 
“We will again insist on the need to differentiate normal 
emotions from pathological ones.”( p 85) 
Then group members are expected to learn to recognise their unique version of bipolar 
disorder; 
“...always emphasize the need to individualize the knowledge 





of bipolar disorder but about my bipolar disorder.” (p 163) 
[italics in original] 
These skills are particularly pertinent to the process of learning to predict and respond to 
signs of relapse. A patient who can individualize can take the generic information about 
bipolar disorder they have been given and apply it to themselves; 
“Step 2: Individualization – identification of one’s own 
warnings or operational warnings. The goal of this step is 
to individualize, that is adapt the information from Step 1 
to everyone’s particular case. We try to have the patients 
to identify which warning signs appear regularly in each 
type of episode.” (p 158) 
A patient who can specialize can take their ability to examine themselves one step further; 
“Step 3: Specialization – prodromes of prodromes, or early 
warning signs...in this step the patient claims 
‘specialization’ in their own case, beyond knowledge of 
their own relapse signs. The point is to identify the 
signals that precede the warning signs – ‘warnings of 
warnings’.” (p 159) 
Each of these steps now needs to be completed for each abnormal mood state so that a list 
can be created and used daily as a means to examine oneself and determine what needs 
changing; 
“If after reviewing the list, you match one or one of the 





If you match two items for 3 days in a row, you should 
consult with your support person. 
If you match three or more items in a single day, it is time 
to put an emergency plan into effect.”( p 162) 
A bipolar patient becomes a prudent planner who can separate the normal from the 
pathological, name, list and rank symptoms by their importance, monitor themselves via 
their lists of warning signs and plan for the inevitable relapse. 
This self-surveilling subject position also requires the bipolar patient to recognise both the 
problems and potentials associated with their thoughts and attitudes. Thoughts are 
problematic due to the way they indicate the presence of actual or potential illness; 
“The handling of depressive or negative cognitions, which 
also appear in some euthymic patients, is extremely delicate 
during a group psychoeducation session, because having the 
patients begin to sympathize with such cognitions must be 
avoided, especially those that have to do with the disorder 
(‘we’re a bunch of losers’, ‘what lousy luck – we’d be 
better off dead’, ‘we’ll never do anything good,’ etc.)” (p 
42) 
While thoughts are a problem, they also offer the way to bring about change in a person; 
“The attitude toward the disorder and the health beliefs of 
each patient play a highly significant role in the emergence 
of poor adherence; obviously, bipolar patients who firmly 
believe that they can control their mood by themselves will 





Bipolar patients are therefore called upon to intervene in their thoughts; 
“We can propose that the group debate blame vs. 
responsibility, by contrasting how thoughts of blame are 
useless and unproductive, and how useful, on the other hand, 
feelings of responsibility are.” (p 74) 
And change their attitude toward themselves; 
“He was aware that this attitude involved scarifies 
[spelling mistake in original], but since he was a smart 
little pig, he understood that it was worthwhile to live a 
moderate life in exchange for something as important as his 
happiness and personal stability.” (p 70) 
Surveillance of one’s thoughts and attitudes is a central aspect of this subject position. The 
bipolar patient becomes both a prudent planner and someone who understands the way 
their thinking can both act as means to measure illness and as a means to bring about 
change in themselves. Despite this, the bipolar patient doesn’t always act as he or she 
should so this requires them to be able to recognise their mistakes and then tell others; 
“This session, and one of the previous ones, is rather 
propitious for confessions of poor adherence by the 
patients, which is very positive both for patients who speak 
sincerely and for their group mates. If this happens, we 
will try to have patients explain their reasons without 
being interrupted by the rest of the group and we will not 
adopt under any circumstances an openly critical attitude. 
Our first reaction must always be to thank the patient for 





such a significant problem both to (we) therapists as well 
as to the other members of the group.” (p 140,141) 
The importance of the admission of wrong doing and the opportunity it offers people with 
bipolar disorder to come to know, examine and change themselves is underscored by the 
strong directive given to clinicians about how they must act in this situation. Through the 
practice of confession the group member takes “the role of the self-examinatory, self-
reflective subject who needs both [to] tell and recognize the truth” (Hook, 2003, p. 612) of 
their self.  
While the capacity for reflexivity can be understood as an attribute of contemporary 
subjectivity for all people (Giddens, 1991), for bipolar patients it is a central attribute to be 
cultivated, especially if psychoeducation is to be successful. There appears to be an 
intensified expectation that a bipolar patient can and will examine their thoughts, emotions 
and behaviours in line with the doctrine of psychiatry, confess mistakes and then adjust 
themselves accordingly. 
Deferring to the expert 
As a bipolar patient, the person is also called to see themselves as someone who defers to 
expert knowledge on what it means to have bipolar disorder and there are a number of 
ways that this subject position can be taken up.  
People who defer to the experts comply with a psy-science way of understanding what 
bipolar is and voice this to others; 
“Participation in this group implies ‘confession’ in front 






They will take medication and encourage others to do so; 
“Once again, it will be very positive if it is not the 
psychologist or psychiatrist who appears to be the only 
defender of the need to take medication, even though 
obviously he would already have taken this position in front 
of the group; it is appropriate for patients themselves to 
advise good adherence.” (p140) 
If psychoeducation has been successful, they will recognise themselves as the third little 
pig in The Three Little Bipolar Pigs tale; 
“The third little pig joined a psychoeducation group for 
little bipolar pigs. This activity, in addition to 
reasonable behaviour and being highly motivated not to 
relapse (he knew he enjoyed life a lot more during periods 
of euthymia), led him to take all the necessary precautions 
to avoid the dreaded relapse; he took his medication and 
paid attention to his doctor’s order and those of this 
psychologist.” (p70) 
 
The bipolar patient who resists the knowledge of bipolar as a brain disorder that needs 
medication and therefore does not defer to psy-expertise becomes instead a rebellious 
patient; 
These are more ‘open’ session; in other words, sessions in 
which the patients are invited more to give their opinion 
concerning the topic discussed. The purpose of this approach 





attitudes are being handled by our patients in order to find 
out exactly on what point we must emphasize, and to 
understand what prejudices they have in connection with the 
disorder, since they are often dominated by guilt. Certain 
patients react [to] explanations with resistance; in this 
case, the better strategy is to allow the members of the 
group to discuss between them the contents of the sessions 
rather than for us to act as defense [spelling in original] 
lawyers for the medical model, since if we do so quite a few 
patients will accuse us of having corporate-like attitudes. 
In exchange, if it is another patient that defines the 
biological character of the bipolar disorder and the need 
for treatment, the ‘rebel’ patient is left without weight 
arguments. (P54) 
The rebel patient is constructed as someone who simply needs to be persuaded of the error in their 
thinking and psychoeducation is presented as the means by which this lack of understanding will 
be rectified; 
Incomprehension is an opportunistic illness that exacerbates 
the course of psychiatric disorders…[p]atients who do not 
know their disorder do not know their lives… (P27)  
A lack of understanding is constructed as something to be cured by medicine, just like an illness. 
At the same time, lack of awareness of one’s bipolar disorder is also constructed as part of the 
disorder itself; 
Subjects suffering a manic episode do not recognize that 
they are ill [italics in original] and they might resist 





As is a lack of trust; 
…problems such as irritability or lack of trust that often 
arise from the psychopathology itself, which can be an 
obstacle to receiving proper treatment. (P26) 
Everything about the non-conforming patient is to be explained by the brain disorder they are 
understood to have such that people who resist the knowledge of psy-experts are no longer 
complex creatures with multiple and conflicting motivations and beliefs, they are simply 
displaying the characteristic “high rates of illness insight” (p53). 
Clinical relevance 
With psychoeducation now a recognised education based psychological intervention that 
promotes the self-managing capacities of people with bipolar disorder, it appears to have 
taken on the status of common sense – who would not want to be better informed about the 
condition they have? But it is it’s taken for granted status that makes it of interest to 
discourse analysis which offers a means to stand back from the ideas and the language of 
psychoeducation and treat it as just one truth among many, held in a place of dominance 
by language and power (Parker 1992). In this way it is possible to reflect on what it is we 
do as mental health clinicians when we think and speak; from the assessment of problems 
understood to effect the mind through to the treatment of emotional distress, language acts 
as the primary technology by which mental health clinicians act upon others. The 
productive nature of language in combination with clinicians’ role as discursive 
practitioners also draws attention to the therapeutic potential in prompting people 
experiencing mental distress to explore the assumptions they hold about themselves and 






By focusing on a psychoeducation text for bipolar disorder we have identified how the 
language and practices of psychiatry tightly regulates the object known as bipolar disorder 
and the person with the condition. Using The Manual as our point of reference, to live 
successfully with bipolar disorder explicitly requires people to take on a way of thinking 
and acting that conforms to psychiatric assumptions of normality and engage in practices 
of self-governance mandated only by psychiatry. This means that any talk of a possible 
social or relational location for a person’s difficulties are effectively silenced, as are 
emotions such as trust, shame and guilt. 
This discourse analysis also draws attention to how the text acts as a form of disciplinary 
power that Foucault called pastoral power (Foucault, 2003d). It brings together notions of 
salvation, self-sacrifice, attention to the individual and the importance of knowing the 
individual’s inner world and a style of power relations that is common in health and 
welfare practices of care (Foucault, 2003a; Toll & Crumpler, 2004). Instead of saving the 
soul it is a person’s physical and psychological health that is in need of saving while it is 
the knowledge of the psy-sciences that acts as the authority and means by which to know a 
person’s inner world. It is all “...those tender and beneficial forms of attention and 
regulation operating on the basis of the mechanism of love, or some heart-felt ‘calling’, 
which nonetheless serve state power-interests even whilst facilitating greater well-being.” 
(Hook, 2003, p. 617). As such it highlights the asymmetrical nature of power relations in a 
practice that is more usually constructed as empowering and promoting agency in the 
individual with bipolar disorder (Stafford & Colom, 2013; Smith, Jones, & Simpson, 
2010). 
Through the way The Manual uses language to sanction its view on the truth, it takes on 
the appearance of a rule book, a list of do’s and don’ts and as such brings with it a sense of 





ideas of pastoral power suggest, health care practices including psychoeducation are 
provided from a desire to heal suffering and not exacerbate it. What this analysis suggests 
is that while that may be the stated intention, psychoeducation practices may also be acting 
upon subjectivity in ways that are undesirable. 
Summary 
Using a Foucauldian inspired discourse analysis we have shown how in a psychiatric 
discourse everything about the person with bipolar disorder is interpreted in terms of the 
condition they are understood to have and how the psy-sciences have a tightly regulated 
way of constructing what bipolar disorder is and an equally all-encompassing approach to 
understanding the person who is understood to have the condition. This discourse analysis 
also demonstrates the productive capacity of discourse and the way it makes it possible to 
think in certain ways and exclude others. Psychiatric and scientific discourse makes 
particular things thinkable and understandable (Parker, 2004; Rose, 1999a) and in doing so 
creates a particular space to play out one’s life on the basis of knowledge that stakes out 
the boundaries of those things are permissible and those that break the rules. Using 
techniques of a secular pastorate, psychoeducation calls people called to take on a way of 
understanding and caring for the self that relies only upon the authority of medical science 
because of its truthfulness and trustworthiness. Any attempt by people with bipolar 
disorder to think and speak outside of these positions them as lacking self awareness which 
for psychiatry makes them potentially suffering a relapse.  
But what does it mean for a person’s sense of self if they are ambivalent about psychiatry’s 
views on bipolar disorder? What about those who recognise themselves in the tale of the 
three little bipolar pigs but are not able to live to its standards? Those deemed successful at 





while those who don’t or can’t would seem to be left with few ways to make sense of 
themselves beyond unruly, oppositional or resistant. 
Clinical practice highlights 
1. Psychiatric discourse dominates how bipolar disorder can be understood and in 
the process provides a limited vision of how a person can live with it 
successfully. 
2. Engaging in practices of self-management enters people into relations of power 
that are not necessarily empowering in nature. 
3. Discourse analysis provides one way for mental health clinicians to step back 
from the way they use language, consider the effect it has upon subjectivity and 
change how they use words as a result. 
4. Mental health clinicians are ideally positioned to develop ways of working with 
people that allows space to explore assumptions about self and others and find 
ways of constructing experience that are enabling. 
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